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This dissertation is an in-depth exploration of lame duck sessions 
of Congress.  The old conventional wisdom, that lame duck sessions of 
Congress were insignificant periods where Congress conducted some 
housecleaning by passing minor bills left over from the regular session, 
ignores a key factor: elections.  Elections do not just affect the 
composition of the next Congress; they also affect the legislative output of 
the current one.  Specifically, when elections result in changes in partisan 
control, particularly from unified to divided government and vice versa, 
leaders and rank-and-file members of the political party on the way out 
have an incentive to pass more significant legislation before they 
relinquish the reins of power. 
 
My research provides the theoretical basis for this expectation, 
weighing the different electoral permutations and discussing issues of 
representation, electoral mandates, and ideological polarization.  
Building on previous work, I create a statistical model that incorporates 
electoral results with measures of legislative significance and party 
polarization.  Although this model is based on data from 1877 to 1995, it 
predicts with some accuracy the legislative outputs of subsequent lame 
duck sessions of Congress. 
To provide a broader context, the dissertation includes a historical 
overview going back to the founding of the Republic, a review of relevant 
literature, and in-depth case studies of the three most recent lame duck 
sessions (2008, 2010, and 2012).  The case studies go hand-in-hand with 
the statistical model, validating the conclusion that elections help 
determine the number and significance of laws enacted during 
subsequent lame duck sessions.  Scrutiny of the output of lame duck 
sessions is a significant departure from the existing literature and is 
central to my contribution.  Ultimately, this dissertation provides a 
theoretical and statistical basis for the hypothesis that changes in partisan 
control of one or more chambers of Congress – or the White House – 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
i. Why study lame ducks? 
 
In the 2012 film Lincoln, Steven Spielberg focuses his biopic on the 
January 1865 struggle to pass the 13th Amendment abolishing slavery.1  
At various points throughout the film, Lincoln and his advisors solicit 
support for the proposal from lame duck members of Congress.  They 
offer federal patronage to Democrats who would not support abolition if 
they were worried about future election prospects but, having lost their 
bids for re-election, were now free to vote as they wished and also 
looking for new jobs.  Thanks to a combination of bargaining, cajoling, 
and Lincoln’s own charisma, the Amendment passes by two votes in the 
movie’s climactic scene.2 
                                                
1 Zelikow, Philip.  2012.  “Steven Spielberg: Historian,” The New York 
Times (November 29), available at 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/29/steven-spielberg-
historian/.  The House Republican Whip took several rank-and-file 
members to see the film in the latest lame duck session, though what 
lessons they took from it remains a mystery.  See Hirschfeld Davis, Julie.  
2012.  “Republicans Rallying for ‘Lincoln’ – Majority Whip’s ‘Movie-
Night’ Out,” Bloomberg.com (November 28), available at 
http://go.bloomberg.com/political-capital/2012-11-28/republicans-
rallying-for-lincoln-majority-whips-movie-night-out/ 
2 Denby, David.  2012.  “Six Footnotes to the Greatness of ‘Lincoln’”, The 





 The film offers an intriguing portrayal of a significant moment not 
just in the history of lame ducks but in the broader sweep of the 
American history.  The notion that lame duck legislators would be more 
susceptible to “palace intrigue” has existed for over two centuries, 
whether for noble causes as in the case of the Thirteenth Amendment or 
for ignoble ones such as the ship subsidy bill of 1922.  Indeed, that has 
been the research focus of several political scientists and historians who 
have examined individual-level voting behavior during lame duck 
sessions or specific votes in such sessions.  However, individual lame 
duck members are not the primary focus of this dissertation. 
This dissertation will explore the nature and importance of lame 
duck sessions of Congress.  In particular, my research question can be 
boiled down to the following:  
 
How do elections affect the productivity and significance of lame 
duck sessions? 
 
Lame duck sessions are exceptional periods in the congressional calendar.  
At these times, a number of legislators – and, one-quarter of the time, the 
president – are on their way out, with the electoral connection severed.  
For the rest, the electoral connection is at its weakest point, for many will 
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be at the greatest distance from their next elections.3  Yet the president 
and congressional leaders remain in power, now armed with the sure 
knowledge of who will control the government for the next two years but 
facing a strict deadline to complete any further action.  How does this 
new knowledge affect the behavior and legislative output of politicians 
who have already been there for 20 months, 20 years, or in some cases 
even more? 
This question is important to political science because it can help us 
understand the factors that determine politicians’ behavior and 
legislative productivity in both quantitative and qualitative terms.  
Sometimes, lame duck sessions have been mere appendages to the 
regular sessions, where lawmakers clean out the legislative closet.  Other 
times, though, lame duck sessions have enabled determined legislators to 
enact important laws that were stymied during the regular session.  I will 
explore why the legislative output of lame duck sessions can vary so that 
they become either forgotten endings or significant milestones. 
Lame duck sessions are interesting and important to study for 
several reasons.  First, accountability is at its weakest: a lame duck 
session is the only point in the congressional cycle where any members 
have been de-authorized by the voters.  This makes lame duck sessions 
                                                
3 While newly re-elected senators have six years until their next election, 
others will face the voters in four or two years’ time – which can still be 
an eternity in politics. 
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particularly interesting from a democratic theory perspective – do elected 
representatives act differently when they no longer have to face electoral 
consequences for their actions?  Moreover, do the president, 
congressional leaders and Congress as a whole behave differently when 
one or more are about to lose their positions?  This second, larger issue is 
the one I will focus on, and it is another reason that lame duck sessions 
are important to study, for it is the first period after elections where their 
impact can be felt.  And, by highlighting similarities and differences 
across time, my results may shed light on these questions of democratic 
accountability not only in lame duck sessions, but in regular sessions as 
well. 
This dissertation aims to fill a gap in the literature on lame duck 
sessions of Congress.  Until now, most of the literature has focused on 
either a) individual-level changes in politicians’ voting and shirking 
behavior during lame duck sessions, or b) case studies of specific lame 
duck sessions.  Yet the literature does not address the cumulative 
legislative output of lame duck sessions.  To date, nobody has compared 
the number and significance of laws passed in lame duck sessions to that 
of regular sessions.  Nor has anyone compared the legislative outputs of 
different lame duck sessions, testing whether elections have an impact 
before those who are newly elected even take office.  I think that I can 
accomplish both of these goals, thereby adding to the literature on lame 
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duck sessions in particular but also contributing to the discussion of 
factors that determine the significance of legislation. 
The models outlined below indicate that elections play a major role 
in determining both the output and the significance of lame duck 
legislation.  In particular, incumbents who are on the way out of power 
have every incentive to exercise that power until their clocks strike 
midnight.  My models support this reasoning, indicating that outgoing 
presidents and outgoing majority parties enact significantly more 
important legislation than continuing presidents and a Congress that 
retains the same partisan make-up for the succeeding term.  These 
findings have important implications for the study of Congress, and more 
generally for the study of representation and democracy.  Thus, the lame 
duck session should not be dismissed so easily; examining it gives us a 
clearer understanding of the final tenth of a congressional term and also a 
window onto Congress and democratic legislatures overall. 
 
 
ii. What is a lame duck? 
 
The term “lame duck” originally emerged in 18th-century Britain to 
describe a stockbroker who owed more than he was worth yet continued 
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to conduct business despite being “financially crippled.”4  By the mid-19th 
century, the term had migrated to the United States, where it ultimately 
acquired the meaning we still use today: a politician still in office but 
whose successor has already been chosen. 
Many commentators and politicians have realized that lame duck 
members of Congress are free to act in a way that returning members are 
not.  Returning members face the same constraints of accountability that 
all members face during regular sessions.  Specifically, members in 
republican systems of government face accountability from the voters in 
regular elections.  In the case of the pre-17th Amendment Senate, most 
members were held accountable by the state legislatures who selected 
them.  Within each chamber of Congress, one must also bear in mind the 
accountability that partisans often feel to their party leadership.  In 
modern times, members of Congress may also feel beholden to interest 
groups who contributed heavily towards their election campaigns. 
Yet each of these constraints is loosened by the knowledge that one 
is not returning to serve in the next Congress.  Lame duck members need 
not grovel for campaign donations before interest groups if there is no 
further re-election campaign on the horizon.  The power of the party 
                                                
4 Bernstein, R.B.  “Twentieth Amendment,” in Palmer, Kris E., ed.  2000.  
Constitutional Amendments 1789 to the Present (Detroit: Gale Group), 453.  
See also Bienvenu, Emile.  1922.  Accounting and Business Dictionary 
(New Orleans: Poynton Press Co), 177. 
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leadership to re-assign members away from choice committees is 
irrelevant to those who will not be serving on any committees at all in the 
near future.  And the fear of being cast aside by one’s constituents, be 
they state legislators or voters from the mass public, vanishes when one 
no longer needs their future approbation. 
It is true that the difference between lame ducks and flying ducks 
might not always be obvious.  After all, even lame duck members may 
feel some constraints.  Members who lose their re-election races may try 
to curry favor with the party leadership in order to reap the rewards of 
patronage.  Some politicians who have been turfed out of office 
nonetheless retain the desire to serve and have their sights set on 
regaining their seats in Congress or seeking some other elected position.5  
In addition, returning members may sense that some of the normal 
constraints feel looser during the immediate post-election period.  
Conversely, it is entirely possible for a member of Congress to decide 
privately that the current term will be his last.  When such decisions are 
not made public for months or even years (as may be the case for senators 
serving six-year terms), it may be difficult to determine when members’ 
                                                
5 Among current members of Congress who have served non-consecutive 
terms are Ron Paul (R-TX), Jim Cooper (D-TN), Dan Lungren (R-CA), 
Steve Chabot (R-OH) and five other representatives, as well as senators 




behavior – in committee, on roll call votes, or in public statements and 
draft legislation – changes as a result of cutting the electoral connection. 
Nonetheless, the lame duck session is a unique period that merits 
close examination.  An election period, whether it lasts months or just a 
single day, is a clear dividing line.  Before the election, the number of 
returning members of Congress is always unclear; afterwards, it becomes 
evident.  Before the election, the overall partisan composition of the next 
Congress may be predictable but it is never certain; afterwards, party 
leaders, members, interest groups, and the public at large know for sure.  
Before the election, much of the committee structure and membership in 
both chambers is up for revision; afterwards, the re-organization can take 
place. 
Of course, it is impossible to forget one other key political actor: the 
President.  While half of lame duck sessions of Congress occur in the 
middle of presidential terms, the other half take place immediately 
following a presidential election.  The president’s status as a lame duck or 
as a newly reelected head of state with a full four-year term ahead of him 
can have an immediate impact on the lame duck session.  In particular, if 
the president is a lame duck, he and his partisan allies in Congress have 
only the short session to enact any remaining items on his legislative 
agenda.  While there can be a different feel to the session if the president 
lost his re-election bid or if he was barred from seeking re-election under 
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the 22nd Amendment, the point remains that the lame duck session 
encompasses his final opportunity to effect legislative change. 
Finally, it is important to highlight that the end of the lame duck 
session marks the death of any bills that have not become law.  This 
brings an increased urgency to the sponsors and supporters of bills that 
may have wound their way through committees and even passed in one 
chamber, only to face the legislative clock resetting on the day that the 
new congressional term begins.  Sometimes bills are brought to the floor 
in a last-ditch attempt to make them law; other times, members may 
propose “ill-thought-out” bills during lame duck periods.  Party leaders 
may decide that the lame duck period is their last chance to enact favored 
bills, or they may look forward to the next session confident that bills 
they oppose will not see the light of day. 
The questions explored in this dissertation deal less with lame 
duck members and more with the lame duck sessions as an entity.  In 









iii. Examining lame duck sessions 
 
113 Congresses have been elected since the founding of the 
American Republic in 1789.  The vast majority of Congresses (90 thus far) 
have met between the elections for the succeeding Congress and the day 
when that new Congress takes office.  Lame duck sessions are nothing 
new; in fact, they used to be a regular part of the congressional calendar.  
While the 20th Amendment was intended to curtail lame duck sessions – 
and indeed there were fewer such sessions during the Cold War period – 
lame ducks are on the rise again.  Every two years since 1998, Congress 
has met during the lame duck period following the November elections, 
and there was little doubt before any of these elections that Congress 
would do so. 
Moreover, it is quite likely that Congress will not soon break the 
current streak of eight lame duck sessions in a row.  The crowding of the 
congressional calendar, increasingly complex annual appropriations bills, 
today’s hyper-partisan atmosphere, ideologically polarized political 
parties, seemingly never-ending campaigns – all combine to slow the 
legislative process.  For example, the last time that Congress completed 
all thirteen regular appropriations bills in an election year (midterm or 
presidential) was 1998 – ever since, work on the legislation necessary to 
keep the government functioning has carried over into lame duck 
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sessions (or, via continuing resolutions, into subsequent regular sessions).  
Even unified control of both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue no longer 
greases the legislative wheels enough to avert a lame duck session.  
Barring a drastic change in American political culture, lame duck sessions 
have basically become part of the regular congressional calendar – just as 
they were for the first century and a half of the Republic. 
Yet lame duck sessions of Congress are qualitatively different from 
regular sessions.  First and foremost, a sizeable minority of members of 
Congress knows that they will not return to Congress in January or face 
another election.  For these members, the electoral connection is severed.  
Second, even for those members who will continue to serve, the electoral 
connection is at its weakest during the lame duck period.  These two 
months are as far away as possible from the next electoral test, and the 
attention of voters and non-voters alike tends to shift away from politics.  
Lame duck sessions are therefore unique periods in the congressional 
calendar, for they give elected politicians a chance to take on unpopular 
measures with minimal consideration of the electorate. 
Third, lame duck sessions take place once the uncertainty of who 
will govern next is over.  Only after the voters have their say do the 
changes in composition and control of the White House and both 
chambers of Congress become clear.  This gives a particular sense of 
urgency to members of the political party that lost congressional seats or 
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the presidency in the recent elections; they may be willing to pass 
legislation which is not their ideal but better than they can expect to pass 
in the coming Congress.  Conversely, members of a political party that is 
now certain to gain control of one or more branches of government may 
approach the lame duck session in one of two minds: either complete 
obstruction, delaying legislation until it dies so that they can pass their 
own version once they control the legislative process, or a willingness to 
let unpopular measures through before they take over.  For all members 
and parties, however, the lame duck period provides a unique moment 
when the incoming officeholders and leaders are known but those on the 
way out are still in power. 
It is true that some lame duck sessions, especially those of the last 
twenty years, have been relatively distinctive.  In 1994, for example, 
Congress returned to pass the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) primarily because Sen. Fritz Hollings (D-SC), an avowed 
opponent of free trade legislation, delayed action before the elections.6  
Four years later, the House of Representatives held a lame duck session 
that culminated in the impeachment of President Clinton.  Likewise, the 
2010 lame duck session was unusually productive – the most productive 
ever, according to some commentators.  These three sessions shed light 
                                                
6 Kaplan, Edward S.  1996.  American Trade Policy, 1923-1995 (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press), 130-132. 
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on the behavior of individual members, but it is harder to generalize 
about lame duck sessions from these narrow snapshots. 
However, party control and partisan shifts seem to affect the 
productivity and significance of lame duck sessions.  In 1982 and 2004, 
for example, when the majority party in each chamber knew it would 
have a larger majority come January, Congress deferred matters until the 
next session.  On the other hand, when the majority party knows it will 
either hold a slimmer majority or lose the majority entirely in the next 
session, its leaders try to accomplish far more, as in 1922 (unsuccessfully) 
or in 2010 (successfully).  When one party has unified control of the 
executive and legislative branches, as in 1916, lame duck sessions tend to 
more productive and significant than when there exists divided 
government, as in 1920. 
It is possible, then, to examine lame duck sessions across time and 
draw certain conclusions.  These conclusions are not just historical in 
nature, but they are still relevant to contemporary lame duck sessions.  
Moreover, the quantitative analysis on pre-1995 lame duck sessions leads 
to some predictions for subsequent lame duck sessions, predictions that 
have been broadly confirmed by events of the last fifteen years.  The 
work contained herein could potentially be used to suggest the legislative 




iv. Outline for the dissertation 
 
Following this introduction, chapter II lays out the historical background.  
It explains why we have lame duck sessions in the first place and 
explores the original debates over the timing of sessions.  Covering the 
constitutional requirements of congressional meetings, the chapter 
proceeds to highlight the change over time in the use of lame duck 
sessions.  The strategic use of lame duck sessions by party leaders 
ultimately led to a backlash, precipitating the 20th Amendment.  This 
chapter discusses the amendment’s struggle for passage, concluding with 
an overview of lame duck sessions from its adoption in 1933 and right up 
to 2010.  In addition, there is some discussion of why lame duck sessions 
occur or do not occur in the modern era. 
 Chapter III moves from reality into theory.  This chapter describes 
my own theories about lame duck sessions, including my take on the 
electoral connection and my contribution regarding the effects of partisan 
shifts on both strategic behavior and legislative output.  Out of these 
theories come several testable hypotheses that seek to answer and 
supplement my research question.  En route to the hypotheses, the 
chapter reviews the current literature on lame ducks, noting the gap that 
this dissertation seeks to fill.  There is coverage of existing theories about 
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lame ducks, representation, shirking, strategic behavior, and the electoral 
connection. 
 Chapter IV covers the data and methods of the project.  First, there 
will be explanation and analysis of the Clinton and Lapinski dataset on 
legislative significance, with the merits and drawbacks of their holistic 
approach.  Then my own expansion on their dataset will come into view, 
and there will be coverage of my original dataset on legislative timing. 
 The datasets are used in Chapter V, where I test my hypotheses.  
This chapter constitutes the heart of the quantitative analysis.  Following 
up on the various datasets, the chapter proceeds with the statistics, the 
regressions that test the hypotheses.  The results will show that all of my 
hypotheses are supported by the mathematical evidence. 
 Chapter VI brings some of the quantitative analysis into the 
qualitative realm.  Specifically, this chapter provides comparative case 
studies of three lame duck sessions of Congress: 2008, 2010, and 2012.  
These three sessions work well for comparison because each session 
followed a different electoral outcome: a change from divided to unified 
government, a change from unified to divided government, and a 
reaffirmation of the status quo.  Unlike Chapter II, which gives a broad 
historical sweep, this chapter delves into specific sessions that illustrate 
and illuminate the statistical results of Chapter IV.  Here, we can see how 
my model’s predictions perform in the real world.  While the model is by 
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no means perfect, its forecasts, based on data from years earlier, correctly 
estimate the legislative outputs of the last three lame duck sessions of 
Congress. 
 The dissertation comes to an end with Chapter VII.  This final 
section brings all the research together in a discussion that ultimately 
seeks to ascertain both the peculiarities and the importance of lame duck 
sessions of Congress.  This chapter reviews and expands on the empirical 
findings, connects the quantitative and qualitative analyses, and 
summarizes why lame duck sessions are important.  It reiterates the key 
findings, draws some conclusions about lame duck sessions in historical 
terms, and extrapolates from recent trends.  This chapter suggests some 
possibilities for future research, and it closes with some thoughts about 






Chapter II: Historical Background 
i. When did lame ducks start quacking? 
 
Lame duck sessions of Congress exist because the exigencies of history 
resulted in a quirk in our constitutional system. 
After two months of discussion, the 1787 Philadelphia Convention 
created a five-member Committee of Detail to integrate already-adopted 
resolutions into a draft Constitution.7  The Committee proposed that 
Congress should meet annually on the first Monday in December, and in 
due course the Convention debated this proposal. 8   James Madison 
suggested that Congress should regularly set its own meeting date by law, 
but he was overruled by delegates who believed that states needed to 
know when Congress would meet so that they could arrange their own 
elections.  Some delegates doubted that Congress would even need to 
meet every year, while one worried that annual sessions would lead to 
unnecessary legislation.  As a compromise, the Convention adopted a 
proposal to specify a meeting time before the first meeting of the new 
Congress – the first Monday in December – while enabling future 
Congresses to set a different date.  When Madison and Gouverneur 
                                                
7 Vile, John R.  2005.  The Constitutional Convention of 1787 (Santa Barbara, 
CA: ABC-Clio), vol. I, 105-108. 
8 Ibid.  Vol. II, 175-176. 
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Morris suggested that Congress should start its sessions in May, 
objections arose that many members of Congress would be involved in 
agriculture, and summer sessions of the federal Congress might interfere 
with sessions of the various state legislatures.  Thus the Convention 
agreed to the December starting date for annual sessions of Congress. 
In the end, Article I, section iv of the original Constitution reads as 
follows: 
 
“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators 
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the 
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law 
make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing 
Senators. 
 
“The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such 
Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they 
shall by Law appoint a different Day.” 
 
The Constitution is thus very clear about the beginning of congressional 
sessions.  However, the Constitution does not discuss the beginning of 
members’ terms. 
Instead, the timing of terms emerged almost by accident based on 
the timing of constitutional ratification.  The Convention submitted the 
proposed Constitution to the states for ratification at the end of the 
summer of 1787.  States began to ratify it in December, and enough states 
ratified the document by the end of June 1788 for it to become operative.  
In September, the Congress of the Confederation (still the reigning 
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national authority under the 1781 Articles of Confederation) decreed that 
the new form of government would replace the existing one on the first 
Wednesday of March 1789, which turned out to be the 4th.  Newly elected 
members of Congress began congregating in New York City to call the 
new government into order, count the Electoral Votes for President and 
Vice President, and begin the business of running the country.  Given the 
March 4th start and the constitutional mandate of two-year terms for 
Representatives (making it impossible to alter the start of a congressional 
term of office without a constitutional amendment), subsequent 
Congresses began their sessions on the same date.9  Thus the timing of 
congressional terms for 140 years was determined by a lame duck 
organization that predated the government’s founding and was already 
about to become defunct! 
Thanks to this precedent, the stickiness of these dates codified lame 
duck sessions of the newly formed United States Congress.  Sessions in 
odd-numbered years would begin in December and had no mandated 
end-point, so they typically ended in the late spring to enable members to 
return home to their districts in time for the summer and autumn 
agricultural work.  Sessions in even-numbered years also began in 
December, but they would have to end by the subsequent March 4th, 
                                                
9 Kyvig, David E.  1996.  Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. 
Constitution, 1776-1995 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas), 269. 
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when terms began for members of the incoming Congress.  The former 
became known as long sessions, while the latter, the lame duck sessions, 
became the short sessions. 
Legislators in these short sessions had to complete action on all 
legislation by noon on March 4th, when the clock ran out and any 
outstanding bills would have to start the entire legislative process anew 
in the subsequent Congress.  Thus minorities could delay or filibuster 
legislation in order to defeat it or force compromise.  Defeated members, 
never having to face an electorate again, might be unusually susceptible 
to corruption.10  Moreover, any disputed presidential election would be 
decided by the outgoing Congress, which might not reflect the recent 
elections, as in the case of the election of 1800 when the country chose the 
opposition party, coalesced around Thomas Jefferson, in both 
presidential and congressional elections.  A discredited Federalist 
Congress had to choose between two Democratic-Republicans, Jefferson 
and Aaron Burr, and the lame duck Federalist-led House of 
Representatives took twelve weeks to pick Jefferson before adjourning.  
Despite these problems that became apparent very early in the history of 
the Republic, there was not enough support to make any changes to the 
calendar at either the federal or the state level. 
                                                
10 Ibid, 270. 
 
 21 
While federal institutions determined congressional terms and 
sessions, the timing and organization of elections was left up to the 
individual states.  States generally used their own state and local election 
dates to determine the federal election dates.  Much of the variation was 
regional: in the northeast, elections coincided with annual town meetings 
in the spring, while fall elections were common in the Mid-Atlantic and 
Great Lakes areas.  The congressional election cycle actually lasted up to 
eighteen months; for example, once it joined the Union, California held 
elections in the fall of odd-numbered years, a full year after most other 
states.11 
National standardization of election dates began in 1845, when 
Congress (in a lame duck session) mandated that presidential electors be 
appointed on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November.  
November was chosen for logistical purposes: the harvest was already in 
but travel would not be hindered by winter snow, and farmers could take 
several days to vote, with a full day’s travel after Sunday, a day to vote, 
and a day to return home.12  Since elections could be expensive to run, 
states began moving other elections to coincide with the presidential 
                                                
11 James, Scott C.  2007.  “Timing and Sequence in Congressional 
Elections: Interstate Contagion and America’s Nineteenth-Century 
Scheduling Regime,” Studies in American Political Development 21 (Fall), 
3-6. 
12 Neale, Thomas H.  2001.  “The Electoral College: How it Works in 
Contemporary Presidential Elections,” CRS Report for Congress, 5. 
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ballot as more states turned to popular voting for presidential electors.  
By the Civil War, most northern states voted for members of Congress in 
early November, but few southern states did.  Only in 1872 did Congress 
regulate and synchronize the election date for its own members.13 
Yet in no case could a newly elected member take office before the 
short session.  Fully thirteen months would elapse between a member’s 
election and his first meeting of Congress, at which point another election 
would loom just eleven months away.  Since the short session began in 
December of the even-numbered year but the new term did not begin 
until March of the odd-numbered year, members of Congress could keep 
exercising their legislative powers for the three-month short session after 
the elections – even if they were repudiated at the polls.  This session 
became known as the lame duck session. 
For decades – indeed, for over a century – the long delay between 
elections and taking office was accepted as necessary in an expanding 
country with poor infrastructure.  It would be unreasonable, for example, 
to ask a representative from California elected on Tuesday to start work 
in Washington on Thursday.  In addition, there were benefits to some 
measure of time that would allow departing members of Congress to 
clear out their offices and arrange for a transition to newly elected 
                                                
13 James, Scott C.  Op cit, 3-6.  
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members.  Newly elected members could use the time not only for 
logistical purposes, but also to prepare for their coming legislative work. 
Of course, lame duck sessions were not just transition periods, for 
they also provided opportunities for Congress to pass some significant 
legislation.  The 37th Congress (1861-1863) passed some of the most 
significant legislation of the 19th century, such as an income tax, the 
Homestead Act, and laws authorizing the transcontinental railroad and 
land grant colleges (such as the University of Maryland).  While most 
came during the regular session, the most controversial bill was enacted 
on March 3, 1863: it mandated conscription, famously leading to draft 
riots in Northern cities.  The Thirteenth and Fifteen Amendments to the 
Constitution passed during lame duck sessions.14  The 39th Congress also 
passed controversial legislation in its lame duck session, most notably the 
first Reconstruction Act and the Tenure of Office Act, which led to the 
impeachment of President Andrew Johnson.  Other significant lame-duck 
legislation includes the Pendleton Act reforming the civil service (January 
16, 1883), the Meat Inspection Act passed in the wake of Upton Sinclair’s 
                                                
14 See Chapter VII.  Also, the “original” thirteenth amendment, which 
would have barred the federal government from ever interfering in 
states’ rights with regards to slavery, passed Congress on March 2, 1861 
in a last-ditch attempt to avert the Civil War.  Abraham Lincoln referred 




The Jungle (March 4, 1907), and legislation creating various national parks 
(February 1919). 
Changes in technology made the four-month period anachronistic.  
By 1900, it was possible to cross the entire country by rail in days, and the 
telegraph enabled information to travel much faster than that.  Yet in 
sleepy Washington, DC, there was no clamor for changes to the 
congressional calendar, not even after the 1917 lame duck filibuster that 
President Wilson derided and ultimately led to the Senate’s adoption of 
the cloture rule.  Occasional efforts to fix the lame duck problem, going 
back to the Gilded Age, always came to naught.15  No, the real catalyst for 
a schedule change was the ship subsidy bill of 1922. 
 
 
ii. The ship subsidy debate 
 
The ship subsidy bill was a proposal advocated by the Warren G. 
Harding administration and designed to strengthen the American 
merchant marine.  Because the American maritime industry had trouble 
competing with their European counterparts in the wake of the First 
World War, Harding proposed that the government subsidize private 
                                                
15 Jenkins, Jeffery A. and Timothy P. Nokken.  2009.  “Contemporary 




contractors to construct new ships, which would then be available for 
national defense in times of need.  Harding was lucky enough to work 
with a nominally friendly Congress – Republicans held 59 out of 96 seats 
in the Senate and 302 out of 435 seats in the House – and he did get much 
of his legislative program enacted.  However, he faced considerable 
hurdles when it came to the ship subsidy bill.  A significant number of 
Republicans in Congress represented farming states and preferred giving 
additional government aid to farmers rather than to the coastal shipping 
industry and eastern business interests.  The Republican congressional 
leadership tried to persuade Harding that pushing the bill through would 
cost too much political capital and could alienate voters.  Harding tried 
everything short of bribery, but Majority Leader Franklin Mondell 
warned him that the head count was 159 Republicans and 6 Democrats in 
favor and 100 Democrats and 80 Republicans opposed.  Reluctantly, 
Harding accepted the need to postpone the debate, but he did vow to call 
a special session of Congress specifically to address the bill.16 
In the November 1922 midterms, voters gave the Republicans a 
thumping: Their majorities were slashed to ten in the Senate and fifteen 
in the House.  “As the November elections had plainly indicated,” wrote 
one contemporary observer, “the ship subsidy legislation … was certain 
                                                
16 Murray, Robert K.  1969.  The Harding Era (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press), 280-325. 
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to be defeated in the new Congress.”17  Just two days after the election, 
Harding stayed true to his word, calling a special session to pass the ship 
subsidy bill.  This time, meeting in a lame duck session, Harding’s 
supporters managed to persuade enough recalcitrant Republicans to 
switch their votes, and the bill passed the House a week into the special 
session, 208-184.  Moreover, a disproportionate number of lame duck 
Republicans voted for the bill; without their change of heart, it would 
never have passed.  And while the administration technically stopped 
short of bribery, ten defeated members were given political appointments 
to begin their post-congressional careers; all ten supported the bill. 
The Senate ultimately refused to vote on the bill, for opponents 
used various parliamentary tactics and finally resorted to a filibuster.18  
                                                
17 Rogers, Lindsay.  1924.  “American Government and Politics: The 
Second, Third and Fourth Sessions of the Sixty-Seventh Congress,” 
APSR 18:1 (February), 90-91. 
18 Goodman, Craig and Timothy P. Nokken.  2004.  “Lame-Duck 
Legislators and Consideration of the Ship Subsidy Bill of 1922,” 
American Politics Research 32:4 (July), 473-478.  Goodman and Nokken 
show that the lame-duck variable is statistically significant and positive, 
with lame duck Republicans voting 81.9% in favor of the bill, as 
compared to 67.7% for returning members.  Those who lost re-election 
were significantly more likely than retirees to vote in favor of final 
passage.  (over) 
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Nonetheless, the large number of changed minds in the House, along 
with the general appearance that the White House was ramming the bill 
down Congress’ throat in direct contradiction to the will of the American 
people, spurred a different kind of action in the Senate. 
Several Senators were shocked, both by the heavy-handed 
administration lobbying and by the fact that the bill could not have 
passed the House without the support of so many now-unaccountable 
legislators.  Sen. Thaddeus Caraway (D-AK) introduced a concurrent 
resolution that would limit defeated members from voting on substantive 
policy matters during the short session.19  To avoid the bill’s death in the 
conservative-led Judiciary Committee, progressive Sen. George Norris 
(R-NE) sought to examine the bill in the committee he chaired, the 
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.  While his committee reported 
back to the Senate that the Caraway proposal would be unconstitutional, 
he instead offered a constitutional amendment to eliminate the lame duck 
session by altering congressional and presidential terms to begin in 
                                                                                                                                          
Goodman and Nokken conclude, “Lame-duck status proved to be an 
extremely important explanatory factor when predicting MCs’ vote 
choices on the highly controversial ship subsidy bill. … Defeated 
Republicans were the most likely group of members to support the ship 
subsidy bill.  The results suggest that the bill’s success [in the House] 
was primarily because of the adoption of a strategy to schedule the vote 
during a lame-duck session of Congress. … The elimination of 
legislators’ linkages to constituents creates a setting in which significant 
changes in roll call behavior is inherently possible and more likely to 
occur than if the electoral connection remains intact” (483-486). 
19 Kyvig, David E.  Op cit, 271. 
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January.  With surprisingly little debate, the Senate passed his resolution 
63-6 in February 1923. 
However, the House Republican leadership was not about to 
relinquish the advantages of lame duck sessions.  Party leaders knew that 
they could strong-arm members into voting for particular bills in short 
sessions for three reasons.  First, these periods were as far away as 
possible from the next election, so voting the party line over one’s 
constituency interests was least unpalatable during lame duck sessions.  
Second, members who were leaving Congress – especially those who 
were not retiring voluntarily and still wanted to work for the government 
– could be lured by promises of patronage for supporting the party.  
Finally, party leaders had long relied on the tactical opportunities 
inherent in the short sessions with their fixed termination dates (i.e. 
March 4th).20  To this day, congressional leaders use strategic scheduling 
in order to pressure rank-and-file members to vote a particular way, 
primarily by taking advantage of regular recesses as deadlines for most 
roll call votes.21  The ultimate deadline, of course, is the end of the session, 
and the congressional leadership knew it.  Norris wrote to a constituent,  
 
                                                
20 Ibid, 272-273. 
21 Yackee, Susan Webb.  2003.  “Punctuating the Congressional Agenda: 
Strategic Scheduling by House and Senate Leaders,” Political Research 
Quarterly 56:2 (June), 139. 
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As the fourth of March approaches, this tension increases its 
strength in a wonderful degree.  Members of Congress who are 
trying to prevent the passage of what they believe to be obnoxious 
legislation, very often remain silent because they think other 
legislation in which they are deeply interested may stand some 
show if they do not take up the time of the Senate or the House in 
debating what is to have consideration.  It therefore often happens 
that half-baked legislation is enacted.  Jokers creep into the laws, 
because those who would guard the public interest are anxious to 
get consideration for other important legislation which Congress 
will not have time to consider unless expedition is made.22 
 
Indeed, almost half of all lame duck legislation before 1933 was enacted 
in the first four days of March, up to and including the March 4th 
handover.  The visual representation, highlighting the total number of 
laws approved on each day of the year, is striking: 
 
  
                                                
22 George W. Norris papers, letter to Christian A. Herter, February 1, 1925. 
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House Republican leaders in the 1920s were loath to give up the clear 
advantages of the lame duck sessions, and consequently they refused to 
allow a vote on Norris’ constitutional amendment.23 
Norris proposed the lame duck amendment every two years for the 
rest of the decade, and it overwhelmingly passed the Senate every time, 
but House leaders refused to budge.  It was only when Democrats took 
control of the House in 1931 that a vote was allowed, but even then it was 
a lame duck Republican alternative that would put into the Constitution 
a specific end-date for the second session to preserve the leadership’s 
power of timetabling.  This was a good example of an outgoing majority 
party offering a legislative proposal that it did not like to head off one 
that it disliked even more from coming to the floor in the subsequent 
Congress.  Because Norris knew he would have a better chance of an 
amendment passing unsullied in the incoming Congress, he did not 
compromise in the conference committee and both proposals died.  Once 
an unchanged Norris proposal (passed by the Senate early in the new 
Congress as usual) came to the House floor on March 2nd, 1932, the larger 
chamber passed the amendment by the lopsided vote of 336 to 56.  
Ratification was completed by January 1933, and every single state in the 
union had endorsed it by April.  “Never before,” notes David Kyvig, 
                                                
23 U.S. Congress.  1923.  Congressional Record, 67th Congress (Washington, 
DC: GPO), 5086-5087. 
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“had an amendment been unanimously approved on initial consideration, 
even in the days of a much smaller Union.”24 
 
 
iii. After passage 
 
At first the Twentieth Amendment worked as it was intended.  The 
73rd Congress met in two regular sessions, from March 9th to June 15th, 
1933 – FDR’s vaunted Hundred Days – and then again from January 3rd 
to June 18th, 1934.  Instead of watching the outgoing Congress hold a lame 
duck session and then waiting thirteen months after the 1934 midterms to 
take office, newly elected members took their oaths on January 3rd, 1935 
and got to work immediately on the Second New Deal.  However, there 
was a slight problem: while lame duck sessions were no longer part of the 
regular congressional calendar, they were not specifically prohibited. 
Lame duck sessions no longer occur automatically, but there are 
several ways to instigate them.25  Congress could promulgate a resolution 
to reconvene after an election and then adjourn sine die, so that the lame 
duck session would be a separate session.  This formal method was used 
                                                
24 Kyvig, David E.  Op cit, 274.  
25 Beth, Richard S., and Jessica Tollestrup.  2011.  “Lame Duck Sessions of 
Congress, 1935-2010 (74th-111th Congresses),” report for the 
Congressional Research Service, 3-8. 
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regularly before passage of the Twentieth Amendment but has not been 
used since then.  Instead, Congress often decides to recess its existing 
session for a period leading up to and including the election, and 
subsequently reconvenes after the election.  This is done when both 
chambers adopt a concurrent resolution to adjourn for a specific period 
without ending the current session, as has been used a dozen times since 
1933. 
Three other methods can be used to convene a lame duck session.  
Congress typically recesses with the proviso that its leadership can 
reconvene it “if the public interest shall require.”  Even sine die 
adjournments regularly include such provisos, and should leaders 
reconvene Congress after an election, this would count as a lame duck 
session.  Twice, the Speaker of the House has used contingent 
reconvening authority to call the House back into session after a sine die 
adjournment, in 1998 to impeach President Clinton and in 2008 to deal 
with the financial crisis.  Additionally, Congress can continue to meet 
during or after elections in pro forma sessions, whereby no legislative 
business is conducted but members can go home to their districts without 
a formal adjournment.  These pro forma sessions have taken place several 
times, particularly in the Senate, which has taken advantage of this 
mechanism to preclude presidential recess appointments.  Finally, the 
President can call a special session of Congress after elections; though 
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Richard Nixon threatened to do this when the 1970 lame duck session 
recessed without passing his legislative initiatives, it has never been done 
after passage of the Twentieth Amendment.26 
World War II saw the first post-Twentieth Amendment lame duck 
sessions, when Congress decided to remain in pro forma session after 
elections in 1940, 1942 and 1944.  The 1940 lame duck session came about 
because congressional leaders felt that, while America was not yet at war, 
Congress should remain in session to “stand by” in case of emergency.  
FDR, just re-elected to a third term, chose to hold major new proposals, 
such as Lend-Lease, until the new Congress could take office in January.  
Interestingly, contemporary accounts of the 1940 congressional elections 
suggested that, although Republicans made modest gains in the Senate, 
the number of conservatives fell – especially in the House. 27   It is 
plausible that the administration wanted to wait for a more friendly 
Congress, though logistical hurdles (e.g. raising a quorum) probably 
played a part as well. 
Two years later, “Activities in the lame duck portion of the 77th 
Congress were affected by the knowledge that the 78th Congress, to begin 
in January [1943], would contain a much narrowed Democratic 
                                                
26 Oberdorfer, Don.  1970.  “Nixon Weighs Hill Recall for Welfare Bill,” 
The Washington Post (December 12), A1. 




majority.”28  Yet little was accomplished in the 1942 lame duck session.  
Similarly little was done in the 1944 lame duck session, while the 1948 
session lasted just 90 minutes and accomplished even less.29  The 1950 
lame duck session took place in the shadow of the Korean War, and 
President Truman submitted a number of proposals upon which 
Congress acted.  In 1954, only the Senate reconvened in a lame duck 
session, specifically to censure Joseph McCarthy.30 
The next lame duck session did not occur until 1970, when 
congressional leaders called one in order to act on a long list of 
unfinished legislative proposals.  However, Congress did not pass a 
number of proposals sent over by the Nixon administration, including 
the Family Assistance Plan, which would have guaranteed every 
American family a minimum income.  The Boston Globe editorialized that 
this lame duck Congress deserved “a good paddling by the home folks,” 
and Nixon criticized the “major failures” of the lame duck session.31 
In 1974, Congress also faced a legislative backlog, this time because 
of the Watergate scandal and its fallout.  Newly installed President 
                                                
28 Beth and Tollestrup, Op cit, 19. 
29 The Congressional Record does not even note the 1948 lame duck session.  
30 Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 2nd session (Washington, DC: GPO), 
November-December, 1954, 15837-16404. 
31 “The confused lame duck,” The Boston Globe, 1970 (December 24), 10; 
Beth and Tollestrup, Op cit, 21. 
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Gerald Ford sent Congress a long list of legislation he wanted passed, 
which was no surprise since the midterms proved to be significant 
Democratic victories.  Congressional Democrats, emboldened by their 
electoral gains, expected less from the lame duck session.32  Sure enough, 
Congress approved Ford’s nomination of Nelson Rockefeller to be Vice 
President, but it ignored the rest of his agenda, passing a number of bills 
against the president’s wishes and overriding two of his vetoes.33 
1980 and 1982 also saw presidents who wanted to push through 
their legislative agendas before their parties relinquished seats in 
Congress.  The 1980 session took place because Democrats wanted to 
avoid tough budget votes before the election.34  President Jimmy Carter 
also wanted to use the lame duck session for tough votes such as 
ratification of the SALT II arms treaty with the Soviets.35  It ultimately 
turned out to be a lame duck period for Carter himself, and after the 
elections, Democrats knew they were about to lose control of the Senate 
for the first time in 26 years.  Commentators in the wake of the elections 
did not anticipate a productive lame duck session, with Democrats “shell-
                                                
32 “Democrats expect few bills from lame-duck Congress,” The Boston 
Globe, 1974 (November 19), 10. 
33 Lyons, Richard L.  1974.  “Rockefeller Becomes Vice President,” The 
Washington Post (December 20), A1. 
34 “Lame Duckery,” The Washington Post, 1980 (November 10), A18. 
35 “Carter to Seek Senate OK of SALT II After Election,” The Los Angeles 
Times, 1980 (October 19), A1. 
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shocked” and the ascendant GOP eager to exercise their new political 
muscles.36  SALT II was not ratified, and many budget bills were deferred 
until Reagan took the helm.  Still, the Democratic Congress did complete 
action on many of the unfinished bills, ranging from several 
appropriations bills to the “Superfund” environmental program.  In 1982, 
it was President Ronald Reagan who asked congressional leaders for the 
lame duck session, probably anticipating that Republicans would lose 
seats in the midterms.37  Yet because the Democrats still controlled the 
House and could use the filibuster in the Senate, the session was 
acrimonious, featuring the failure of an immigration reform bill and a bill 
to fund the MX missile.38 
1994 and 1998 were idiosyncratic lame duck sessions.  In 1994, Sen. 
Fritz Hollings (D-SC) had held up the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) during the regular session, forcing Congress to return in 
                                                
36 Dewar, Helen.  1980.  “Shellshocked Lame Ducks Return to Wrangle 
Over Money Matters,” The Washington Post (November 12), A2; “GOP 
Set to Flex Muscle, Democrats in Lame-Duck Congress Face Uphill 
Fight,” The Boston Globe, 1980 (November 7), 1. 
37 Tate, Dale.  1982.  “Reagan Requests Lame-Duck Session on ’83 
Spending Bills,” CQ Weekly Report 40 (September 18), 2337. 
38 Interestingly, neither Beth and Tollestrup nor Jenkins and Nokken note 
that the president’s party expected and suffered major losses in the 1974, 
1980, and 1982 elections, which could be another factor that determined 
the sitting of a lame duck Congress. 
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the lame duck period to quickly pass it.39  In 1998, the House leadership 
reconvened the chamber in a lame duck session specifically to impeach 
President Clinton.  In the latter case, the fact that impeachment took place 
during a lame duck period led to some scholars questioning whether the 
trial could take place after the congressional session ended, but the 
administration chose to ignore the technical questions and fight on the 
political questions instead.40 
Despite their sporadic occurrence, lame duck sessions from after 
passage of the Twentieth Amendment through to the end of the twentieth 
century did pass several important pieces of legislation.  Here is a partial 
list of this important legislation: 
 
  
                                                
39 Devroy, Ann and Peter Behr.  1994.  “White House Digs In for GATT 
Battle; Sen. Hollings Forces Lame-Duck Session,” The Washington Post 
(September 30), A1. 
40 Ackerman, Bruce.  1999.  “Testimony before the U.S. House Judiciary 
Committee,” PS: Political Science and Politics 32:1 (March), 29-30; 
Ackerman, Bruce.  1999.  “Revolution on a Human Scale,” The Yale Law 
Journal 108:8 (June), 2342-2345. 
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Table 2.1. Significant Legislation in Lame Duck Sessions, 1934-199941  
 
Date  Law 
  
1951-1-3 Excess Profits Tax Act of 1950 
1970-11-30 Agricultural Act of 1970 
1970-12-24 Plant Variety Protection Act 
1970-12-29 OSHA Act of 1970 
1970-12-30 Poisoning Prevention Packing Act of 1970 
1970-12-30 Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 
1970-12-31 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 
1970-12-31 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 
1971-1-2 Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 
1971-1-11 Food Stamp Act of 1970  
1971-1-12 Foreign Military Sales Act Amdts/Tonkin Gulf Resolution Repeal 
1974-11-21 FOI Act Amendments of 1974 
1974-11-26 National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974 
1974-12-16 Safe Drinking Water Act 
1974-12-31 Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1974 
1974-12-31 Privacy Act of 1974 
1975-1-3 Trade Act of 1974 
1975-1-3 Speedy Trial Act 
1975-1-3 Hazardous Materials Transportation Act 
1975-1-4 Magnuson-Moss Warranty-FTC Improvement Act  
1975-1-4 National Health Planning and Resources Development Act 
1980-12-2 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 
1980-12-11 Comp. Env. Response, Compensation, Liability (“Superfund”) 
1980-12-11 Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 
1980-12-12 Patent and Trademark Laws, Amendments 
1982-12-21 Boland Amendments (II) 
1983-1-6 Surface Transportation Assistance Act 
1983-1-7 Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982  
1994-12-8 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Implementation Act 
 
                                                
41 Compiled from Beth and Tollestrup, Op cit; Stathis, Stephen W.  2003.  
Landmark Legislation (CQ Press: Washington, DC); Landsberg, Brian K.  
2003.  Major Acts of Congress (Macmillan Reference USA: New York); 
Jenkins and Nokken, Op cit. 
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Congress regularly holds lame duck sessions today, as it did before 
passage of the Twentieth Amendment.  Why, then, did Congress not hold 
regular lame duck sessions from 1934 through the end of the twentieth 
century?  The short answer is that the whole point of Norris’ amendment 
was to eliminate lame duck sessions.  With the amendment successfully 
incorporated into the Constitution, and a new congressional calendar 
now in effect, few politicians in the 1930s wanted to bring these sessions 
back.  After the Second World War, lame duck sessions returned to 
obscurity, only brought out for specific purposes over the next 25 years.  
Presidents and congressional leaders simply saw no need: with a 
relatively low level of partisanship in what Richard Neustadt calls the 
“politics of mid-century,” Washington was unusually productive.  In the 
last twenty years, for example, Congress has passed an average of under 
500 laws per term, but from the 1930s through the 1960s this average was 
over 800.42 
 This high legislative productivity began to change in Richard 
Nixon’s first term.  The 91st Congress passed just 520 laws in its regular 
sessions, the lowest in the 25 years since the war, and so leaders called the 
lame duck session in order to complete unfinished legislation.  While not 
                                                
42 The mid-20th century was productive for Congress by historical 
standards as well.  Legislative output averaged 400 laws per term for the 
fifty years up to 1920, while the average had been approximately 130 
laws per term for the half-century leading up to the Civil War (and less 
than 100 before that). 
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everything was enacted, another 175 bills became law during that lame 
duck session.  Similarly, legislation had stalled in the 93rd Congress 
because of the Watergate scandal; with only 501 laws enacted in the 
regular session, congressional leaders again called a session to finish 
legislative business.  Congress enacted 150 bills in this lame duck session.  
After Congress rejected most of President Reagan’s proposals in the 1982 
post-election session that he had actively sought – and the long, testy 
session disgusted Speaker Tip O’Neill – Washington eschewed lame duck 
sessions for the next decade.43 
 
 
iv. Contemporary lame duck sessions 
 
Since 2000, though, every Congress has held a lame duck session.  
This is primarily because of two factors: a growing legislative agenda and 
increased levels of partisan polarization.  The first means that there are 
always bills pending; Congress’ work is literally never done.  The second 
helps explain why it has become so hard to move quickly on legislation. 
The two chambers of Congress have to agree on an identical bill for 
it to be sent to the President’s desk, but they work under very different 
                                                
43 Dewar, Helen.  2004.  “Another Congress to Return for Another Lame-
Duck Stint,” The Washington Post (October 27), A23. 
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rules.  Majoritarian rules of the House of Representatives, coupled with 
higher party unity scores, generally enable the House leadership to move 
proposals forward.  Yet the Senate relies far more on unanimous consent 
agreements, and increased use of the filibuster usually means that at least 
some cross-partisan cooperation is usually necessary for even the most 
mundane legislation, as noted by countless observers.44  Indeed, as Sarah 
Binder has pointed out, inter-cameral disagreement has often explained 
more gridlock than inter-branch disagreement.45  Or, as John Dingell once 
put it, the Senate is “the place where good legislation goes to die.”46  
Clearly, the Senate has not always been this way.47  But the hyper-
partisan atmosphere that has pervaded Washington for the last decade 
                                                
44 For example, see Binder, Sarah and Steven S. Smith.  1997.  Politics or 
Principle?  Filibustering in the U.S. Senate (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press); Binder, Sarah and Forrest Maltzman.  2002.  
“Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal Judges, 1947-1998,” AJPS 46:1 
(January), 190-199; Lee, Frances E., and Bruce I. Oppenheimer.  1999.  
Sizing Up the Senate (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 
45 Binder, Sarah.  1999.  “The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96,” 
The American Political Science Review 93:3 (September), 519-533. 
46 http://washingtonscene.thehill.com/in-the-know/36-news/4047-
dingell-senate-is-where-good-legislation-goes-to-die.  Joe Wantz told me 
about how he once worked in a House Democrat’s office, and he 
overheard a senior staffer explaining, “The Republicans aren’t the 
enemy.  The Republicans are the opposition.  The Senate is the enemy.” 
47 Former Senate staffer and White House advisor Ira Shapiro even wrote 
a book in which he argues that comity and compromise ruled the Senate 
before the 1980 election, after which a more partisan atmosphere made 
trench warfare the norm.  See Shapiro, Ira.  2012.  The Last Great Senate 
(PublicAffairs: New York). 
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only makes it harder for the Senate and therefore Congress as a whole to 
function effectively and efficiently. 
Unsurprisingly, then, in none of the years since 2000 has Congress 
completed action on all required appropriations bills.  Indeed, the 
appropriations system is one of the biggest factors in the 
institutionalization of lame duck sessions this century.  It has become 
increasingly difficult for Congress to complete all of its work to fund the 
government in regular session, and lame duck periods are now necessary 
to finalize such bills or, as a last resort, implement continuing resolutions 
to prevent a federal shutdown.  Only on occasion during the George W. 
Bush administration were important bills passed in lame duck sessions, 
most notably the creation of the Department of Homeland Security after 
Republican successes in the 2002 midterms.48  A CRS report discusses 
favorable post-election conditions in 2004 that permitted several budget 
and intelligence measures to pass.49  2006 and 2008 saw even less pass in 
lame duck sessions, for in both cases congressional Democrats sought to 
                                                
48 Van de Hei, Jim and Jonathan Weisman.  2002.  “Republicans Poised to 
Enact Agenda,” The Washington Post (November 7), A1. 
49 Beth and Tollestrup, Op cit, 26. 
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Table 2.2. Significant Legislation in Lame Duck Sessions, 2000-200951 
 
Date  Law 
  
2000-12-11 Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan 
2000-12-21 Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000 
2002-11-26 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Department of Homeland Security established) 
2002-11-26 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 
2002-11-27 Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2003 (inc. Creation of the 9/11 commission) 
2004-12-17 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004  
2006-12-18 US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 
2006-12-20 Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 (Part of Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006) 
2006-12-20 Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act  
 
 
                                                
50 Babington, Charles.  2006.  “So Much Legislation, So Little Time,” The 
Washington Post (September 26), A19; Kane, Paul.  2008.  “Democrats’ 
Push for Full-Scale Stimulus Stalled Until Jan. 20,” The Washington Post 
(November 15), A1. 
51 See footnote 41. 
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Which brings us to 2010. 
On November 2nd, 2010, congressional Democrats took an electoral 
“shellacking,” as President Obama put it.52  Republicans regained control 
of the House and narrowed the Democrats’ Senate majority to just a few 
seats.  The pundits took it as a sign that President Obama had 
overreached in his first two years, that voters were frustrated with the 
continued economic problems and angry with Washington.  Many 
commentators began discussing the new political realities of the 
incoming 112th Congress, including prospects for potential legislation and 
bipartisan cooperation.  The few analysts who remembered that the 111th 
Congress was not yet over did not expect much from the remaining two 
months of its term. 
Yet by the time the lame duck session of the 111th Congress closed 
up shop on December 22nd, Congress had passed several significant 
pieces of legislation.  The Bush tax cuts were extended for two years; 
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell was repealed; 9/11 responders got aid for medical 
expenses; a major food safety bill passed; and the Senate ratified the New 
START treaty.  “A six-week session that was expected to reflect a 
weakened president has turned into a surprising success,” wrote The 
                                                
52 Obama, Barack.  2010.  “The President’s News Conference,” November 
3.  Put online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American 




Washington Post.53  “It wasn’t such a lame-duck session after all,” added 
the Examiner.54  The 2010 lame duck session was widely cited as the most 
productive session since the adoption of the Twentieth Amendment.55 
One impetus for the success of the 2010 lame duck session was the 
fallout from the midterm elections.  President Obama and congressional 
Democrats now knew with certainty that the six-week lame duck session 
would be their last chance to exercise complete control over both ends of 
Pennsylvania Avenue in at least two years.  The president wanted to 
show that he was, in President Clinton’s words, “still relevant.” 56  
Moreover, the Bush tax cuts were scheduled to expire on December 31st, 
2010, and neither Congress nor the White House wanted to be held 
                                                
53 Bacon, Perry, Jr.  2010.  “A lame-duck session with unexpected 
victories,” The Washington Post (December 22), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/12/22/AR2010122203663.html 
54 Ferrechio, Susan.  2010.  “Lame-duck Congress not so lame after all,” 
The Examiner (December 22), available at 
http://washingtonexaminer.com/lame-duck-congress-not-so-lame-
after-all/article/108691#.UOhtN4n-l7k 
55 For example, see Franke-Ruta, Garance.  2011.  “The Most Productive 
Lame Duck Session Since WWII – and Maybe Ever,” The Atlantic 
(January), available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/12/the-most-
productive-lame-duck-since-wwii- and-maybe-ever/68442/; Sabato, 
Larry.  2010.  “It’s official.  Like it or not, this lame-duck session is the 
most productive of the 15 held since WWII,” tweet available at 
https://twitter.com/LarrySabato/status/17602021557276672. 
56 Clinton famously uttered this statement in April 1995, after months of 
the newly Republican-led Congress setting the agenda. 
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responsible for the resulting tax increases should the lower rates not be 
extended. 
On the Republican side, meanwhile, there were also reasons to 
reduce obstruction.  A number of Republicans no longer had to worry 
about alienating rabid partisans or constituents more generally; in 
particular, several moderate senators became more willing to buck the 
party line.  For example, while no Republican senator voted for cloture on 
the defense authorization bill that included the DADT repeal when it 
came to the floor in September, six did vote to end debate in December: 
Mark Kirk and Lisa Murkowski (newly elected and re-elected), George 
Voinovich (retiring), and Scott Brown, Susan Collins, and Olympia 
Snowe (Brown knew he would face a difficult re-election race in liberal 
Massachusetts, while Snowe has since retired).  One other newly re-
elected Republican, Richard Burr, voted in favor of final passage. 
2010 appears, at first glance, to be an outlier among lame duck 
sessions.  Both the House and the Senate held more roll call votes than in 
the previous seven lame duck sessions combined, and the votes included 
very significant legislation.  However, one could also see 2010 as a 
preview of future lame duck sessions.  With continually crowded 
legislative agendas, higher levels of partisanship, and an increasingly 
nationalized and volatile electorate, it is very unlikely that we will soon 
return to an era where one party can control a chamber for decades.  With 
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more frequent shifts in partisan control, there are more likely to be lame 
duck sessions that congressional leaders see as a last chance to enact 
legislation.  In addition, more frequent shifts mean that no one party is 
likely to finish with all the significant legislation it wants to pass during 
regular sessions. 
While it is true that a confluence of events led to the Democrats’ 
successful 2010 lame duck session, it is also true that such a set of 
conditions may no longer be a once-in-a-generation occurrence.  2010 
may instead prove to be a harbinger of future lame duck sessions.  
Having reviewed the historical narrative of lame ducks dating back to the 
Constitutional Convention – and before undertaking statistical analysis to 
help shed light on future lame ducks – we can now move to the current 
relevant literature, the gaps in the literature, and to the theories that I 
hope will fill some of those gaps.  
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Chapter III: Theory and Literature Review 
i. What do we think we know about lame ducks? 
 
My contribution to the literature focuses on the effects of elections on the 
proximate lame duck sessions of Congress.  Specifically, I argue that 
changes in partisan control of one or more of the three cogs in the 
legislative machine – the House, the Senate, and the White House – alter 
the strategic calculations of key players.  But rather than examining in 
excruciating detail these individual strategic calculations, I suggest that 
the policy output of Congress as a whole reflects the overall sum of 
strategic calculations.  Therefore, I focus on the legislation that emerges 
from Congress after elections.  Scrutiny of the output of lame duck 
sessions is a significant departure from the existing literature and is 
central to my contribution. 
 Indeed, there has been some academic work done on lame duck 
members, but virtually none on lame duck sessions.  Therefore, I will give 
a broad overview that begins with the questions of timing, then moves to 
representation, public influence on policymaking, and legislative shirking.  
All of these are important elements of my theory since I argue that lame 
duck sessions are unusual periods when members of Congress might 
change their calculations on these three questions.  In this overview I also 
refer back to some of the theories on political parties, especially the 
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parties in Congress, including the question of the effects of unified and 
divided government; again, these factors will be tied to the question of 
lame duck sessions themselves.  Then I discuss the scant existing 
literature on lame ducks, both in the White House and, finally, in 
Congress.  At the end of each section, I highlight the gaps in the current 
literature.  But before completing the literature review, I will discuss my 
own theories on lame duck sessions of Congress.  In explaining them, I 
will show how they differ from and add to the existing literature.   
 
 
ii. Deadlines and ducks 
 
 Time can be a powerful force in politics.  On many occasions, the 
timing of events ranging from elections to economic calamities has 
affected the content of legislation.  Deadlines have often been cited in 
bringing parties to agreement, and notable mediators have created 
artificial deadlines that force legislators or negotiators to come to an 
agreement that might not have been reached without the time constraint.  
Strategic scheduling, the deliberate attempt on the part of key decision-
makers to create an artificial deadline so as to induce cooperation or 
compromise, has also played a role in getting legislation passed.  In both 
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cases, the inescapable conclusion is that one should not underestimate the 
importance of time.57 
 The time issue is one of the main reasons I think it is worth 
studying lame duck sessions of Congress.  These sessions are, by 
definition, time-limited, and as such they provide a unique set of 
circumstances that can change the regular lawmaking patterns. 
 The power of time crops up in many an anecdote.  George J. 
Mitchell, who knew a thing or two about the importance of deadlines 
from his days as Senate Majority Leader, realized when chairing peace 
negotiations over the future of Northern Ireland, “A deadline would not 
guarantee success, but the absence of a deadline would guarantee 
failure.”58  On March 25th, 1998, he set a two-week deadline for the 
completion of talks, and while the parties missed the deadline by 
seventeen hours, the Good Friday Agreement on April 10th remains the 
basis for the transition to today’s more normalized and peaceful situation 
in an area once plagued by violence.  More prosaically, former 
Congressman Timothy Penny (DFL-MN) notes in a book he wrote after 
leaving office that members always face a legislative rush in order to get 
                                                
57 For a general discussion of the impact of setting the agenda, see Levine, 
Michael E. and Charles R. Plott.  1977.  “Agenda Influence and Its 
Implications,” Virginia Law Review 63:4 (May), 561-604. 
58 Mitchell, George J.  1999.  Making Peace (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press), 126.  
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home for the summer, Thanksgiving, or any other recess.59  Likewise, 
John Hilley, who was a congressional liaison for President Clinton, 
describes the rush to close a budget deal in July 1997: 
 
The congressional calendar was closing in.  If we could 
quickly reach agreement, we would be able to draft and file 
the bills and pass them in time for the August recess.  But if 
we failed, the long August recess that was currently our ally 
would turn against us.  If it became apparent that we could 
not move the bills by the end of the week, those who 
opposed the agreement would gain the upper hand.60 
 
More recent examples of self-imposed congressional deadlines include 
Patriot Act reauthorization, the debt ceiling, the Bush tax cuts, and, of 
course, the 2012-2013 fiscal cliff.61  Steven Dennis of CQ suggests that in 
times of high party polarization, when primary elections often determine 
who goes to Washington and incumbents need to worry about potential 
intra-party challenges, “Lawmakers need to have their backs against a 
wall — or cliff — to contemplate reaching a deal with the other side.”62 
                                                
59 Penny, Timothy J. and Major Garrett.  1995.  Common Cents (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company), 3 and 19. 
60 Hilley, John L.  2008.  The Challenge of Legislation: Bipartisanship in a 
Partisan World (Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC), 217-218. 
61 “Up Against a Deadline: A Familiar Situation for Congress,” CQ 
Weekly (December 3, 2012), 2418-2419, available at 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport112-000004183510. 
62 Dennis, Steven T.  2012.  “A Preview of Cliffs to Come,” CQ 




On the academic front, Juan J. Linz describes time as both a 
resource and “an extremely confining and limiting condition.”63  Terry 
Sullivan and Scott de Marchi explore the effect of presidents with limited 
tenure on legislative bargaining with Congress, concluding that “horizon 
effect” bargaining significantly affected much American policy-making, 
especially before 1933.64  Sarah Binder and Forrest Maltzman note that 
late-term judicial nominations are confirmed far less than those made 
early in a president’s term.65  Susan Webb Yackee highlights the “rushes” 
of roll call votes that congressional leaders schedule before major 
recesses.66  In each of these studies, what emerges is how scheduling can 
alter not only the timing of decisions, but the decisions themselves. 
Why would congressional leaders leave roll call votes, particularly 
on important issues, to the last minute?  There are two principal strategic 
reasons for deftly handling the congressional schedule.  The first deals 
with the individual member’s perspective: more time working on a bill 
                                                
63 Linz, Juan J.  1998.  “Democracy’s Time Constraints,” International 
Political Science Review 19:1 (January), 22. 
64 Sullivan, Terry and Scott de Marchi.  2011.  “Congressional Bargaining 
in Presidential Time: Give and Take, Anticipation, and the 
Constitutional Rationalization of Dead Ducks,” JOP 73:3 (July), 748-750. 
65 Binder, Sarah and Forrest Maltzman, Op cit.  See also Massie, Tajuana 
D., Thomas G. Hansford, and Donald R. Songer.  2004.  “The Timing of 
Presidential Nominations to the Lower Federal Courts,” Political 
Research Quarterly 57:1 (March), 145-154. 
66 Yackee, Op cit, 139. 
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means more opportunities to put a mark on the bill, particularly a large 
mark.  “Most lawmakers know serious legislative work is left to the last 
minute,” writes Penny.  “That’s because power brokers are able to secure 
more concessions the longer they hold out.  Why should anyone want to 
compromise any earlier than necessary?”67  Ceding points on a bill in the 
early stages of writing the legislation can be perceived as weakness or an 
abandonment of principles, while reaching the exact same compromise 
after months of bargaining may earn one the reputation of being a tough 
negotiator.  Since most legislators have an eye on future legislation (not to 
mention re-election), their reputations as determined negotiators are 
important to maintain; lame duck legislators may be more willing to 
compromise because they do not have to worry about any future 
negotiations. 
The second reason to leave votes until late in the day can be 
chalked up to the party leaders.  As Yackee explains, “Congressional 
leaders work to manipulate the timing of roll call votes to maximize the 
electoral advantage of their party Members.”68  Now it is a question not 
so much of the substance of the bill, but the public perception of the bill.  
Some leaders may want to keep an issue alive for elections, so they seek 
to delay a vote indefinitely because they feel that voters will reward their 
                                                
67 Penny and Garrett, Op cit, 215. 
68 Yackee, Op cit, 147. 
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party and punish the opposition the longer that the issue is kept in the 
public eye.  Others may be afraid for their own party’s electoral 
consequences because of their stance, and so they delay a vote until the 
lame duck session.  In 2010, for example, Democratic leaders shied away 
from scheduling a vote on extending the Bush tax cuts during the regular 
session; only after the elections did a vote come to the floor as part of a 
wider compromise. 
Neither Yackee nor Penny touches on lame duck sessions.  Penny 
points out why major legislation tends to come at the end of a specific 
timeframe, though there are several such timeframes within each 
congressional term (e.g. the long period leading to the summer recess or 
the months before the Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays).  He does 
not address the last possible timeframe, a post-election session.  
Meanwhile, Yackee does not make the leap to the strategic use of lame 
duck sessions, although congressional leaders who want to implement a 
policy that might cause electoral problems have a clear incentive to wait 
until after elections to seek a vote.  My work seeks to bridge this gap and 
insert lame duck sessions into the discussion about the strategic use of the 






iii. New theories 
 
Simply put, the current literature does not examine or explain the 
legislative output of lame duck sessions.  Broadly speaking, laws passed 
in lame duck sessions are considered inconsequential, a collection of 
unfinished business and legislative afterthoughts that fill the time 
between elections and new oaths of office.  Oftentimes, such laws are, in 
fact, insignificant – yet lame ducks are quite productive in their short 
sessions, and some of their laws are not trivial at all.  The reason is that 
lame duck sessions are the last chance for Congress as a whole to finish 
off bills before the clock strikes midnight and they turn into pumpkins, 
having to start from the beginning of the legislative process in the new 
session.  Moreover, these sessions are the last chance, period, for those 
politicians who will not continue to serve in the coming year.  Are lame 
duck sessions more productive than regular sessions?  Is the legislation 
passed in lame duck sessions more significant than that of regular 
sessions?  And do elections have an impact on lame duck legislation?  Let 
us look at these questions in turn, which will lay the basis for my 
contribution to the gaps in the literature. 
 First, absolute productivity.  Given that lame duck sessions are 
much shorter than regular sessions, it is reasonable to expect that fewer 
laws would pass in the short sessions.  The flip side is that the legislative 
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process is a long and cumbersome one, so there might be a number of 
bills that have to make their way through various committees, hearings, 
etc. and only reach the final stages near the end of a session.  Moreover, 
the lame duck session is the last chance for any bill to pass before it 
would have to start the entire process from the beginning in the new 
Congress.  Thus, I would expect a surge of legislation in the waning days 
of a Congress; when a Congress holds a lame duck session, that surge 
should come then.  And even if there are fewer laws enacted in lame 
duck sessions, my expectation is that the proportion of laws passed to the 
number of legislative days would be far higher in lame duck than in 
regular sessions.  Sure enough, my research shows that while over 2,400 
laws have been passed in the final month before an election, the same 
quantity of laws have been enacted in the last three days of a congressional 
session (see Figure 2.1, 30).  Generally speaking, more laws are passed per 
day in a lame duck session than during a regular session. 
 More interesting than the number of laws, however, is the 
significance of those laws. 
 To date, no one has examined the legislative output of lame duck 
sessions.  Focusing on the behavior of individual members of Congress is 
an important part of the story of lame ducks, but these individual 
members can only form a part of the story.  If MCs stray further from 
their constituents’ interests, or from the party line, during lame duck 
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sessions, does that have a measureable effect on the legislative outcomes?  
What determines the level of significance of legislation passed in lame 
duck sessions?  Is it merely a time to name more postmasters and post 
office buildings or is it a time to achieve all that is left to achieve? 
In general, I would expect that the most important laws passed in a 
two-year congressional term would come in the first year.  When a new 
party comes to power, its leaders seek to implement a legislative agenda; 
given that time is often the enemy of political action, party leaders 
usually try to attack the most important issues as quickly as possible.  
Even if partisan control has not changed at the polls, there is invariably a 
new cohort of elected officials, each with a set of ideas or promises to 
pursue in Congress.  There are plenty of historical examples, such as 
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs enacted in the first half of 1965, 
Ronald Reagan’s and George W. Bush’s pushes for tax cuts in 1981 and 
2001, and of course Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Hundred Days (twice). 
But in the second year of the term, much of the attention is focused 
on upcoming elections.  Legislative achievements of 1934, 1966, 1982, and 
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2002 pale in comparison to those of 1933, 1965, 1981, and 2001.69  There 
may be more grandstanding than lawmaking before the elections; only 
afterwards, when partisan battles have receded and voters and the media 
are no longer focusing on the elections as if they were horse races, can 
Congress return to the business of legislating.  So while there may be a 
decline in the significance of an average law from the first year to the 
second, within that second year laws should become more significant as 
one proceeds from the regular to the lame duck session. 
Even more interesting is the variation in legislative significance 
from one lame duck session to another.  Many scholars have compared 
the legislative outputs across different Congresses, but no one has done 
so across lame duck sessions.  Since these sessions are unique – with the 
membership of the old Congress but knowledge of the new – the strategic 
calculations are also unique to these sessions.  Some scholars have looked 
at the effect of a change in party control of a chamber on individual 
members’ voting behavior, but not on the legislative output; additionally, 
no one has yet taken into account changes at the White House.  The 
calculations made by presidents and congressional party leaders depend 
                                                
69 Even after the September 11th, 2001 attacks, with some important pieces 
of legislation passed in 2002, the legislative accomplishments of 2001 
remain, arguably, more impressive: the Bush tax cuts, No Child Left 
Behind, and the Patriot Act.  And for evidence of a rise in significance 
from the regular to the lame duck session within the second year, one 
can consider the law creating the Department of Homeland Security, 
which passed in November 2002. 
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in large part on the make-up of partisan control of both ends of 
Pennsylvania Avenue and, more importantly, on the partisan picture for 
the coming Congress.  The key factors in lame duck sessions are not only 
whether the government is under unified or divided partisan control, but 
also whether the elections have triggered a shift from one to the other. 
My theoretical contribution lies here, at the crossroads of electoral 
results and partisanship within Congress.  If one political party has 
control of all three elements of the legislative process – the House, the 
Senate, and the White House – but it has just lost control of one or more 
of those institutions, its leaders have every incentive to pass as much 
legislation as they can in their final days.  Moreover, they have every 
incentive to pass the most significant legislation possible before 
relinquishing power.  Not only that, but the outgoing majority party now 
recognizes that the soon-to-be majority may have a stronger bargaining 
position within the lame duck sessions because the certainty of the future 
invariably affects the present.70 
Partly this is the changing perception of power; partly it is an 
awareness that the outgoing majority will soon depend on the incoming 
majority for the scraps from the top table.  This is particularly true in the 
                                                
70 The logic is the same when an OPEC decision to reduce oil production 
(effects that might not actually take place for months) can raise gas 
prices the same day.  Gas stations’ present prices reflect not just current 
supply and demand but also future expectations. 
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House, where the majority can run roughshod over the minority.71  The 
obvious recent example is the 2010 lame duck session, but the same can 
be said of the 1980 lame duck session, when Democrats lost both the 
White House and the Senate.  On the other hand, if the elections did not 
produce shifts in partisan control, then there need not be any rush.  
Congress did not pass any memorable legislation after the 2004 elections, 
for example.  Therefore, I infer that the average significance of legislation 
passed in lame duck sessions would be higher when there is an 
impending change in partisan control than if the election simply 
maintained the status quo. 
The ultimate shift in partisan control is when one party in control 
of the House, the Senate, and the White House loses all three in the 
elections.  Because mid-term congressional elections typically signal 
impending changes at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, a complete 
change in one election has only happened three times in the entire history 
of the United States: 1800, 1840, and 1952.  The first two dates are not 
covered by the dataset I will use, compiled by Joshua D. Clinton and John 
S. Lapinski, and the outgoing Congress did not meet in a lame duck 
session after the Republican takeover in 1952. 
                                                
71 It is possible that the outgoing majority may have an incentive not to 
annoy the incoming majority, but historically, there is less of an “if I’m 
nice, then they’ll be nice” sentiment and more of an “uh-oh, I’d better 
get everything done before I leave” mentality. 
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However, the 1800-1801 lame duck session is famous for the 
outgoing Federalists’ attempt to deny Thomas Jefferson the presidency.  
It is also memorable for passage of the 1801 Judiciary Act, which allowed 
lame duck John Adams to appoint “midnight judges” including John 
Marshall and led to Marbury v Madison.  The 1840-1841 lame duck session 
did not see any significant legislation, but then the 26th Congress did not 
pass much significant legislation anyway.  Instead, the outgoing Senate 
selected, as was the tradition, the Senate printers for the upcoming 
session; since these printers were partisan allies filling patronage 
positions, the new Whig-led Senate immediately fired those printers 
upon taking office and installed their own allies.72  Both of these sessions 
highlight the point I am trying to make, namely, that a political party on 
its way out of power has every incentive to pass legislation and make 
appointments before the opposition takes control.  Given the time 
constraints of a lame duck session, an outgoing unified government will 
tend to pass more significant legislation than either a continuing unified 
government or a divided government.  
In addition, the length of incumbency is important.  A party that 
has held unified control for many years will have had time to enact most, 
if not all, of its legislative agenda before its last months in power.  But if a 
                                                
72 Koger, Gregory.  2010.  Filibustering: A Political History of Obstruction in 
the House and Senate (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 62-63. 
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party has only had unified control for a session or two, there is every 
likelihood that it has not completed action on all its major policy 
initiatives.  Thus the party leadership would have an incentive to 
undertake a “strategic rush.”  This would help explain the Democrats’ 
legislative accomplishments in 2010 after they had only controlled 
Congress for two sessions and had unified control for a single session.  
On the other hand, Republicans exactly a century earlier in 1910 had little 
left to do after having had unified control for over a decade, since the 
realigning election of 1896.  In sum, I suggest that some of the key factors 
that determine the average significance of a law passed in a lame duck 
session are partisan control, oncoming partisan shifts, and the time that 
the current partisan make-up has lasted. 
Of course, it is also important to look at the incentives of the 
minority party.  In the case of a party that knows it will remain in the 
minority for the foreseeable future, I suggest that there should be more of 
a willingness to cooperate with the majority party.  For example, after 
Republicans failed to wrest control of Congress from Democrats in 1970 
and 1974, nobody in Washington believed that they would be able to do 
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so for many years to come.73  Partly because the election results gave 
credence to this belief, the Republicans were willing to go along with 
legislative agendas of the Democratic majority (sometimes over the 
objections of the Republican Presidents). 
In general, this willingness to accede to the congressional majority 
emerges because the electoral considerations are no longer paramount.  
Before the election, a minority party has an incentive to oppose every 
major initiative proposed by the majority party, if only to draw a contrast 
for the voters, but this should factor less after Election Day.  If the 
minority party wins control of the House, Senate, and White House, then 
it has no incentive to cooperate.  Thus did very little happen during the 
1932-1933 lame duck session despite the gravest economic crisis the 
country had ever seen.  Instead, the incoming majority party has every 
incentive to block or delay significant legislation until the next session, 
when it will have unified control on its own. 
The tougher question is, what happens when a minority party 
captures at least one chamber of Congress or the White House, changing 
Washington from unified to divided partisan control.  One possibility is 
that it would have an incentive to block or delay legislation until it has a 
                                                
73 That is one reason that the 1980 elections caught so many people off 
guard – nobody, not even Republican leaders, expected Republicans to 
take control of the Senate for the first time in decades – and therefore 
created an environment conducive to legislative productivity in the 
lame duck session. 
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more powerful seat at the table in the next session.  On the other hand, its 
leaders can afford to be magnanimous in the wake of the electoral 
victory; perhaps they might also allow unpopular legislation through at 
this point, preferring that it pass under the outgoing regime rather than 
having to deal with it themselves.  At the same time, some minority party 
members who had toed the party line to help present a united front 
before the election often feel more free to vote with the majority party.  
Whipping votes in lame duck sessions can prove more difficult than in 
regular sessions74; even if defectors constitute only a minority of the 
minority, they might still constitute enough votes to enable the majority 
to overcome a filibuster in the Senate.  The relevant example here is, 
again, the 2010 session, when several Republicans dropped their 
filibuster of the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell repeal and other bills. 
So what about status quo elections?  If control of Congress and the 
White House will remain the same in the forthcoming session of 
Congress, then there is typically little incentive to pass significant 
legislation before the new session begins.  Even when there are budget 
bills still to pass, recent Congresses have generally kicked the can down 
the road via continuing resolutions rather than finalizing the 
appropriations.  This is particularly the case when the incoming Congress 
                                                
74 Friel, Brian.  2010.  “On the Hunt for Lame-Duck Loyalty,” CQ 




will look much like the outgoing Congress; without an impending shift, 
there is generally no sense of urgency amongst any of the political parties 
(neither for appropriations bills nor for any other significant legislation).  
I would expect that the lame duck sessions following elections that do not 
alter the partisan make-up of Washington end up passing legislation with 
relatively low average significance. 
The final scenario is when divided government gives way to 
unified government.  Conclusions about this scenario are more difficult to 
draw because the context can vary.  For the party soon to be without any 
control, it is the last chance to exert influence from the top table, so the 
onus lies on the party about to take full power.  For example, in the wake 
of the Panic of 1893, Republicans took control of Congress, sharing power 
with Democratic President Grover Cleveland until they took back the 
White House in the 1896 elections.  Working with a conservative 
Democratic president – and losing 50 seats despite William McKinley’s 
victory 75  – Republican congressional leaders were able to legislative 
effectively during the lame duck session.  On the other hand, following 
Warren G. Harding’s victory in the 1920 elections, leaders of the 
Republican Congress had no reason to do very much in the 1920-1921 
                                                
75 The 54th Congress (1895-1896) saw 254 Republicans in the House as 
compared with just 93 Democrats, and while Republicans kept a solid 
majority in the subsequent 55th Congress, there were only 206 
Republicans versus 124 Democrats and 22 Populists. 
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lame duck session.  Given that their party won an additional 62 seats in 
the House and 10 seats in the Senate, Republicans had even less incentive 
to move significant legislation. 
The key here is the change in congressional seats for the party of 
the incoming president.  If this party makes huge gains, it is in their 
interest to wait until their new members can take office.  If this party 
makes only minor gains, or even loses a few seats, then it may wish to act 
sooner – in the lame duck session – rather than later.  On average, then, I 
would expect lame duck Congresses under divided government about to 
become unified government to pass more significant legislation than 
lame duck Congresses where there will be no change.76 
In sum, I think there is a hierarchy of legislative output when it 
comes to lame duck sessions.  At the bottom end are those that follow 
status quo elections for the reasons described above.  A change from 
                                                
76 A corollary is that the impetus to pass significant legislation would be 
stronger if the political parties are further apart ideologically.  If the 
parties are relatively close on an ideological scale, then relinquishing 
power is not the end of the world.  One party yielding to another during 
Neustadt’s “politics of mid-century” would not lead to a tectonic shift in 
policy, as was shown when Eisenhower and the Republicans took 
power in 1952, Democrats regained Congress in 1954, or Kennedy won 
in 1960.  If, on the other hand, party polarization is high, then losing an 
election may be akin to losing a war.  This certainly seems to be the case 
in recent elections, where Democrats could not believe that George W. 
Bush won re-election in 2004 and Republicans felt the same way after 
Barack Obama won re-election in 2012.  So in my model I will control for 
the ideological gap between parties, assuming that the higher the gap, 
the more significant the legislation passed in lame duck sessions. 
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divided to unified government should lead, on average, to a somewhat 
higher level of legislative significance (though at times a divided 
government could be stymied from passing important legislation, as also 
described above).  But a lame duck session meeting after elections that 
change a unified government to a divided one (or to opponents’ unified 
government) should pass legislation with the highest average level of 
significance out of all three scenarios. 
The question may be asked, what about the Senate minority?  
Given the potential for filibusters, wouldn’t minority senators have even 
greater incentives for talking bills they don’t like to death?  Sometimes, 
this has happened.  As Gregory Koger points out, many filibusters in the 
19th century happened during lame duck sessions.77  And, yes, senators 
have filibustered more key bills during lame duck sessions when partisan 
feelings run high, such as in 1917 – when a filibuster led directly to 
President Wilson’s request for an anti-filibuster mechanism, which 
became the cloture rule – and in more recent times, when the 2010 Dream 
Act fell to a filibuster.  However, even in highly partisan times, no 
political party is monolithic.  As noted earlier, individual members of 
Congress often try to hide intra-party divisions before elections in order 
to present a united front to the electorate.  Once the elections are over, 
conservative Democrats, liberal Republicans, or moderates on either side 
                                                
77 Koger, Gregory.  2010.  Op cit. 
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may be more willing to either switch votes or to at least stop supporting a 
filibuster.  Thus, the DADT repeal passed in the 2010 lame duck session 
with support from several Republicans, while in 1889, a month before a 
Republican-led unified government took over, a lame duck Grover 
Cleveland signed into law the bill creating the Cabinet-level Department 
of Agriculture, passed by a Republican Senate and Democratic House. 
Of course, filibusters are far more common today than they were a 
decade ago, much less a century ago.  Unless there is substantive 
filibuster reform, it is hard to see how the number of filibusters will 
decrease; even threatened filibusters are often enough to stop legislation 
in its tracks.  However, since filibusters have become the norm during the 
regular sessions as well, senators are unlikely to see them as an 
extraordinary last resort.  Given that the filibuster have become just 
another legislative tactic, it becomes harder to keep every senator onside 
in such a lame duck session when filibusters have become a regular 
feature of the regular session as well. 
Comparing the policy outputs of different lame duck sessions will 
enable me to supplement the work already done on individual members 
of Congress in such sessions.  I want to tie together the research on 
unified versus divided government, political parties and partisanship, 
and strategic behavior in the context of lame duck sessions.  Then we can 
see how strategic behavior affects scheduling, shirking and the outcomes 
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in terms of actual legislation.  All of this ties back to the larger question of 
representation, for lame duck sessions are unusual periods when the 
electoral and partisan connections are weakened if not severed.  What 
does it say about our system that lame duck sessions, having languished 
in obscurity for so long, are now becoming increasingly important?  Most 
other democracies do not feature lame duck sessions; does that mean 
their governments are more representative of their people?  Or do lame 
duck sessions enable elected officials to govern instead of grandstand, to 
legislate instead of pander, thereby serving the greater good?  These are 
the key questions that my research seeks to help answer. 
 
 
iv. Representation and shirking 
 
The modern idea of representation can be broken into three 
component parts: (1) a representative person or group has 
power to act for, or in place of, another person or group; (2) 
the representative is elected by those for whom he is to act; 
(3) the representative is responsible for his acts to those 
whom he represents. 
- Charles A. Beard and John D. Lewis78 
 
Scholars tend to agree that members of Congress take constituent 
preferences into account in virtually everything they do.  From casting 
                                                
78 Beard, Charles A. and John D. Lewis.  1932.  “Representative 
Government in Evolution,” APSR 26:2 (April), 228. 
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votes to choosing committee assignments, the constituency looms large in 
members’ calculations.  If the Founding Fathers had a trustee model of 
representation in mind – à la Edmund Burke – with all the constitutional 
limitations on democracy, we seem to have left that model behind a long 
time ago.  More fitting nowadays would be a party mandate model, 
where representatives generally toe the party line, or perhaps a delegate 
model, whereby members vote as they think their constituents (or at least 
their re-election constituency) would want them to vote.   
In order to continue in their roles, members of Congress must 
maintain fealty to their constituents as much as possible.  David Mayhew 
famously described members as “single-minded seekers of re-election.”79  
Therefore, members cast their votes with an eye not only on current 
public opinion, but also on potential future public opinion.  Other notable 
political scientists such as R. Douglas Arnold, Richard Fenno, Morris 
Fiorina, and John Kingdon concur.80  In fact, it is hard to find any major 
scholar who truly believes that re-election is not a priority for members of 
Congress.  After all, even if one’s overriding goal is to promote and pass 
                                                
79 Mayhew, David R.  1974.  Congress: The Electoral Connection (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 5. 
80 Arnold, R. Douglas.  1990.  The Logic of Congressional Action (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press); Fenno, Richard F., Jr.  1973.  
Congressmen in Committees (Boston, MA: Little, Brown); Fenno, Richard 
F., Jr.  1978.  Home Style (Boston, MA: Little, Brown); Kingdon, John.  
1981.  Congressmen’s Voting Decisions, 2nd ed (New York: Harper and 
Row), 569; Fiorina, Morris P.  1989.  Congress: Keystone of the Washington 
Establishment, 2nd ed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press). 
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good public policy, as Fenno argues, one has to be in power in order to 
do so.  Consequently, as Joseph A. Schlesinger puts it, “The desire for 
election and, more important, for re-election becomes the electorate’s 
restraint upon its public officials.”81  Not a single one of these authors, 
however, discuss how members might change their behavior if re-
election is no longer a factor. 
Some scholars believe that an MC’s votes in Congress don’t make 
much of a difference to voters.  For issues to matter, voters must be aware 
of them, care about them, and, crucially, they must know what the parties 
say about and how they differ on the issues.  If “The voters are not fools,” 
in V.O. Key’s famous dictum, MCs must take voters’ views into account.82  
If voters are not well informed, though, they tend to fall back on cues, 
especially party labels, so MCs have more freedom in casting votes on 
legislation.  The two ends of the spectrum are encapsulated by the 
rational-choice school in Anthony Downs’ An Economic Theory of 
                                                
81 Schlesinger, Joseph A.  1966.  Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand 
McNally), 2. 
82 Key, V.O.  1966.  The Responsible Electorate (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press); see also Key, V.O.  1961.  Public Opinion and American 
Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf). 
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Democracy and the Michigan Model in Angus Campbell et al’s The 
American Voter.83 
Under the latter view, the conventional academic view that 
Congress and the public are not responsive to one another would, as 
David R. Jones and Monika L. McDermott put it, underestimate the 
democratic capabilities of both Americans and Congress.84  After all, if 
public opinion shifts, politicians often pick up the shift as well.  “Like 
antelope in an open field,” as James A. Stimson puts it, “[politicians] cock 
their ears and focus their full attention on the slightest sign of danger.”85  
Thus it would be impossible for MCs not to take constituent opinion 
                                                
83 Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. 
Stokes.  1960.  The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.); 
Downs, Anthony.  1957.  An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: 
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Dona-Gene Mitchell, and Scot Schraufnagel.  2007.  “Does Familiarity 
Breed Contempt?,” AJPS 51:1; Ferejohn, John.  1986.  “Incumbent 
Performance and Electoral Control,” Public Choice 50:2, 5-26; Fiorina, 
Morris P.  1981.  Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New 
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Voter (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 
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85 Stimson, James A., Michael B. MacKuen, and Robert Erikson.  1995.  
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under consideration when casting votes on bills, which would suggest 
that reducing the constituent pressure might alter both individual and 
collective behavior.  Such a reduction can come during lame duck 
sessions, which makes them worthy of study to shed light on the links 
between people and their representatives. 
That is why the different theories of voting behavior are relevant to 
the study of lame duck Congresses, for one’s beliefs on how individuals 
make their choices in the ballot booths infuse how one sees the general 
public influencing policy.  If voters know or care little about how their 
elected representatives act in Congress, then those representatives should 
behave the same way before and after elections.  On the other hand, if 
voters pay at least some attention on some issues, then representatives 
don’t have carte blanche to do anything they like.  If they stray too far 
from public opinion in their home districts, they could lose their re-
election bids; but in the lame duck period after an election such 
considerations would play a diminished role. 
I agree with the balance of scholarly opinion that members of 
Congress must adhere, for the most part, to constituency opinion, or at 
least to the opinions of those constituents upon whom they rely for 
support.  Furthermore, I think party leaders – whose primary goal is to 
win or retain majority control of their chambers – understand the 
constraints of public opinion.  They strive to balance the need for party 
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members to win re-election with the party’s legislative aims.  When such 
goals come into conflict, party leaders can schedule votes on controversial 
issues in a strategic manner, so as to assure passage while minimizing 
any electoral damage to the rank and file.  A great time to schedule such 
votes, of course, is during the lame duck session. 
Tied to the question of representation is that of legislative shirking, 
whereby members of Congress can act and vote without focusing on 
constituents’ interests or electoral consequences.  The literature on 
shirking explores the relative weight of personal ideology and constituent 
interest in determining congressional voting behavior.86  “The electoral 
mechanism constrains elected representatives,” write Lawrence S. 
Rothenberg and Mitchell S. Saunders.87  “Voting contrary to what your 
constituents want is electorally costly in November,” writes Eric 
Uslaner.88  But what about those who no longer have to worry about 
electoral considerations? If voters elect representatives who share the 
                                                
86 Bender, Bruce and Lott, Jr., John R.  1996.  “Legislator Voting and 
Shirking: A Critical Review of the Literature,” Public Choice 87:1-2 
(April), 67-68.  For example, see Richardson, Jr., Lilliard E. and Michael 
C. Munger.  1990.  “Shirking, Representation, and Congressional 
Behavior: Voting on the 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act,” 
Public Choice 67:1 (July), 11-33. 
87 Rothenberg, Lawrence S., and Mitchell S. Sanders.  2000.  “Severing the 
Electoral Connection: Shirking in the Contemporary Congress,” AJPS 
44:2 (April), 322. 
88 Uslaner, Eric.  1999.  The Movers and the Shirkers: Representatives and 
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same ideology, the same values and positions on the issues, then there 
should not be a problem, since the congressional voting behavior would 
not change even without the threat of re-election. 
Nonetheless, there appear to be some changes in behavior.  For 
example, those members who retire voluntarily tend to have a more 
focused legislative agenda, introducing bills on just one or two topics 
instead of those running for re-election, who are more prone to 
introducing what Rebekah Herrick et al call “apparently frivolous 
legislation.”89  Some scholars have explored shirking in state legislatures 
as well, often focusing on the effects of term limits on legislators who 
cannot seek reelection.  They do not find large substantive effects, though 
term-limited politicians do shift their focus away from pork-barrel 
projects and towards the perceived need of the state as well as their own 
                                                
89 Herrick, Rebekah, Michael K. Moore, and John R. Hibbing.  1994.  
“Unfastening the Electoral Connection: The Behavior of U.S. 




beliefs rather than their perceptions of constituent interests.90  Gerald C. 
Wright notes that there is no evidence that term-limited legislators are 
any less representative than those in states without term limits.91 
But what about the most serious form of shirking, voting against 
the interests of one’s constituents?  The evidence here is mixed, with 
some finding that departing members of Congress do shirk more than 
                                                
90 Carey, John M., Richard G. Niemi, and Lynda W. Powell.  1998.  “The 
Effects of Term Limits on State Legislatures,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 
23:2 (May), 271-300.  See also Franklin, Daniel, and Tor Westin.  1998.  
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91 Wright, Gerald C.  2007.  “Do Term Limits Affect Legislative Roll Call 
Voting?  Representation, Polarization, and Participation,” State Politics & 
Policy Quarterly 7:3 (Fall), 256.  The evidence is mixed when it comes to 
one form of shirking, non-attendance.  See Lott, Jr., John R.  1990.  
“Attendance rates, political shirking, and the effect of post-elective office 
employment,” Economic Inquiry 28:1 (January), 133; Figlio, David N.  
1995.  “The effect of retirement on political shirking: Evidence from 
congressional voting,” Public Finance Quarterly 23, 226-241; Parker, 
Glenn R. and Matthew S. Dabros.  2012.  “Last-period problems in 
legislatures,” Public Choice 151:3-4, 789. 
 
 78 
their colleagues and others disputing the claim.92  Meanwhile, Matthew B. 
Wright finds that voters punish shirking legislators, while David N. 
Figlio finds that the timing of shirking behavior is crucial: shirking early 
in a term has less of an effect on reelection than shirking in the final year 
before a senator is up for re-election.93  By extension, shirking in a lame 
duck session as far away as possible from the next election would have 
minimal effect on the next popular vote.  At the same time, he also finds 
that the causal arrow can point both ways, that a decision to retire can 
lead to political shirking.94   But it is important not to assume that 
politicians are always looking to vote against their constituents’ interests, 
only held back by the threat of repudiation at the polls.  After all, they got 
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elected because the voters approved of their views in the first place.  As 
Bruce Bender and Lott conclude, most of the evidence indicates that even 
when shirking becomes feasible, “Politicians continue to vote in the same 
way that they have previously.”95 
Yet Bender and Lott, like Figlio and many others in the shirking 
literature, do not examine behavior in lame duck sessions.  In these 
sessions, such shirking behavior should theoretically be at its maximum 
because in the members who decided to retire voluntarily are joined by 
those who just lost their re-election bids.  So while retiring members may 
shirk well before the lame duck session, others should not.  Moreover, the 
number of retirees is usually exceeded by the number who leave office 
involuntarily.  The combined number of MCs who lose primary elections, 
general elections, and attempts to reach other office usually exceeds the 
number of voluntary retirees (while true half the time for the Senate, it 
has been true all but twice in the House over the last 40 years).  And the 
number of Congressmen who only learned on Election Day that they 
would be leaving is even more telling, since in the last four decades, that 
number within one party exceeds those who knew earlier that they were 
lame ducks only on five occasions: Republicans in 1974 and 2006, and 
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Democrats in 1980, 1994, and 2010.96  Not surprisingly, four of those five 
lame duck sessions were the most productive since passage of the 20th 
Amendment in terms of significant legislation. 
In fact, there seems to be very little discussion of lame duck 
sessions in the main body of work on legislative shirking.  However, my 
analysis will focus on the actions of Congress as a whole, not those of 
individual members.  Since shirking can mean voting against one’s 
constituent interests in favor of the party interest, let us now turn to the 
roles and behavior of political parties. 
 
 
v. Parties and partisanship 
 
The role and behavior of political leaders and political parties as a 
whole is central to my approach to lame duck sessions of Congress.  What 
                                                
96 http://www.rollcall.com/politics/casualtylist.html - For example, in 
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is the function of political parties in Congress? My approach takes 
political parties as more than just fluctuating coalitions of like-minded 
legislators, but as institutions in an of themselves.97 
I see partisan control of each chamber and the White House as 
crucial to understanding what happens in Congress, particularly in lame 
duck sessions.  I don’t go as far as the responsible party government 
theory, where cohesive parties simply enact the platforms on which they 
run as in parliamentary systems.98  However, I do draw upon John 
Aldrich and David Rohde’s theory of conditional party government.  
Here, the strength of a party depends upon its legislators’ preferences; 
under the accompanying strategic party government model, each party’s 
unity increases along with that of the opposing party, with higher unity 
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normative doctrine.  See Jones, Bryan D.  1994.  Reconceiving Decision-
Making in Democratic Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press); 
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linked to electoral outcomes.99  If preferences diverge across parties but 
are homogeneous within them, then the majority party ought to be 
sufficiently strong to pass significant legislation.100 
Generally speaking, majority parties can use institutional rules to 
influence collective choice.101  Particularly in the House, the majority 
party leadership can set the agenda.  As Speaker Tip O’Neill commented, 
                                                
99 Lebo, Matthew J., Adam J. McGlynn, and Gregory Koger.  2007.  
“Strategic Party Government: Party Influence in Congress, 1789-2000,” 
AJPS 51:3 (July), 464.  See also the work done by Gary Cox and Mathew 
McCubbins on how parties act as legislative cartels: Cox, Gary W., and 
Matthew D. McCubbins.  1993.  Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in 
the House (Chicago: University of Chicago Press); Cox, Gary W. and 
Matthew D. McCubbins. 2005.  Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party 
Government in the U.S. House of Representatives (New York: Cambridge 
University Press). 
100 Rohde, David W.  1991.  Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press); Aldrich, John H.  1995.  Why 
Parties?  The Origins and Transformation of Party Politics in America 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press); Aldrich, John H. and David W. 
Rohde.  1995.  “Theories of the party in the legislature and the transition 
to Republican rule in the House.”  Presentation at the annual meeting of 
the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. 
101 See Shepsle, Kenneth A.  1979.  “Institutional Arrangements and 
Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models,” AJPS 23:1 (February), 
27-59; Shepsle, Kenneth A.  1986.  “The Positive Theory of Legislative 
Institutions,” Public Choice 50:1-3, 135-178; Shepsle, Kenneth A. and 
Barry R. Weingast.  1981.  “Structure-Induced Equilibrium and 
Legislative Choice,” Public Choice 37:3, 503-519; Shepsle, Kenneth A. and 
Barry R. Weingast.  1984.  “When Do Rules of Procedure Matter?” JOP 
46:1 (February), 206-221; Weingast, Barry R.  1979.  “A Rational Choice 
Perspective on Congressional Norms,” AJPS 23:2 (May), 245-262. 
 
 83 
“The power of the Speaker of the House is the power of scheduling.”102  
Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert acknowledged in 2004 that he 
wouldn’t let a vote come before the chamber unless “a majority of the 
majority” wanted it.103  The majority party then claims legitimacy for 
passing significant legislation (or any legislation) by virtue of perceived 
public opinion as expressed at the ballot box. 
This party mandate (or voter mandate) model rests on two 
components: The first is that voters consciously use their votes to signal 
their preferences to the government, but the second is that public officials 
actually receive the signal and then act on it.104  After an election, argues 
Jones, the responsible party model dominates postelection political 
                                                
102 Congressional Record, 98th Congress, 1st session (Washington, DC: GPO), 
November 15, 1983, 32675. 
103 Babington, Charles.  2004.  “Hastert Launches a Partisan Policy,” The 
Washington Post (November 27), A01, available online at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A15423-
2004Nov26.html.  Of course, this majority-of-the-majority problem was 
evident in the 2012 lame duck session, when Speaker Boehner had to 
pull his Plan B bill to deal with the fiscal cliff because of a lack of 
Republican support.  This Plan B would have allowed tax rates to rise 
for those with annual incomes over $1 million, but with no significant 
support in either party, Boehner – mindful of the impending vote to re-
elect him as Speaker – did not even allow a vote on his own proposal.  
See Newhauser, Daniel and Meredith Shiner.  2012.  “Boehner Says He’s 
‘Not Interested’ in Passing a Bill That Most of GOP Objects To,” Roll Call 
(December 27), available at 
http://www.rollcall.com/news/boehner_says_hes_not_interested_in_p
assing_a_bill_that_most_of_gop_objects-220392-1.html?pos=hln 
104 Grossback, Lawrence J., David A.M. Peterson, and James A. Stimson.  
2006.  Mandate Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press), 14. 
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commentary and press coverage.  A mandate is hailed when there was a 
clear ideological difference between the candidates; significant issues 
debated; a landslide presidential victory; and an accompanying party 
victory that increases that party’s gain in Congress – conditions necessary 
for responsible party government.105  But Jones focuses on the presidency, 
ignoring potential mandates in congressional mid-terms (1994, 2006, and 
2010, just to name a few).  Moreover, all the literature on mandates deals 
with what happens once the newly elected members take office; there is 
virtually no mention of the effects of a proclaimed mandate on the 
politicians still in office in lame duck sessions.106 
My contribution lies in filling the void that party models and 
theories have left by not dealing with lame duck sessions.  I argue that 
three factors are unique to lame duck sessions.  First, the elections are 
over, so party leaders and rank-and-file members of Congress can act 
with fewer electoral constraints, real or perceived.  Second, now that 
party leaders know whether they will remain in their current positions or 
                                                
105 Jones, Charles O.  1994.  “Winner but Not Champion: President 
Clinton and the Separated System,” The Brookings Review 12:3 (Summer), 
42-45. 
106 For example, see Grossback et al, Op cit, 91: “Well into May 1981, fully 
one quarter of the members of the 97th Congress were voting more 
conservatively than normal.”  Yet the authors do not touch on the lame 
duck session of the 96th Congress.  The same is true in Andrew E. 
Busch’s work on mid-term elections – he only focuses on subsequent 
Congresses, not lame duck sessions (Busch, Andrew E.  1999.  Horses in 
Midstream: U.S. Midterm Elections and Their Consequences, 1894-1998 
[Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press]). 
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trade places, they can follow up on strategic choices made before the 
elections or make new strategic decisions based on the new information.  
Finally, the current members of Congress can also be affected by post-
election talk of mandates; in fact, my contention is that perceptions of a 
mandate will affect the majority party in Congress no matter what the 
election results are.  Either the party, with its majority strengthened, feels 
emboldened to act now, or – what is historically more likely – the party 
sees that its strength will diminish in the new Congress and strives to 
enact all that it can while the de jure party strength remains.  In this case, 
a perceived mandate for one political party in the next Congress can have 
the opposite effect on the intervening lame duck session. 
 
 
vi. Unified and divided government 
 
The new rise of parties has shifted the entire frame of the debate 
over the impact of unified and divided government.  Periods of divided 
partisan control of the legislative and executive branches have occurred 
since the dawn of the Republic, existing some 40% of the time.  But the 
prevalence has changed across time: before the end of World War II, 
there was unified government 70% of the time, but then the proportion 
almost reversed and we have had divided government 60% of the time 
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since then.  Consequently, while once there was little reason to examine 
the idiosyncrasies of divided government, a vigorous debate over the 
effects of divided versus unified government has emerged over the last 
twenty years. 
The debate was sparked by David Mayhew’s Divided We Govern, 
where he challenged the conventional wisdom that unified government 
would experience less gridlock and pass more significant legislation than 
divided government.  Instead, he compiled a list of significant laws from 
1947 to 1990 using both contemporary and retrospective accounts and 
showed that these laws passed just as much under divided as under 
unified government.107  Charles O. Jones finds that significant policies, 
broadly defined, have passed across all possible partisan configurations 
of the two branches.108  Fiorina agrees with Mayhew, while Paul J. Quirk 
and Bruce Nesmith highlight external factors that can cause more 
                                                
107 Mayhew, David R.  1991.  Divided We Govern (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press). 
108 Jones, Charles O.  1994.  The Presidency in a Separated System 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press); Jones, Charles O.  1997.  
“Separating to Govern: The American Way,” in Present Discontents: 
American Politics in the Very Late Twentieth Century, Byron E. Shafer, ed. 
(London: Chatham House), 379-397.  
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gridlock than divided government.109  Finally, Keith Krehbiel argues that 
divided government doesn’t explain gridlock because parties ultimately 
don’t matter; instead, he proposes a model of pivotal voters.110  Each of 
these authors maintains that divided and unified government should 
pass similar levels of significant legislation, yet none of them refers to 
lame duck sessions of Congress.  None of Mayhew’s critics does so 
either.111  One can infer that all of these scholars think parties would act 
the same way in lame duck sessions or that such sessions are insignificant. 
                                                
109 Fiorina, Morris P.  1996.  Divided Government, 2nd ed. (Boston, MA: Allyn 
Bacon); Quirk, Paul J. and Bruce Nesmith.  1994.  “Explaining Deadlock: 
Domestic Policymaking Under the Bush Presidency,” in New Perspectives 
on American Politics, Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin Jillson, eds. 
(Washington, DC: CQ Press), 191-211. 
110 Krehbiel, Op cit.  He argues that the Constitution sets up huge 
roadblocks to passing legislation, so winning coalitions are almost 
always bipartisan, and therefore a better way to explain gridlock is to 
focus on the key pivot points, e.g. the 60th Senator when dealing with a 
filibuster or the 290th Congressman in the case of a veto override.  See 
footnote 97. 
111 See Kelly, Sean Q.  1993.  “Divided We Govern?  A Reassessment,” 
Polity 25:3 (Spring), 483; Kelly, Sean Q.  1993.  “Let’s Stick with the 
Larger Question,” Polity 25:3 (Spring), 489-490; Howell, William, Scott 
Adler, Charles Cameron, and Charles Riemann.  2000.  “Divided 
Government and the Legislative Productivity of Congress, 1945-94,” 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 25:2 (May), 285; Coleman, John J.  1999.  
“Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness,” 
APSR 93:4 (December), 821; Lohmann, Susanne and O’Halloran, Sharyn.  
1994.  “Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and 
Evidence,” International Organization 48:4 [Autumn], 628; Reynolds, John 
F.  1995.  “Research Note,” email to Social Science History Association 





Sarah Binder argues that inter-cameral differences between the 
House and Senate are just as much to blame for gridlock as partisan 
divides between Congress and the White House.112  “It is hard to imagine 
the New Deal or Great Society legislative programs getting off the 
ground under divided government,” write Daryl J. Levinson and Richard 
H. Pildes.  “And more generally, it is hard to believe that unifying party 
control does not lower the transaction costs of assembling legislative 
coalitions in support of the majority’s agenda, since solving collective 
action problem is a major reason why legislative parties exist in the first 
place.”113  While Mayhew’s original work may have shaken the study of 
American institutions and political parties, much scholarly opinion has 
                                                
112 Binder, Sarah, 1999, Op cit; Binder, Sarah.  2003.  Causes and 
Consequences of Legislative Gridlock (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press).  She adds, though, that divided government does 
contribute to higher levels of gridlock, for more significant legislation 
dies in divided government than in unified government, and Edwards, 
Barrett, and Peake agree (Edwards III, George C., Andrew Barrett, and 
Jeffrey Peake.  1997.  “The Legislative Impact of Divided Government,” 
AJPS 41:2 [April], 545-563).  For an alternative view, see Chiou, Fang-Yi 
and Lawrence S. Rothenberg.  2008.  “Comparing Legislators and 
Legislatures: The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock Reconsidered,” 
Political Analysis 16:2 (Spring), 197-212.  Charles R. Shipan suggests that 
divided government actually increases the size of the policy agenda 
because control of one lever of government increases the potential for a 
party to advance its priorities onto the agenda (Shipan, Charles R. 2006. 
“Does Divided Government Increase the Size of the Legislative Agenda?” 
in The Macropolitics of Congress, E. Scott Adler and John S. Lapinski, eds. 
[Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press], 151-170). 
113 Levinson, Daryl J. and Richard H. Pildes.  “Separation of Parties, Not 
Powers,” Harvard Law Review 119:8 (June), 2340. 
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reasserted the conventional wisdom that unified party government 
produces more significant legislation. 
Yet throughout the entire canon dealing with the question of 
unified versus divided government, there is virtually no mention of lame 
duck sessions of Congress.  This is a gap that would be interesting to fill 
because politicians’ electoral and strategic calculations can change 
dramatically after Election Day.  If there was a need to highlight partisan 
differences before the elections, there may be an inclination for 
bipartisanship afterwards, or – if there is a shift in partisan control – a 
desire to push through legislation that had been stalled.  Exploring lame 
duck sessions with an eye towards partisanship in government, which 
factors in not only the present state of affairs (unified or divided) but also 
the incoming state of affairs, would shed light on the topic within and 
outside of these periods. 
My work addresses this gap in the literature and, as in the gap on 
party mandates, examines this question in the context of lame duck 
sessions.  I argue that whatever Mayhew concluded about Congress in 
general does not apply in lame duck sessions.  Instead, I posit that there 
exists a qualitative difference between unified and divided government 
in lame duck periods, that here, unified governments pass more 
important laws than divided governments.  I would also argue that the 
greater the partisan divide between the parties, the more likely that a 
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unified government will get a lot done while a divided government will 
get little done.  When it comes to lame duck sessions, therefore, I agree 
with the once conventional view that unified partisan control of both 




viii. Lame duck Presidents 
 
In contrast to the dearth of work on lame duck Congresses, several 
academics have researched lame duck Presidents.  Conventional wisdom 
dictates that presidents have “political capital” when they first enter 
office or win re-election, and that their supplies of political capital decline 
over time until they have little if any authority left by the last few months 
in office.114  Neustadt memorably states, “Presidential power is the power 
to persuade.”115  Presidential power is at its height when the president is 
                                                
114 See Pfiffner, James  1988.  “The President’s Legislative Agenda,” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 499 
(September), 22-35; also Pfiffner, James  1988.  The Strategic Presidency: 
Hitting the Ground Running (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan 
Press).  
115 Neustadt, Richard E.  1960.  Presidential Power: The politics of leadership 
(New York: John Wiley). 
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most popular 116  – and presidents tend to be most popular at the 
beginning of their term.  Paul Light calls this the policy cycle of 
decreasing influence; he finds that 72% of legislation introduced in the 
first three months of a term is eventually enacted, nearly twice the 
proportion of items introduced in the next three months and three times 
that of bills introduced in the three months after that.117  Charles O. Jones 
finds that 18 of 21 landmark laws between 1947 and 1990 were launched 
by first term presidents.118  Presidents themselves have also emphasized 
the need to hit the ground running, to front-load key elements of their 
legislative agenda.  Franklin D. Roosevelt’s famed Hundred Days set the 
gold standard; as Lyndon Johnson noted a generation later, “Every day I 
lose a little more political capital.  That’s why we have to keep at it, never 
                                                
116 See also Lebo, Matthew J. and Andrew J. O’Geen.  2011.  “The 
President’s Role in the Partisan Congressional Arena,” JOP 73:3 (July), 1-
17; Canes-Wrone, Brandice.  2001.  “The President’s Legislative 
Influence from Public Appeals,” AJPS 45:2 (April), 313-329; Canes-
Wrone, Brandice and Scott de Marchi.  2002.  “Presidential Approval 
and Legislative Success,” JOP 64:2 (May), 491-509; Edwards III, George 
C.  1980.  “Presidential Legislative Skills as a Source of Influence in 
Congress, Presidential Studies Quarterly 10:2 (Spring), 92-93; Rivers, 
Douglas and Nancy Rose.  1985.  “Passing the President’s Program: 
Public opinion and presidential influence in Congress,” AJPS 29 (May), 
183-196; Ostrom, Charles W., and Dennis M. Simon.  1985.  “Promise 
and performance; A dynamic model of presidential popularity,” APSR 
79 (June), 334-358; Peterson, Mark A.  1990.  Legislating Together: The 
White House and Capitol Hill from Eisenhower to Reagan (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press), 119. 
117 Light, Paul.  1982.  The President’s Agenda (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press), 35-45. 
118 Jones, Charles O., 1994, Op cit.  
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letting up.  One day soon … we will be at a stalemate.  We have to get all 
we can, now, before the roof comes down.”119 
When a president becomes a lame duck, the roof tends to come 
down on any remaining legislative proposals.  “A President on his way 
out is never given much consideration,” said Calvin Coolidge.  “That’s 
politics.”120  Michael L. Mezey notes that time is a major constraint on 
presidential power, and when the clock is running down the power is as 
well.121  If the president is not running for re-election, most members of 
Congress still are, and pundits and the press focus on those races and on 
the race for a presidential successor.122  If the president has just been 
defeated for re-election, he has even less clout between the November 
elections and the inauguration of the next president.  Yet none of the 
existing literature discusses the impact of congressional elections on the 
president’s ability to govern during lame duck sessions. 
                                                
119 Valenti, Jack.  1975.  A Very Personal President (New York: Norton), 144. 
120 Stoddard, H.L.  It Costs to Be President (New York: Harper & Brothers), 
133. 
121 Mezey, Michael L.  1989.  Congress, the President, and Public Policy (Ann 
Arbor, MI: Westview Press), 115-117. 
122 Bill Clinton lampooned himself at the 2000 White House 
Correspondents’ Dinner with a video entitled “The Final Days” that 
showed how everyone was ignoring him and he had nothing to do.  
Instead, he filled his time answering White House phones, doing 
laundry, watching a cartoon with his dog, doing yard work, making 
lunch for his wife Hillary (then running for Senate), and playing 
Battleship with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  The video can 
be found here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hi39UO57LHw 
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Some analysts maintain that presidents do not suffer from “lame 
duck syndrome” at all and retain de facto as well as de jure power in 
their last months in office.  “That a president is no longer accountable to 
the voters in the two-and-a-half months between the election and the 
inauguration in no way diminishes his authority,” argue Ivo Daalder and 
James M. Lindsay.123  As Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) puts it, “No 
president is a lame duck.  He’s still president.”124  Marissa Silber Grayson 
and James R. Hedtke suggest that more important than a “lame duck jinx” 
are presidential approval ratings, partisan control of Congress, and 
support from the president’s co-partisans in Congress.125  Moreover, Jay 
Cochran III finds that the White House puts out a significantly higher 
                                                
123 Daalder, Ivo H. and Lindsay, James M.  2001.  “Lame-Duck Diplomacy,” 
The Washington Quarterly 24:3 (Summer), 17.  John Massaro adds that 
presidents tend to nominate higher-caliber nominees to the Supreme 
Court in their final year in office (Massaro, John.  1978.  “‘Lame-Duck’ 
Presidents, Great Justices?” Presidential Studies Quarterly 8:3 [Summer], 
301). 
124 Clark, Josh.  “How lame is a lame-duck president?” Available online at 
http://history.howstuffworks.com/american-history/lame-duck-
president.htm 
125 Silber Grayson, Marissa.  2010.  “A Race Against Time: Does Time 
Determine Presidential Policymaking Effectiveness?”  Presented at the 
annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association; Silber, 
Marissa.  2007.  “What Makes a President Quack?  Understanding Lame 
Duck Status.”  Presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political 
Science Association.  “Not one … persuasion indicator [treaties, 
confirmation rate, presidential support scores] confirms the existence of 
a lame duck syndrome,” writes Hedtke.  “Perhaps the lame duck 
syndrome is a creation of political pundits and is more myth than 
reality.”  See Hedtke, James R.  2002.  Lame Duck Presidents – Myth or 
Reality (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press), 92, 138. 
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number of executive branch regulations in transition quarters than in any 
other three-month period during a full four-year term.126  Yet even here, 
Grayson’s emphasis is on the current Congress, not on the incoming one, 
and Cochran does not address the elections that have just determined the 
make-up of the next Congress.  The only analysts who come close to 
discussing the elections are Jerry Brito and Veronique de Rugy, who note 
that the number of “midnight regulations” is disproportionately high 
when a president is about to give way to a successor of a different 
party.127 
Despite the difficulties in introducing new legislative proposals, 
presidents have a myriad of other ways to effect change: executive orders, 
                                                
126 Cochran III, Jay.  2001.  “The Cinderella Constraint: Why Regulations 
Increase Significantly during Post-Election Quarters” (Arlington, VA: 
Mercatus Center, George Mason University).  Available online at 
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/The_Cinderella_Constraint(1).
pdf 
127 Brito, Jerry and de Rugy, Veronique.  2008.  “For Whom the Bell Tolls: 
The Midnight Regulation Phenomenon,” Mercaturs Policy Series Policy 
Primer No. 9 (Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center, George Mason 
University).  Available online at 
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proclamations, executive agreements, national security directives, and 
memoranda, just to name a few.128  “The flurry of administrative activity 
at the end of a term may be seen as an abuse of presidential power and 
contrary to social welfare,” writes Jack Beermann.  For example, he cites 
the 176 pardons that President Clinton signed on his last day in office: 
“The large number of end-of-term pardons makes it appear as if 
President Clinton waited to exercise the pardon power until he was about 
to leave office so he would not bear the political consequences of the 
pardons.”129  The partisan nature of the transition makes a difference: 
presidents about to cede power to the opposite party issue nearly twice as 
many executive orders as presidents leaving the White House in the 
hands of a co-partisan.  William G. Howell and Kenneth R. Mayer 
distinguish between two types of last-minute presidential actions: 
extensions of existing policy (possibly in the pipeline for some time by 
                                                
128 Howell, William G. and Mayer, Kenneth R.  2005.  “The Last Hundred 
Days,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35:3 (September), 534-537.  See also 
Howell, William G.  2003.  Power without Persuasion: The politics of direct 
presidential action (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press); Mayer, 
Kenneth R.  2001.  With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and presidential 
power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press); Tseng, Margaret A.  
2003.  “The Unilateral Presidency: Evidence of a Lame Duck Effect.”  
Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University. 
129 Beermann, Jack.  2003.  “Presidential Power in Transitions,” Boston 
University Law Review 83, 952 and 978.  On the other hand, notes 
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the end of the term) and decisions that would not have been made had the 
president or a co-partisan been reelected.130  They conclude: 
 
Contrary to conventional wisdom on the matter, presidents 
do not quietly relinquish their powers the moment that the 
nation votes them out of office.  Instead, these presidents 
squeeze these last moments in office for all they are worth, 
issuing all sorts of rules and directives, many of which 
cannot be changed without exacting a significant political 
price to either the incoming president or to the nation as a 
whole.  While legislative processes may lay dormant at the 
end of a presidential term, the production of unilateral 
directives kicks into high gear.131 
 
While Howell and Mayer shed considerable light on presidents in their 
waning months in office, but the last sentence quoted above discounts the 
legislative processes that, both historically and in recent years, have not 
lain dormant at all.  They make the same error as do most analysts of 
lame duck presidents and, in fact, most political scientists: they assume 
that lame duck Congresses are of little or no importance.  I believe this 
perception to be mistaken, that in fact lame duck Congresses can be very 
significant, and that what happens in such sessions can reverberate far 
beyond the end of the session. 
 And that is where we turn to the existing body of work on the 
difference between members of Congress who retire (voluntarily or not) 
and those who look to continue their public service into the next term. 
                                                
130 Howell and Mayer, 2005, Op cit, 550.  Emphasis in original. 
131 Ibid, 549-550. 
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viii. Lame duck Congresses 
 
Scholarly work on lame duck sessions on Congress has focused 
primarily on individual-level changes in members’ voting behavior.  
Working together and individually, Jeffrey A. Jenkins and Timothy P. 
Nokken have researched the voting behavior of and party constraints on 
members of Congress in lame duck sessions.   Much of their research 
focuses on the 1871-1931 period (before the adoption of the Twentieth 
Amendment), though they have also examined the so-called “modern 
period” of the lame duck, right through 2006.132  They find mixed, 
sometimes contradictory results.  First, retirees abstain from voting more 
than returners. On this point there seems to be little debate.  But as to 
whether departing members change their voting behavior in a 
substantive manner, they reach different conclusions in different articles.  
In a 2007 study, they conclude, “Defeated members from both parties 
make modest, but statistically significant, shifts in their voting behavior 
                                                
132 Nokken, Timothy P.  2002.  “Participation on House Roll Call Votes in 
Lame Duck Sessions of Congress, 1871-1931.”  Presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA; 
Jenkins, Jeffery A. and Timothy P. Nokken.  2007.  “Member 
Participation and Leadership Strategy in the Lame-Duck Congressional 
Era.”  Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science 
Association, Chicago, IL; Nokken, Timothy P.  2007.  “The Electoral 
Disconnection: Roll-Call Behavior in Lame-Duck Sessions of the House 
of Representatives, 1879-1933,” in Party, Process, and Political Change in 
Congress, vol. 2.  David W. Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins, eds. 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), 354. 
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toward the ideological extremes of their respective parties.”133  In other 
words, departing members moved further away from the party median 
than returning members during lame duck sessions.  Yet in an article 
published a year later, they write, “We find little systematic evidence to 
suggest that exiting members altered their behavior significantly (i.e., 
shirked) in their last terms in office.”134 
This apparent contradiction can be resolved by pointing out that 
retiring members could change their behavior relative to their regular 
session voting records, but perhaps all members change their voting 
during lame duck sessions.  If returning members adhere more closely to 
the party median, then the difference between their voting behavior and 
that of departing members could become statistically significant.  Jenkins 
and Nokken argue that this difference results primarily from escaping the 
partisan constraint, the sticks and carrots that party leadership can apply 
to members who return in the next Congress.  Thus, they suggest that 
party leaders should pursue a more moderate agenda in lame duck 
                                                
133 Nokken, 2007, Op cit, 353. 
134 Jenkins, Jeffery A. and Timothy P. Nokken.  2008.  “Legislative 
Shirking in the Pre-Twentieth Amendment Era: Presidential Influence, 
Party Power, and Lame-Duck Sessions of Congress, 1877-1933,” Studies 
in American Political Development 22 (Spring), 111. 
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sessions.135  However, in post-20th Amendment period, they find that 
party leaders’ ability to pressure their caucus members on votes remains 
essentially constant across regular and lame duck sessions.  They suggest 
that this is because of the professionalization of MCs, whereby member 
turnover is far lower.136 
 Jenkins and Nokken do, however, note that there can be some 
differences within lame duck sessions depending on the outcome of the 
immediately preceding elections.  “Majority-party leaders were able to 
exercise negative agenda control in lame-duck sessions when their party 
maintained control of the next Congress,” they note, “but they often acted 
to roll their own party members (an occurrence [they] dub a ‘strategic 
roll’) when their party lost control of the next Congress, as a way to 
minimize policy loss.”137  Basically, if the incoming majority party was 
planning to legislate on a particular issue, the outgoing majority party 
leaders might try to pass a watered-down bill that addresses that issue, 
thereby “solving” the issue and taking it off the agenda for the new 
Congress and limiting what the other party could do.138  Partly as a result 
                                                
135 Jenkins, Jeffrey A. and Timothy P. Nokken.  2008.  “Partisanship, the 
Electoral Connection, and Lame-Duck Sessions of Congress, 1877-2006,” 
JOP 70:2 (April), 455. 
136 Ibid, 461. 
137 Ibid, 450. 
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of this strategic calculation, partly because of the incentive to pursue a 
more moderate agenda, and partly because the minority party exhibited 
higher party unity scores when they knew they would soon take the helm, 
Jenkins and Nokken posit that parties passed more centrist laws in lame 
duck sessions preceding a change in partisan control than in sessions 
without a change on the horizon.139  However, Craig Goodman disagrees: 
“Elections do not induce changes in the behavior of legislators.  Instead, 
changes in public policy occur through replacement rather than 
conversion.”140 
My contribution to the literature challenges Goodman’s 
assumptions and seeks to add another dimension to the work done by 
Jenkins and Nokken.   
 
 
ix. Filling the gap: Hypotheses 
 
As explained at the beginning of this chapter, I start from the idea that 
lame duck sessions do not occur in a political vacuum.  Time, which can 
                                                
139 Goodman, Craig and Timothy P. Nokken.  2001.  “Lame-ducks and roll 
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Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science 
Association, Chicago, IL; Nokken, 2007, Op cit, 352. 
140 Goodman, Craig.  2004.  “Ideological Stability in Congress: 




play an important role in politics, looms over lame duck sessions in a 
particularly strong way because of the fixed start and endpoints.  The 
preceding elections determine the composition of the next Congress but 
also affect the strategic calculations and voting behavior of the current 
legislators before anyone new takes office.  Even with the belief that 
elected officials are constrained by public opinion, the link to constituents 
and pressure groups is weaker during lame duck periods for both 
departing and returning MCs.  Opportunities for shirking are therefore 
greater for individual members, while party leaders face a similar set of 
choices but often a very different set of circumstances.  Comparing lame 
duck sessions in different years, one can see that unified governments act 
differently to divided governments within these transition periods, and 
that changes from one to the other can have a significant impact on 
legislation.  While there is an extensive literature on lame duck presidents, 
a far smaller group of analysts have examined lame duck Congresses. 
 With my work, I will add to the literature on lame duck sessions by 
examining their legislative output.  I theorize that the biggest factors that 
determine the significance of lame duck legislation are partisan control 
and upcoming changes in partisan control.  I argue that unified 
government passes more significant legislation than divided government 
does during lame duck sessions.  Moreover, I suggest that a shift in 
partisan control tends to increase the significance of lame duck legislation.  
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The legislative output of lame duck sessions reflects the strategic 
decisions made by political leaders at key points near the end of a term, 
and these strategic choices depend primarily on the outcome of the 
elections and any resulting shifts in partisan control. 
 By shining a light on lame duck sessions of Congress, I hope to 
explain the workings of an institutional period that has become a regular 
feature of the calendar once again.  While some of my conclusions may be 
applicable to regular sessions as well, it is my focus on the lame duck 
session itself that I think can help us understand the effects of timing, 
representation, and partisanship on legislative output.  In other words, it 
is now time to examine and explain my hypotheses. 
Based on the theories outlined above, I have come up with a 
number of hypotheses regarding what can affect the significance of 
legislation in lame duck sessions.  My hypotheses will touch on the 
variations of divided and unified government (and the transitions 
between them).  To test each of them, I will use the average significance 
of the laws passed as an indicator for legislative output.  Below I list my 
hypotheses, in the next chapter I explain the data I use in my models, and 
then in Chapter V, I run various regressions to test these hypotheses.  The 
results will show that, while not all of my assumptions are borne out by 
the data, the four hypotheses are supported by the evidence. 
All four of the hypotheses relate to leadership changes: 
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H1: More significant legislation will pass in a lame duck session if the 
president himself is a lame duck than if he is continuing in office. 
H2: More significant legislation will pass in a lame duck session under 
divided government that will yield to unified government after 
the session ends than under divided government that will 
continue after the session ends. 
H3: More significant legislation will pass in a lame duck session under 
unified government that will yield to divided government after 
the session ends than under unified government that will 
maintain control after the session ends. 
H4: More significant legislation will pass in a lame duck session if an 
outgoing unified government had only gained power in the 
previous 1-2 elections than if it had held power for many years. 
 
The general idea here is simple: if a person or a party has power and is 
about to lose it, s/he has every incentive to wield it before relinquishing 
it.  That might not be a novel idea; as discussed above, presidents have 
been known to effect numerous unilateral actions in their waning days, 
ranging from executive orders to pardons.  However, this theory has 
never been tested empirically in the context of lame duck sessions of 
Congress.  After all, it is difficult if not impossible for Congress to do 
anything quickly, and of course it cannot enact laws unilaterally.  But the 
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lame duck session provides a powerful incentive for congressional 
leaders to finalize bills in conjunction with the president, since any bills 
left unsigned die at the end of the session. 
H1 focuses on the president rather than the president’s party 
because even if the man in the Oval Office is ceding power to a co-
partisan, he can only be sure that certain changes will take place if he 
makes them himself.  While the circumstances can be vastly different 
across time – a president leaving office after losing re-election is probably 
in a very different state of mind than one who is retiring after his second 
term – the point remains that no president has ever been able to complete 
absolutely everything he wanted to achieve.141 
The president’s sense of lame-duckness can often be attributed, in 
part, to his party’s performance in the elections.  In both the H2 and H3 
scenarios, it is almost always the case that the president’s party is the 
losing party in the election.142  If a sitting minority party has won an 
election where they take back the White House and substantially increase 
their representation in Congress, they have little incentive to let the 
sitting majority party pass landmark legislation.  Instead, now that they 
know how much stronger their position will be in the new Congress, 
                                                
141 With the possible exception of James Polk. 
142 Only six times in American history – in 1796, 1834, 1856, 1880, 1948, 
and 2002 – has a president’s party gained control of an additional 
chamber of Congress (which does not, therefore, bode well for 
Democrats seeking to take back the House in 2014). 
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these party leaders should work to block major bills or slot them behind 
minor bills in the legislative calendar, leading to a lower average 
significance of laws.  From the other side of the aisle, when a president’s 
party loses seats in mid-term elections, as has generally been the case, 
then that party has more of an incentive to pass significant legislation 
before its power decreases.  
 What about the interests of the minority party?  If the government 
is under unified control, and the party in power is about to lose at least 
one chamber of Congress, the first instinct might be to assume that the 
current minority party would seek to block any remaining legislation in 
the knowledge that it will shortly take over control of the chamber.  
However, there are several important countervailing drives.  For example, 
since the minority party leaders’ hand is stronger, they may be able to 
force the majority party to amend significant legislation and move it 
closer to their own ideal position.  Minority party leaders know that, with 
the government divided in the subsequent session, they won’t be able to 
achieve 100% of their goals, so some form of compromise will be 
necessary regardless.  Yet if they accept a compromise now, in the lame 
duck session where much of the legislation writing has already been 
accomplished, they would be able to turn to their own legislative agenda 
in the new Congress.  While the ideological content might change within 
significant bills that pass, those significant bills would still pass.  Even with 
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considerable minority party opposition, that opposition need not remain 
entirely intransigent – or it might not remain united in opposition – in the 
lame duck session.  
 The fact that the elections are over can also explain changes in the 
minority party calculus.  Before the election, both the leaders and the 
rank-and-file members of the minority party have one overriding goal: to 
win the election.  To do this, they must draw a contrast with the majority 
party and seek to deny it major legislative accomplishments.  But after 
the election, that overriding goal is no longer a consideration, and in the 
scenarios listed in H2 and H3 that goal has already been met.  Thus the 
party leaders can be more willing to compromise in the pursuit of good 
public policy.  Furthermore, ordinary members of the party would now 
feel freer to buck the party line because the need is diminished to show a 
united front to the electorate.  With the added ability to influence 
pending legislation and the reduced need to maintain constant and 
unified opposition, minority party leaders and members are more willing 
to vote for – or, in some cases in the Senate, drop their filibuster to – 
significant legislation. 
 In the H2 scenario, much of the same applies for members of the 
party about to have unified control.  In this case, of course, their influence 
is larger than in the H3 scenario, for if the party currently in charge of the 
chamber does not compromise, they will have virtually no say in the 
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coming Congress.  Likewise, if the party in control of both chambers of 
Congress is about to take over the White House, the outgoing President 
has every incentive to compromise; meanwhile, the former party can co-
opt members of the president’s party to support their proposals and/or 
end a filibuster if they can get the president on board. 
Finally, H4 builds on the idea that leaders in unified government 
would always have an incentive to legislate before handing the reins over 
to the opposing party in at least one part of government.  It is possible 
that, after many years in power, the remaining legislative agenda would 
be relatively small for a party on the way out.  On the other hand, if a 
party has had control of both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue for only one 
or two sessions, odds are much higher that important elements of the 
legislative agenda remain unfulfilled.  Thus, if the party loses power at an 
election, it would have more significant legislation to enact after just a 
few years as the majority rather than if it had ruled for decades. 
 Of course, none of these scenarios are foolproof.  My theories 
cannot take into account every variation in the type of legislation under 
debate, or the exigencies of the political situation, or the personalities of 
the key players.  But if I can find some substantive and statistically 
significant support for my theories, then they could help us explain and 
predict the outcomes of lame duck sessions based on the election results.  
And while the models that flesh out my theories won’t be able to predict 
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which laws pass, my aim is to create a model that can help predict the 
significance of laws passed in a given lame duck session.  Let us now turn 




Chapter IV: Data and Methods 
i. How do we measure lame ducks? 
 
The previous chapter discussed the theoretical background for this 
examination of lame duck sessions of Congress.  It covered the existing 
literature on lame ducks and related topics, laid out my reasons for 
pursuing this project, and listed the hypotheses that would test my 
theories.  Now it is time to see whether the theories work in practice. 
 My broad focus is lame duck sessions in and of themselves.  
Individual MCs and party leaders are not my dependent variables; 
instead, my dependent variable is the policy output of the Congress as a 
whole.  I am not ultimately seeking to compare regular and lame duck 
sessions, though I will touch on those variations – I am primarily seeking 
to compare lame duck sessions with other lame duck sessions.  My 
contention is that electoral results in November help to determine the 
number and significance of the laws passed in the lame duck sessions 
that immediately follow. 
 One important point to note is that my focus on the effects of 
elections excludes numerous Congresses from my study.  Barring 
extraordinary post-election circumstances, the decision to hold or not 
hold a lame duck session is taken before November.  As noted in Chapter 
II, only twice since the Twentieth Amendment has the leadership made 
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the decision after an election to reconvene Congress: the 1998 
impeachment and the 2008 financial crisis.  In addition, no president since 
Warren G. Harding has called a special session in a lame duck period.  I 
am not examining the decision to hold or not hold a lame duck session 
because the causal arrow in my analysis runs from the elections to the 
lame duck sessions, and in all but two cases, that decision had been made 
long before the elections.  Nonetheless, the fact that lame duck sessions 
are now regular once again means that the conclusions I draw about the 
effects of elections on lame duck sessions should be harbingers for most if 
not all future election years. 
I am exploring the variations in the significance of legislation 
passed across different lame duck sessions.  If lame duck sessions were 
all idiosyncratic, completely separated from one another, then there 
would be no factor or combination of factors that would link them 
together.  If, on the other hand, there are certain elements that tend to 
make laws more important (or less important) across many lame duck 
sessions, then statistical models should be able to find them.  I have 
created some models to test the theories outlined in the previous chapter, 






ii. Defining “significant” legislation 
 
What makes legislation significant?  All of my hypotheses deal with the 
question of significant legislation, identifying which factors lead to more 
significant legislation being passed in certain lame duck sessions as 
opposed to other lame duck sessions.  How do I measure a seemingly 
unquantifiable term such as significance?  After all, while I have a dataset 
of all laws and when they were passed, Charles Cameron points out that 
“The vast bulk of legislation produced by that august body [Congress] is 
stunningly banal.”143  Fortunately, when it comes to determining relative 
legislative significance, I can rely on the work done by a number of other 
scholars who have struggled with this question for decades and have 
used a number of methods to try and provide an answer. 
With Divided We Govern, Mayhew sparked much debate about the 
definition of important legislation.  He sought to explore the impact of 
unified versus divided government on legislation.  Instead of simply 
comparing the total number of laws passed under government of 
different partisan combinations, he compiled a list of landmark laws 
using both contemporary and retrospective analyses.144  For history’s first 
                                                
143 Cameron, Charles, Op cit, 37. 
144 Mayhew, David R.  2005.  Divided We Govern, 2nd ed (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press), 34-50.  Others such as John J. Coleman use his 
data in their work as well (Coleman, John J., Op cit). 
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draft, Mayhew used The New York Times and The Washington Post, which 
publish articles after each congressional session that highlight significant 
legislation, and built a contemporary list of 211 acts.  For the historical 
perspective, he combed the work of 43 experts on specific policy areas, 
such as immigration or foreign aid, and found 203 acts.  He combined the 
two overlapping lists for a total number of 267 important acts.  While 
some might argue that he should have used only the laws that cropped 
up in both contemporary and retrospective accounts, Mayhew points out 
that adding the two lists reduces the possibility of bias and incorporates 
recently-passed key legislation. 145   Based on his list of landmark 
legislation, he concludes that divided government is just as productive as 
unified government. 
Others examining the effects of divided and unified government 
have also sought to define “important” legislation.  Andrew W. Barrett 
and Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha measure presidential success in shaping 
191 important statutes that they choose from Mayhew’s list.146  Sarah 
Binder uses the number of New York Times editorials about an issue as an 
                                                
145 Mayhew, David R.  1993.  “Reply: Let’s Stick with the Larger List,” 
Polity 25:3 (Spring), 485-488.  For the critiques of Mayhew’s combining 
the lists to which he was replying, see Kelly, Sean Q.  1993.  “Divided 
We Govern?  A Reassessment,” Polity 25:3 (Spring), 475-484; and Kelly, 
Sean Q.  1993.  “Response: Let’s Stick with the Larger Question,” Polity 
25:3 (Spring), 489-490. 
146 Barrett, Andrew W. and Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha.  2007.  “Presidential 




indicator of policy importance and does not find huge effects due to 
divided government.147  George C. Edwards et al use not only Mayhew’s 
newspaper sources but also the annual Congressional Quarterly Almanacs 
to create a list of laws that passed and important bills that failed to 
pass.148 
On the other hand, several scholars have come up with alternative 
measures of legislative productivity and significance.  William Howell et 
al rely on source reporting from The Washington Post, The New York Times, 
and CQ Almanac to create categories of laws ranging from landmark to 
minor enactments.149  Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, as well 
as J. Tobin Grant and Nathan J. Kelly, rely on Congressional Quarterly 
coverage to rank the top 500 “most important laws.”150  Stephen G. 
Christianson, Brian K. Landsberg, Christopher Dell and Stephen W. 
Stathis each compile lists of important laws which, although subjective, 
are based on the U.S. Congressional Serial Set, Annals of Congress, Register 
                                                
147 Binder, Sarah, 1999, Op cit, 524.  See also Binder, Sarah.  2003.  
Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock (Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution Press). 
148 Edwards III, George C. et al, Op cit, 550-551. 
149 Howell, William et al, Op cit, 292-293. 
150 Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones.  2003.  “Representation 
and agenda setting.”  Presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA; Grant, J. Tobin and 
Nathan J. Kelly.  2008.  “Legislative Productivity of the U.S. Congress, 
1789-2004,” Political Analysis 16:3 (Summer), 306. 
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of Debates, The Congressional Globe (an early non-governmental version of 
the Congressional Record), and the Congressional Record.151 
To help compare legislative outputs across different Congresses, I 
have put together the lists compiled by Mayhew, Landsberg, Dell and 
Stathis.  This is a first approximation of the 1,414 most important laws 
passed from 1789 to 2008.  The four lists all cover the period 1947 to 2002, 
but Mayhew doesn’t go earlier (and his sweep 2 stops in 1986).  Thirty-
three laws from 1947 to 1986 are considered “landmark” by all four 
analysts, and there are 160 laws from 1789 to 2002 considered landmark 
by all who examined the full period (see Appendix 1).  This ranking, 
while a step in the right direction, is insufficient for my research purposes. 
However, there is one pair of scholars that have amalgamated 
twenty different ratings of legislation into a single dataset that ranks every 
law from 1877 to 1994.  Joshua D. Clinton and John S. Lapinski collected 
information on every public statute enacted in this period and, in tandem 
with the other elite rankings that they utilize, create an item-response 
model that produces a significance score for all 37,767 laws.152  They use 
                                                
151 Christianson, Stephen G.  1996.  Facts about the Congress (The H.W. 
Wilson Company: New York); Landsberg, Brian K.  Op cit; Dell, 
Christopher and Stephen W. Stathis.  1982.  “Major Acts of Congress and 
Treaties Approved by the Senate, 1789-1980, CRS Report 82-156” 
(Library of Congress: Washington, DC); Stathis, Stephen W.  Op cit. 
152 Clinton, Joshua D. and John S. Lapinski.  2006.  “Measuring Legislative 
Accomplishment, 1877-1994,” AJPS 50:1 (January), 232-249.  For details 
of the model, see 238-241. 
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both contemporaneous and retrospective raters.  On the 
contemporaneous side, they incorporate a number of the authors 
mentioned above: Mayhew (Sweep 1), Baumgartner and Jones, Howell et 
al, and Eric Peterson (Sweep 1), plus the annual legislative wrap-ups 
from the American Political Science Review and Political Science Quarterly .153  
For the retrospective angle, Clinton and Lapinski use Mayhew (Sweep 2), 
Peterson (Sweep 2), and numerous volumes from the New American 
Nation and American Presidency series.  They also use several textbooks, 
authored by Lawrence Chamberlain, John Reynolds, Irving Sloan, Paul 
Light, Dewey W. Grantham, Michael Barone, and John Morton Blum.  
Finally, they include the Dell and Stathis CRS report and Stathis’ 
subsequent solo-authored book.154  Using their new model, Clinton and 
Lapinski assign each law passed from November 1877 to November 1996 
a legislative significance score, ranking each statute from the least 
important (1) to the most important (37767). 
As an indicator of the range of legislation, the highest rated law is 
that which created the Federal Trade Commission in 1914, while the 
lowest rated is an Act for the Relief of Gibbes Lykes passed in 1913.  Even 
if one questions the exact rank order, their work ought to be generally 
                                                
153 Peterson, Eric.  2001.  “Is It Science Yet?  Replicating and Validating the 
Divided We Govern List of Important Statutes.”  Presented at the annual 
meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. 
154 Clinton and Lapinski, Op cit, 235-236. 
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acceptable: the Social Security Act (#37763) clearly outranks a 1921 act 
that amends the Federal Reserve Act (#33485), which in turn outranks the 
authorization of the coinage of 50-cent pieces to commemorate the 100th 
anniversary of the incorporation of Bridgeport, CT as a city (#15189) and 
an act appropriating money to clear the Potomac River of ice (#727). 
 
Table 4.1.  Thirty Most Significant Enactments, 1877-1948155 
Law Title Date Hierarchical Mean 
   Federal Trade Commission 9/26/1914 1 (.011) 
Securities Exchange Act 06/05/1934 .945 (.009) 
Tariff of 1909 (Payne-Aldrich) 08/05/1909 .934 (.009) 
Pure-Food and Drug Act 6/30/1906 .919 (.008) 
Anti-Trust Act (Sherman) 7/2/1890 .909 (.008) 
Federal Reserve Act 12/23/1913 .903 (.008) 
Social Security Act 8/14/1935 .896 (.008) 
Tariff Act of 1930 (Hawley-Smoot) 6/17/1930 .890 (.008) 
Commerce Court 6/18/1910 .885 (.007) 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 2/16/1938 .880 (.007) 
Fair Labor Standards Act 6/25/1938 .879 (.007) 
Labor-Management Relations Act 1 (Taft-Hartley) 6/23/1947 .879 (.009) 
An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States 03/11/1941 .876 (.008) 
Trade Agreements Act 06/12/1934 .875 (.007) 
Banking Act 8/23/1935 .872 (.007) 
Inter-state Commerce Act 2/4/1887 .866 (.007) 
Civil Service (Pendleton Act) 1/16/1883 .866 (.007) 
Inter-state Commerce Regulations 6/29/1906 .865 (.007) 
National Industrial Recovery Act 6/16/1933 .865 (.007) 
Tariff Act of 1894 (Wilson Act) 8/27/1894 .864 (.007) 
Agricultural Adjustment Act 05/12/1933 .863 (.007) 
National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) 07/05/1935 .859 (.007) 
U.S. Housing Act 09/01/1937 .855 (.007) 
Silver Dollar 2/28/1878 .855 (.008) 
National Housing Act 6/27/1934 .854 (.007) 
Tariff of 1897 (Dingley) 7/24/1897 .853 (.007) 
Employment Act of 1946 2/20/1946 .850 (.007) 
Anti-trust Act of 1914 10/15/1914 .845 (.006) 
Chinese Immigration 5/6/1882 .842 (.006) 
Tennessee Valley Authority Act 5/18/1933 .842 (.006) 
 
                                                
155 Clinton, Joshua D. and John S. Lapinski.  2004.  “Measuring Significant 
Legislation, 1877 to 1948,” presentation at University of Pennsylvania 
Political Science Workshop (September 24), 40. 
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While the exact ordering can be debated, there is no question that these 
thirty laws were, in Mayhew’s words, “both innovative and 
consequential – or if viewed from the time of passage, thought likely to 
be consequential.” 156   All thirty of these laws are in the first 
approximation that I compiled; in fact, almost all of the laws in my list are 
in the top 500 laws in the Clinton and Lapinski list.  Thus, I feel 
comfortable using the Clinton and Lapinski dataset in my work to 
examine the legislative output of lame duck sessions. 
 
 
iii. Developing a lame-duck model 
 
Clinton and Lapinski record the dates of approval for every law in 
their 120-year period of study.157  To test my theories about lame duck 
sessions, I have added a number of variables to the dataset, detailing 
changes in composition and partisan control of the White House, House, 
and Senate.  In addition, I have added measures of the length of control 
of Congress and the White House.  As a control, I have also included 
polarization scores for the ideological means of each party in each 
                                                
156 Mayhew, David R.  2005.  Op cit, 37. 
157 Profs. Clinton and Lapinski were kind enough to share their data with 
me for the use of this project.  For the full dataset, up to 1994, the only 
difference in the Top 30 is that the 1981 Reagan tax cuts make the grade. 
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chamber.158  My first expectation is that lame duck legislation would be 
less significant, on average, than regular session legislation for the 
principal reason that when new leaders take the reins of Washington, 
they move to implement their main legislative proposals in their first year 
in office.  As examples, one can consider the Federal Reserve Act (1913), 
the Economic Recovery Tax Act (1981), or the extensive legislation of the 
New Deal (1933) and Great Society (1965).  In three of these four 
examples, the governing party had been out of power for some time. 
Sure enough, the significance of an average law passed in regular 
sessions is higher, in both statistical and substantive terms, than the 
significance of an average law passed in lame duck sessions:159 
 
                                                
158 DW-NOMINATE scores created by Keith Poole and Howard 
Rosenthal, available at http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm 
159 In addition, the average rank of a law passed in the first year of a two-
year congressional term is 21749, while the average rank of a law passed 










Figure 4.1. Importance of a Typical Law!
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Looking more closely at the data, we can see that the significance of 
legislation varies within sessions as well: Statute significance increases 
over time within lame duck sessions.  The end-of-session rush is not, 
therefore, just for minor bills, but, on average, for bills that are more 
significant than those passed earlier in the lame duck. 
 However, my research focus is not variation in significant 
legislation within sessions but across different lame duck sessions.  With 
my preliminary expectations confirmed by the data, I now feel ready to 
move to the larger questions. 
 
 
iv. The model 
 
I am using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression as my basic 
model and running it on Stata 10.  My dependent variable is the rank of 
legislative significance, which Clinton and Lapinski assign to every law 
passed between 1877 and 1996.   
First, I want to see how Mayhew’s argument measures up in the 
Clinton and Lapinski dataset.  I will run a basic regression to test 
Mayhew’s idea that there is little difference between unified and divided 
government when it comes to the passage of significant legislation.  The 
dependent variable is the significance ranking, while the independent 
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variable is a dummy variable for unified (1) or divided (0) government.  
The coefficients refer to the expected change in position of a law in the 
Clinton and Lapinski significance ranking: a large positive number 
indicates that, all things being equal, the variable tends to increase the 
significance of an average enacted law passed in that Congress, while a 
large negative number suggests that the presence of the variable (if it is a 
dummy) or an increase in the variable (such as the proportion of the 
President’s party in a chamber) would substantially decrease the 
significance of the average law. 
Since there are 37,767 laws in the ranking, small increases or 
decreases are virtually meaningless, so we would need large coefficients 
if we are to draw any substantive conclusions.  To begin with, I run two 
regressions: Model 2 tests the effect of unified government on the average 
significance of legislation, while Model 1 incorporates control variables 
for the party in charge of the House, Senate, and White House (0 for 









Table 4.2. Measuring the Effects of Unified Government 
 
    Model 1     Model 2       
 
Unified     488.63**      -72.37 
    (155.87)  (115.88) 
 
President     -28.89        -- 
    (147.10) 
 
Senate    321.49*        -- 
   (195.08) 
 
House     1893.19***        -- 
    (230.52) 
 
Constant     17112.14***      18929.23*** 
    (158.05)   (91.61) 
 
Adjusted R2  0.0077  0.0000 
 
N = 37767 
Level of significance: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Note: Cell entries are unstandardized ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
 
The results in Model 2 are not statistically significant, suggesting that 
unified control is not an important factor in determining the level of 
significance of a law.  Even if we want to control for the party in charge of 
the House, Senate, and White House, unified government does not seem 
to play a big role when it comes to determining the significance of 
legislation.  With such a large number of observations and such a low R2 
value, these numbers cannot tell us very much.  And while this suggests 
that the significance of the average law is slightly higher under unified 
than divided government, the substantive effect is minor (1.3%), far less 
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than the effect of having a Democratic House (5% gain in significance).  
Meanwhile, running probit tests to see whether unified government has 
an effect on the top 30, 500, or 3000 laws in the Clinton and Lapinski 
ranking yields mixed results.  While it seems that unified government is 
significantly more likely to enact legislation at the very top of the dataset, 
such as the “Top 30” laws listed above, the effect quickly diminishes as 
the scope of “top” legislation is expanded.  So the verdict on Mayhew is 
mixed – running these tests on post-1946 laws shows that unified 
government has only a negligible effect on the legislative ranking within 
the period he studied. 
 Unified government also seems to have a negligible effect within 













Table 4.3. Effects of Unified Government on Lame Duck Sessions 
 
    Model 1     Model 2       
 
Unified     -2.14    -877.67*     
       (326.10)   
 
President     -1121.34*      -- 
     (418.71) 
 
Senate    281.56        -- 
   (618.26) 
 
House     1646.26**        -- 
    (620.67) 
 
Constant     14086.61***  15120.13***     
       (158.05)  
 
Adjusted R2  .0033   0.0010 
 
N = 6419 
Level of significance: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Note: Cell entries are unstandardized ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
Sure enough, the average significance of a lame duck law passed under 
unified government is 877 spots lower on the ranking than that of a lame 
duck law passed under divided government.  The probit tests show 
statistical but not substantive significance, so we could conclude that, just 
as during regular sessions, unified government does not have a 
significant effect on the importance of legislation passed. 
 Of course, the hallmark of any successful model is that it needs to 
have some explanatory power.  To achieve this – and to explore the other 
hypotheses – we need to add a number of other variables.  First of all, I 
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will add variables for the party in charge of the House, Senate, and White 
House (0 for Republican, 1 for Democrat).  I will also add variables to 
control for the strength of the president’s support in Congress, as 
measured by the percentage of seats held by the president’s party in the 
House and the Senate.  I am considering all these to be control variables 
because I do not think that either the party of the White House occupant 
or the number of Republicans or Democrats in the House and Senate 
should affect the significance of legislation. 
 Party polarization, on the other hand, could affect the significance 
of legislation.  The greater the ideological difference is between the two 
parties, the more likely that each party’s members would vote along 
party lines.  DW-NOMINATE scores are good measures of party 
polarization, for Poole and Rosenthal have compiled scores for the 
ideological means of each party in each chamber.  The greater the 
difference between the two parties’ ideological means, the more likely 
that unified governments will pursue more significant legislation and 
that divided governments will not.  As discussed in the previous chapter, 
there has been a lot of debate over whether divided government is a 
recipe for gridlock.  I contend that in lame duck sessions with unusually 
high levels of polarization, divided government does lead to gridlock. 
On the other hand, higher party polarization can lead to relatively 
efficient government (by American standards) under unified control.  
 
 125 
While there has been some debate about whether the parties’ power of 
the whip increases or decreases in lame duck sessions, I argue that a 
greater ideological difference between the parties can help promote 
significant legislation in a bigger way in lame duck sessions than regular 
sessions.  Members of the minority party who had instinctively voted No 
on majority-supported legislation before the election would now be freer 
to drop their opposition.   Drawing a greater distinction between the 
parties before the election would preclude minority party members from 
supporting the majority party’s legislation.  Within lame duck sessions, I 
therefore posit that higher partisanship as measured by a greater gap 
between the two political parties’ ideological means will increase the 
level of legislative significance.  Since I do not want the polarization angle 
to sway the results on my hypotheses regarding leadership changes, I 
will control for polarization using the DW-NOMINATE data. 
That is not to say that the partisan breakdown and party 
polarization levels won’t affect the content of virtually every bill that 
makes its way into law – of course they will.  But Clinton and Lapinski, 
just as Mayhew, Stathis, and the other analysts, did not determine the 
relative significance of every law by looking through a partisan lens.  For 
example, while most of the top 30 and top 500 laws were passed by 
Democratic Presidents working with a Democratic-led Congress, some of 
this can be attributed to the higher number of total laws passed by 
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unified Democratic governments.160  The differences in proportions are 
not high enough to draw partisan conclusions, nor are they the subject of 
this study, so let us return to the question of elections and lame duck 
sessions and move to testing the key hypotheses. 
 At the top of the list of variables are those that reflect the election 
results.  I test whether changes in control of the Senate, House, and the 
White House affect the legislative output in the lame duck session.    In 
addition, I measure the percentage change in the House and Senate for 
the party of the incoming president to see if partisan shifts without 
changes in control also have an effect.  With regards to the White House, I 
include variables for both a change of president and a change of party.  
Complete swings in power can sometimes take more than one election 
cycle; for example, Republicans took over Congress after the 1918 
elections but were only able to win the White House in 1920; likewise, 
Democrats took over Congress in 2006 and the White House in 2008.  To 
capture these swings, I am adding a variable that combines the partisan 
changes over two elections. 
 With respect to the question of unified versus divided government, 
I include several variables as well.  At the most basic level, I test for the 
effect of unified government.  I also include dummy variables that test 
                                                
160 See the appendix for a more complete breakdown of the legislative 
output cross-tabulated with different partisan configurations 
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the effects of an election that has caused a change from unified to divided 
government or vice versa.  Then, I include a variable that measures the 
number of unified sessions a party has had in power and an interactive 
term that reflects a change away from unified government after that 
number of sessions.  My expectation is that unified government that 
maintains control for many years will pass less significant legislation than 
a unified government that has only recently got into office, especially if 
the party in charge has just been turned out at the polls. 
 Finally, I want to control for polarization as well.  I incorporate 
several variables based on the Poole and Rosenthal DW-NOMINATE 
scores, including the ideological means of the House and Senate (on a 
scale where negative is more liberal and positive is more conservative), as 
well as the difference in each chamber between the ideological means of 
each party.  The differences I also use in an interaction term for when 
unified government is present, since I think high polarization leads to 
different legislative outputs depending on whether or not there is one 
party that can control the entire process. 
 In sum, I have created a model that will measure the effects of 
elections on legislation passed in lame duck sessions.  After defining an 
operational measure of significant legislation and explaining how I can 




Chapter V: Results 
i. What makes a lame duck quack? 
 
The most important contribution I hope to make addresses the impact of 
election results on lame duck sessions.  Specifically, I argue that changes 
in partisan control of one or more chambers of Congress – or the White 
House – affect the legislative output not just of the following Congress 
but also of the lame duck session.   
 The previous chapter laid out how to test my hypotheses.  I created 
several models that incorporate different control variables: Model 1 
includes everything described above, such as which party controls each 
chamber and the percentage of each chamber representing the president’s 
party.  Model 2 includes all of Model 1 except for the variable reflecting 
cumulative shifts in partisan control over two election cycles.  Model 3 
includes all of Model 2 save the partisan make-up of the different 
chambers by percentage.  Model 4 includes Model 3 but without any 
figures reflecting party polarization.  Using STATA to find out if elections 
affect the average significance of legislation as per the Clinton and 
Lapinski dataset, the regression table for the variables directly testing the 




Table 5.1. Effects on average significance of a lame duck law161 
 
H Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
          
H1 Change coming in 
the President 
2,812*** 3,372*** 3,790*** 3,888*** 
 
(502) (500) (497) (461) 
     
H2 Change from divided 
government 
16,488*** 18,302*** 6,093*** 6,297*** 
 
(2,214) (2,215) (1,692) (1,399) 
     
H3 Change from unified 
government 
31,352*** 31,571*** 22,517*** 24,727*** 
 
(3,396) (3,415) (2,689) (2,357) 
      
H4 IAT: change from unified * # of unified 
sessions 
-3,286*** -3,384*** -3,039*** -3,411*** 
 
(342) (344) (302) (294) 
    
      
 
Constant 43,184*** 41,212*** 26,951*** 11,500*** 
  
(4,351) (4,368) (3,239) (781) 
      
 
Adjusted R2 0.0926 0.0828 0.0703 0.0659 
 
N = 6419 (standard errors in parentheses) 
Level of significance: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Note: Cell entries are unstandardized ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
 
 





                                                
161 See full regression table in the Appendix. 
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Figure 5.1. Effects on average significance of a lame duck law 
 
 
So what does this model tell us?  Quite a lot, as can also be inferred from 
the graph above. 
First, the positive impact of a change in the White House occupant 
(H1) is substantively and statistically significant, though a change in the 
White House party is seldom either.  This suggests that even if an 
outgoing president is handing over to a fellow partisan, he still wants to 
put a personal stamp on important legislation before he leaves office.  
This finding ties into the literature on lame duck presidents and adds 
weight to the idea that the lame duck syndrome is just a myth; instead, 
presidents succeed in passing relatively significant legislation right 
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waxes and wanes over time, highest after an election victory and lowest 
after losing a re-election bid, he cannot be ignored just because he is 
about to leave office. 
 Second, the results that reject all of the null hypotheses are robust 
across all models.  A change from divided to unified government (H2) 
always has a large positive effect on the lame duck legislative output (p 
<.001).  Moreover, a change from unified to divided government (H3) has 
an even larger positive effect (p <.001) – usually, this coefficient is 
approximately twice as large as the divided-to-unified change.  Any 
impending partisan change in one or more of the House, Senate, and 
White House leads to more significant legislation.  With the exception of 
the effects of a highly polarized Congress under unified government, the 
unified-to-divided coefficient has the largest substantive effect on 
legislative output.  All of this suggests that leaders of the outgoing 
majority and the incoming majority become more willing to pass 
significant legislation during the lame duck session. 
Finally, the coefficient for the interaction term measuring the 
number of years that one party has held unified control before losing 
power (H4) is remarkably consistent across all models.  Always 
statistically significant (p <.001), it tends to lower the average significance 
of lame duck laws by 5-10% for every session a party has led the country.  
This suggests that parties that only controlled Congress and the White 
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House for a very short time – a presidential term or less, say – still have a 
lot to do in the lame duck session and have a high sense of urgency, 
trying to pass more key bills before they revert to minority status. 
On the other hand, those parties that have controlled Washington 
for a long time have managed to accomplish most of what they wanted to 
do before their final months in office.  While this may seem like common 
sense, the implications can be broad.  For example, this suggests that 
political parties may need time out of office if they are to avoid 
atrophying.  It also suggests that parties out of office for a long period 
may be more effective at generating innovative new policies.  
Furthermore, given that one-party rule has not lasted in Washington for 
more than four consecutive years in half a century, this finding suggests 
that we shall see more significant legislation in future lame duck sessions. 
 
 
ii. Hypotheses revisited 
 
For additional findings from the model, let us go through each of the 






H1: More significant legislation will pass in a lame duck session if the 
president himself is a lame duck than if he is continuing in office. 
 
Coefficient for Change in President: 2,812 
 
The model indicates that a law passed under a lame duck president will 
have a significance ranking that is 7% higher, on average, than a law 
passed in a lame duck session where the president will continue in office.  
Interestingly, the most comprehensive model suggests that the effect of a 
change in the White House is the same whether the partisan affiliation of 
the president changes or not.  In some of the more streamlined models, 
such a change has a relatively small negative effect on significance, 
though in two models it even exceeds the impact of a change of president 
without regard to party.  Thus, even in models where the null hypothesis 
is rejected, the effect of a lame duck president on the significance of 
legislation passed in his last months in office is much smaller than I 
expected. 
 
H2: More significant legislation will pass in a lame duck session under 
divided government that will yield to unified government after 
the session ends than under divided government that will 
continue after the session ends. 
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H3: More significant legislation will pass in a lame duck session under 
unified government that will yield to divided government after 
the session ends than under unified government that will 
maintain control after the session ends. 
 
Coefficient for Change from divided to unified government: 16488 
Coefficient for Change from unified to divided government: 31352 
 
The effects could not be more clear: changes from divided to unified 
government make a huge impact on the legislative output of a lame duck 
session, paling only in comparison to the impact of changes from unified 
to divided government.  When the clock winds down on the current 
distribution of power, it seems that leaders from both political parties 
become more willing to enable significant legislation to pass.  If a divided 
government is about to change to a unified government, the party about 
to be left out in the cold has every incentive to compromise, even on 
important issues; though the party about to take the reins has some 
incentive to delay, there can be reasons not to do so, and apparently those 
reasons are present more often than not. 
Meanwhile, the impact on a political party with unified control of 
government that has just lost at least one chamber of Congress is huge.  
Depending on the model, the impact of a change from unified to divided 
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government is between twice and four times the impact of a change in the 
opposite direction.  This change in control is one of the biggest factors in 
determining overall levels of legislative significance in lame duck 
sessions. 
This finding corroborates my hypotheses and goes to the very core 
of the entire project.  Here is statistical evidence that elections to 
determine the composition of the next Congress change the remaining 
legislative output of the current Congress.  Other analysts have found 
that lame duck legislators often act differently to continuing legislators; I 
am showing that the behavior of a lame duck legislature as a whole 
depends in large part on elections that do not alter its membership. 
 
H4: More significant legislation will pass in a lame duck session if an 
outgoing unified government had only gained power in the 
previous 1-2 elections than if it had held power for many years. 
 
Coefficient for each session of unified control before a change to 
divided government: -3,286 
 
While the number of sessions that a party has had unified control is not 
statistically significant, that number is part of the interaction term that 
reflects the amount of time a party has had in order to implement its 
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policies.  The full term is the number of sessions multiplied by the 
dummy variable, Change from unified to divided government.  Sure 
enough, the model shows that for every session that a party has 
controlled Congress and the White House before relinquishing at least 
one, the average significance of a law decreases by almost 9%.  For 
example, Republicans ran unified government in the Congress of 1889-
1891 but quickly lost the House; when they lost the House again in 1910, 
they had controlled Washington for 14 years.  Since they had more time 
to implement policies before the 1910-11 lame duck session than in the 
1890-1891 lame duck session, the significance of the average 1911 law 
stands some 20,000 places below that of the average 1891 law.  The longer 
a party has unified control before losing it, the lower the significance of 
the average lame duck law, so the null hypothesis is rejected. 
 
 
iii. Robustness checks 
 
To ensure that my findings are not the fluke of just a few models, I 
have run a number of additional models through statistical tests to see if 
they corroborate my results (see above).  While models with subsets of 
variables removed have a lower R2 value, suggesting that they explain a 
little less of the variation in lame duck laws’ significance, the key 
 
 137 
coefficients remain statistically and substantively significant.  The control 
variables are fairly consistent.  The president’s partisan identification 
does not matter as much as partisan control of Congress; while the 
coefficient for a Democratic House is always positive and almost always 
significant, the coefficient for a Democratic Senate is always negative and 
statistically significant.  My conclusion from these results indicate that, 
while we shall see that partisan changes affect legislative significance in 
lame duck sessions, it matters less which party is actually in control. 
 At first glance, the measure of polarization proved to be less robust 
than I expected.  Different models give a wide variety of coefficients, 
positive and negative, statistically significant and not, for the Senate and 
House measures of polarization.  But the polarization measures under 
unified government are another matter: every single model gives assigns 
a large negative coefficient to the Senate and a large positive coefficient to 
the House.  In all but two models, the House coefficient is larger, and in 
all but one model the p value is less than .001 (it is less than .1 for the 
Senate measure in one model).  The polarization figures can exceed .8 in 
the Senate and .9 in the House – and they have done so in recent years 
and still do as of the time of writing.  Given the robustness of these 
findings, we can conclude that the impact of polarization under unified 
government far exceeds that of the partisan breakdown of the chambers. 
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 Other findings were also robust through the different models.  As 
mentioned at the beginning of this section on findings, the positive 
impact of a change of president (H1) remains substantively and 
statistically significant across all models.  However, a change in the White 
House party separate from the man is seldom significant.  This suggests 
that even if an outgoing president is handing over to a fellow partisan, he 
still wants to put a personal stamp on important legislation before he 
leaves office.  A change in partisan control of the House of 
Representatives – though not the Senate – apparently has a negative 
impact on lame duck legislative significance.  On the other hand, for 
every Senate seat lost by the president’s party, legislative significance 
increases.  Although the equivalent number for the House is smaller and 
not as statistically significant in every model, the implication is clear: a 
party holding the White House but about to lose ground in Congress 
seeks to pass more significant legislation in the lame duck period. 
 Finally, the results that reject the remaining three null hypotheses 
are robust across all models.  A change from divided to unified 
government (H2) always has a large positive effect on the lame duck 
legislative output, as does a change from unified to divided government 
(H3) – usually, the latter coefficient is approximately twice as large as the 
divided-to-unified change.  With the exception of the effects of a highly 
polarized Congress under unified government, the unified-to-divided 
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coefficient has the largest substantive effect on legislative output.  
Furthermore, the coefficient for the interaction term measuring the 
number of years that one party has held unified control before losing 
power (H4) is statistically significant, lowering the average significance of 
lame duck laws by 5-10% for every session a party has led the country.  
 All of the straightforward OLS regression models support the 
hypotheses with results that are substantial, robust, and statistically 
significant.  For an additional robustness check, I have divided the 37,767 
laws of the dataset into quartiles and run all the same regressions.  
Though the R2 values are somewhat lower, all the coefficients point in the 
same direction, with similar substantive and statistical significance. 
To add yet another layer of confidence, I have also run probit 
models.162  For these, I have created dummy variables for the top quartile, 
as well as the top 500 and top 3500 laws ranked by significance – Clinton 
and Lapinski used these cutoff points because the former is roughly 
equivalent to Mayhew’s list of landmark legislation while the latter is 
comparable to the top 10% most significant enactments within the data 
period.163  Although the probit models for the top quartile, top 3500, and 
top 500 laws show decreasing statistical significance, the coefficients all 
                                                
162 I assume a Normal distribution for the significance of legislation, 
though I have also run logit models just in case the distribution is 
logarithmic, and the results are similar. 
163 Clinton, Joshua D. and John Lapinski.  2008.  “Laws and Roll Calls in 
the U.S. Congress, 1891-1994,” LSQ 33:4 (November), 523. 
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point in the expected direction with the expected relative values.  For the 
probit model run on the top 3500 laws, the variable with the highest 
statistical significance is the change from unified to divided government. 
As one final additional test, I have also decided to see whether the 
same variables would help explain the difference in important legislation 
between regular and lame duck sessions.  This is to control for the fact 
that different Congresses have different average levels of significance.  
For example, there is a strong similarity between the ranks of the average 
law passed in the lame duck sessions of 1894-95 (9,467), 1910-11 (9,168), 
and 1918-19 (9,990).  But looking only at these numbers without 
comparisons to the respective regular sessions would paint an incomplete 
picture.  The average regular session laws varied widely in rank: 12,837 in 
1893-94, 19,404 in 1909-10, and 22,802 in 1917-18.  In other words, the 
drop in legislative significance was much larger in the latter 65th Congress 
than in either the 61st or 53rd Congresses.  I want to make sure that my 
models have not been skewed by these variations across time. 
For every Congress covered by the dataset, I have taken the 
average significance of all regular and lame duck laws.  Then I created a 
variable for the difference between the two averages, which represents 
the drop in legislative significance from the regular to the lame duck 
session.  The dependent variable represents the change from the regular 
to the lame duck session, so large negative numbers indicate a significant 
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drop in significance, perhaps highlighting a large number of lame duck 
laws that rename post offices.  Positive numbers, on the other hand, 
suggest lame duck laws that are even more important than regular laws.  
Could my hypotheses, which help explain variation across different lame 
duck sessions, also help explain the size of the drop in significance that 
takes place after the elections? 
 
Figure 5.2.  Difference between average significance of a regular session 
law and a lame duck law 
 
 
 It turns out that the answer is yes.  In several different models, four 
coefficients turn out to be substantively and statistically significant across 
the board: the sessions under the same president (negative), the number 
of sessions under unified control (positive), a change from unified to 
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number of unified sessions when there is a unified-to-divided change.  
None of these results contradict my hypotheses; in fact, this alternative 
approach corroborates H1, H2, and H4 (see appendix for regression tables). 
In sum, I am reasonably confident that my model helps explain the 







Chapter VI: Case Studies 
i. Which ducks quack differently? 
 
Now that I have a statistical model that helps explain the variation in the 
legislative outputs of different lame duck sessions, one large question 
remains: does the model have any predictive capability?  To find out, this 
chapter will cover three case studies: the lame duck sessions of 2008, 2010, 
and 2012. 
 I have chosen these sessions for three reasons.  First, each one 
covers a different electoral result: a change from divided to unified 
government, a change from unified to divided government, and a status 
quo election.  Second, these are recent lame duck sessions that took place 
outside the time frame of my dataset.  Thus, predictions from my model 
can be checked against the reality of these sessions.  Third, because these 
sessions come in sequence, many of the key political players remain the 
same; only the strategic calculations change, which is important in 
assessing my theories.  Finally, because these sessions are the most recent, 
I think they can be a useful addition to the historical data when it comes 






ii. Previous case studies 
 
Several case studies have been conducted on a variety of policy 
changes covered in specific votes held in lame duck sessions.  The 1922 
ship subsidy bill, for example, drew attention because a large number of 
defeated Republicans voted for the unpopular measure – in fact, exiting 
Republicans were significantly more likely to vote in favor of final 
passage than those who would continue to serve in Congress.164  In 1982, 
a bill to require that for every 100,000 cars a manufacturer sold in the 
United States, an additional 10% of the value-added content would have 
to be American.  Stalled during the regular congressional session, the 
“domestic content” bill passed the House in the lame duck session, 
though departing members were less likely to vote for it; returning 
members faced pressure to support the auto industry (the vote was seen 
as symbolic, for everyone expected the bill to die in the Senate, which it 
did).165  Meanwhile, during the 1998 impeachment of President Clinton, 
some analysts (though not all) suggested that members acted differently 
in the October vote to hold impeachment hearings as opposed to the 
                                                
164 Goodman, Craig and Timothy P. Nokken, 2004, Op cit. 
165 McArthur, John and Stephen V. Marks.  1988.  “Constituent Interest vs. 
Legislator Ideology: The Role of Political Opportunity Cost,” Economic 
Inquiry 26:3 (July), 461-470; Luger, Stan.  2000.  Corporate Power, American 
Democracy, and the Automobile Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), 146-152; Murray, Alan.  1982.  “House Passes Auto 
Domestic Content Bill,” CQ Trade (December 18), 3072. 
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actual December impeachment vote, and reelected incumbents weighed 
constituent preferences far more heavily than departing members.166 
In the final chapter of The Last Great Senate, Ira Shapiro describes 
the lame duck session of 1980.167  Shapiro was a Senate staffer at the time, 
and the pain he and his fellow Democrats felt on election night is 
palpable in his writing.  Riding Reagan’s coattails, Republican Senate 
candidates had defeated nine incumbent Democrats and picked up 
twelve seats in total, winning a majority for the first time in 26 years.  
What made the victory ever sweeter for Republicans – and harder to 
swallow for Democrats – was that virtually nobody saw the Republican 
triumph coming.  The presidential race had seemed close until the final 
week, there was little polling of Senate races before the election, and exit 
polls did not yet exist.  Five incumbents lost by a margin of less than 5%; 
if fewer than 35,000 voters in key states had changed their votes (out of 
                                                
166 Rothenberg, Lawrence S. and Mitchell S. Sanders.  2000.  “Lame-Duck 
Politics: Impending Departure and the Votes on Impeachment,” Political 
Research Quarterly 53:3 (September), 523; Lanoue, David J. and Craig F. 
Emmert.  1999.  “Voting in the Glare of the Spotlight: Representatives’ 
Votes on the Impeachment of President Clinton,” Polity 32:2 (Winter), 
253-269.  For an opposing view, see Lawrence, Christopher N.  2007.  
“Of Shirking, Outliers, and Statistical Artifacts: Lame-Duck Legislators 
and Support for Impeachment,” Political Research Quarterly 60:1 (March), 
159-162. 
167 Shapiro, Ira.  Op cit, 355-373. 
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over 57 million voters nationwide), Democrats would have retained a 
majority.168 
“Every lame-duck session has an edgy, querulous feel to it,” writes 
Shapiro.  “The members would much rather be at home, savoring their 
victories or licking their wounds.  The one that began on November 12 
[1980] bordered on the full-on surreal.”169  Some felt that Congress should 
not legislate on major substantive matters because the country’s political 
shift was clear, but instead the 1980 lame duck session turned out to be 
remarkably productive.  Among the bills passed were a budget resolution 
and reconciliation bill, five appropriations bills, a three-year extension of 
revenue sharing, changes in military pay and benefits, and a landmark 
environmental cleanup bill to deal with toxic waste sites, known 
afterwards as “Superfund.”170  In addition, the Senate confirmed Stephen 
Breyer’s nomination to a judgeship and enacted the Bayh-Dole Act 
reforming patent policy – primarily because of personal friendships 
amongst senators.  Finally, Congress passed a historic Alaska 
conservation bill after environmentalists pushing for a stronger bill and 
                                                
168 Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 4, 
1980.  1981.  Ladd, Thomas E., ed (Washington, DC: GPO). 
169 Shapiro, Ira.  Op cit, 355. 
170 Ibid, 356. 
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executive orders realized that if they did not compromise during the lame 
duck session, they would get nothing during the next administration.171 
The 1980 lame duck session was unusual, for it was the first time 
since passage of the Twentieth Amendment that such a session took place 
for an outgoing unified government.  Since this change to divided 
government only came after four years of unified government, I would 
expect there to be much significant legislation.  My model estimates that 
the average significance of legislation during this session would be very 
high relative to previous lame duck sessions.  Sure enough, Clinton and 
Lapinski indicate that the 1980 lame duck session did pass some of the 
most significant lame duck legislation in their entire dataset. 
However, the 1980 elections were a harbinger of things to come: 
frequent changes in partisan control.  1986 saw the Senate swing back to 
the Democrats.  Bill Clinton won the White House in 1992, ushering in a 
period of unified government that lasted all of two years.  The 
Republican Revolution of 1994 brought divided government for the 
remainder of the Clinton Administration.  After the contested 2000 
election, Republicans controlled both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue for 
five months, but the resignation of Sen. Jim Jeffords from the party 
opened the door for divided government once again.  Republicans 
                                                
171 Ibid, 356-358. 
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regained the Senate in 2002 and kept unified control for four years before 
Democrats took Congress back in 2006 – which brings us to 2008. 
 
 
iii. Change from divided to unified government: 2008 
 
A change from divided to unified government should, all else 
being equal, lead to higher-than-average significance in lame duck 
sessions.  However, there were other factors, including particularly high 
levels of partisan polarization, that lead my model to predict the 2008 
lame duck session would be a damp squib. 
In 2008, as George W. Bush’s second term was coming to an end, 
America faced a clear choice.  Sen. Barack Obama rode the theme of 
change to victory in the Democratic primaries, while Sen. John McCain 
captured the Republican nomination early.  Summer polls suggested a 
clear lead for Obama, with many voters looking for a change in the White 
House.  Though polls narrowed after the conventions, the economic 
calamity triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15th 
and the responses by the two campaigns made it very likely that the 
Democrat would win.172  In fact, not a single opinion poll after that date 
                                                




showed McCain ahead, and some showed Obama opening up double-
digit leads.  Democratic congressional candidates were gaining traction 
on the campaign trail just as Washington was dealing with a $700 billion 
bailout package to try and steady the financial markets. 
 When the election came, the predictions came true: Democrats ran 
the table.  Barack Obama won a decisive victory in the presidential 
election, sparking street celebrations in major cities across the country.  
Democrats won every close Senate race, picking up eight seats, and 
increased their House majority to a 257-178 margin.  Time magazine’s 
cover shortly after the election featured Obama as a new FDR. 173  
Expectations ran high for the incoming administration and the Congress 
that would work with him come January. 
 Expectations were practically non-existent, though, for the lame 
duck session that would take place before the new President and 
Congress took office.  The Senate met as soon as two days after the 
elections, but only in ongoing pro forma sessions to prevent outgoing 
President Bush from making recess appointments.  The president had 
passed the buck on most domestic appropriations bills, for a continuing 
resolution had been passed before the elections that extended outlays 
until March 2009; bills to fund war spending and security agencies had 
                                                
173 Time, November 24, 2008. 
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already been signed before the elections.174  Washington was almost 
entirely focused on the presidential transition; the House held only seven 
roll calls and the Senate just two after the election, and only 12 of the 460 
laws passed by the 110th Congress were enacted during the lame duck 
session.175  Those 12 were minor bills, mostly making technical corrections 
to previous legislation or authorizing certain commemorative coins, 
though Congress also extended unemployment compensation. 
 The biggest legislative question of the 2008 lame duck session was 
whether and how to fund a bailout of America’s automakers.  
Immediately after the election, talk of a bailout began to make the circles 
in Washington, and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi met with officials 
from the auto companies and unions to discuss federal support. 176  
President Bush wanted Congress to authorize $14 billion from an existing 
Energy Department program intended for producing vehicles with 
higher fuel efficiency.  Congressional Democrats wanted the President to 
use some of the money authorized by TARP, the $700 billion Troubled 
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Asset Relief Program enacted before the elections.  After weeks of 
standstill, Pelosi agreed to support the President, and House-White 
House negotiators put together a bill over a weekend.  The leadership 
brought the bill to the floor, which included the $14 billion in bridge 
loans in return for various requirements such as limits on executive 
compensation and long-term restructuring plans.  It passed with 
overwhelming Democratic support (though 20 representatives, mostly 
Blue Dogs, dissented). 
Despite the President’s backing, just 32 Republicans voted yes.  
Interestingly, they included 3 who were defeated at the polls, 7 retiring 
members, and all but one of the Michigan delegation; those who missed 
the vote included 3 who lost and 6 members retiring voluntarily.  To sum 
up: 
 
Table 6.1.  House Republican vote on the auto bailout,  
 December 10, 2008177 
 
 Yes No Not voting 
Total 32 150 15 
Continuing 22* (14%) 128 (82%) 6 (4%) 
Defeated 3 (15%) 14 (70%) 3 (15%) 
Retiring 7 (33%) 8 (38%) 6 (29%) 
*Including all 7 returning Michigan Congressmen  
 
                                                




Not counting the Michigan delegation, just 10% of Republican 
Congressmen who would continue to serve in the next Congress 
supported the bailout, a far lower proportion than the one-quarter out of 
those leaving at the end of the term who did so. 
 While this breakdown of the vote is instructive and supports the 
existing literature on changes in individual MC voting behavior during 
lame duck sessions, the bigger question of legislative output remains my 
focus.  Here, the interesting part of the story is what happened in the 
Senate.  The tally for Republicans was, proportionally, very similar: 
 
Table 6.2 Senate Republican vote on cloture for the auto bailout, 
 December 11, 2008178  
 
 Yes No Not voting 
Total 9 31 8 
Continuing 6 (18%) 30 (73%) 3 (9%) 
Defeated 1 (25%) 0 3 (75%) 
Retiring 2 (40%) 1 (20%) 2 (40%) 
 
Because three Democrats voted No, Majority Leader Harry Reid saw that 
he could not get to 60 votes to force cloture without broader Republican 
support, so the auto bailout died in the Senate.179  In the end, then, 
President Bush had to do what House Democrats originally pushed for in 
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the first place, namely, he directed that $14 billion of TARP money be 
used to keep the car manufacturers going until the next Congress could 
enact more substantial legislation.180 
 At the end of the 2008 lame duck session, then, Congress had very 
little to show.  Neither chamber met for more than seven days of 
legislative business, and only a dozen mostly minor bills emerged.  The 
one item had to be dealt with straight away – the auto bailout – was 
effectively deferred until the incoming leaders would be in charge.  The 
pending change from a divided government under a lame duck President 
Bush to a unified government led by President-elect Obama meant that 
Democrats had no reason to push forward with legislation, especially 
since they had just gained another 5-6% of the seats in each chamber. 
My model, based on data through 1994, predicts that the average 
significance of a law passed in the 2008 lame duck session would be 
minimal.  That is because the Democrats, as the party of the incoming 
president and the party that made significant gains in the Congressional 
elections, would have little incentive to do anything before their 
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imminent power increase took effect.  Moreover, the partisan gap 
between the parties was the highest since 1892 in the House and the 
highest in the DW-NOMINATE record in the Senate.  According to the 
model, these factors all stand in the way of passing significant legislation 
in a lame duck session.  The session’s negligible accomplishments bear 
out this prediction. 
 
 
iv. Change from unified to divided government: 2010 
 
My model predicts something radically different for the 2010 lame duck 
session.  Instead of a whimper à la 2008, the model forecasts that after the 
2010 elections, Congress would finish with a bang. 
 The reason is that the 2010 elections proved to be a Republican 
landslide.  Mid-term elections are traditionally difficult for the president’s 
party; since the Second World War, the president’s party gained seats in 
Congress only in 1998 and 2002.  But 2010 saw Republicans gain 63 seats 
in the House – the highest turnover since the war – and 6 seats in the 
Senate.  Many commentators agreed that despite the carnage, Democrats 
could count themselves lucky, for the main reason Republicans did not 
win back the Senate as well was the selection of Tea Party candidates in 
primaries in Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, and Nevada.  In any case, 
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the political winds definitely shifted – as President Obama himself 
admitted in his post-election press conference, it was “a shellacking.”181 
 None of this was a surprise.  Some political prognosticators had 
been predicting a Republican takeover of the House since Scott Brown 
had won the special Senate election in Massachusetts back in January.182  
By the end of the summer, Democratic operatives feared that such 
predictions would come to pass.183  24 Democrats voluntarily left the 
House long before November, either through retirement or running for a 
different office (no Democrat ultimately won such a race).  Nonetheless, 
despite the warning signs, Congressional Democrats were reluctant to 
push big-ticket items before November because they wanted to avoid 
additional controversial votes.  Besides, Republicans sensed that the wind 
was blowing in their favor and were not inclined to give way on any 
Democratic legislative priorities before the elections. 
Some Republicans, mindful of the opportunities that a post-election 
lame duck session might present for Democrats, called for Congress to 
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discontinue such sessions altogether.  Former Speaker Newt Gingrich and 
former House Majority Leader Dick Armey developed and circulated a 
“No Lame Duck Pledge” (despite having used the 1998 lame duck session 
to impeach President Clinton).184  Commentators in The Wall Street Journal, 
The Weekly Standard, The Washington Times, and the Drudge Report 
warned that Democrats would try to thwart the will of the people after 
their expected repudiation at the polls.185  Numerous Republican MCs 
echoed the sentiment, including Minority Leader John Boehner, Rep. 
Michelle Bachmann (R-MN), and Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-UT).186  Rep. Tom 
Price(R-GA), chairman of the Republican Study Committee, introduced a 
resolution to prevent Congress from meeting in lame duck sessions 
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except for national emergencies.187  Not surprisingly, the chair quashed it, 
and a procedural motion to appeal the ruling (i.e. to proceed with a vote 
on precluding lame duck sessions) failed on party lines.188  
Meanwhile, Democrats shrugged 
off such concerns as misguided, 
delusional, or based on the fallacy that 
moderates in either party would change 
their votes in a lame duck session.  Some 
MCs like Sen. John Kerry (D-MA) were 
already gearing up for major post-
election legislative battles.189  However, 
most Democrats maintained that a lame 
duck session would deal with relatively 
minor outstanding issues, not serve as a Trojan horse to pass major 
reforms dealing with immigration, union rights such as card check, or 
deficit reduction.  Rep. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), for example, insisted 
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that there was no “secret plan” for a major lame duck session.190  By the 
end of September, Rep. Artur Davis (D-AL), who had lost the 
gubernatorial primary, was more circumspect: “It depends on what 
happens with the size of the majority.”191 
Democrats lost their majority in November when 52 of their 
incumbents lost their bids for re-election.  While everyone focused on the 
magnitude of the Republican triumph and what it would mean for next 
year, some analysts and pressure groups did immediately consider what 
the outgoing 111th Congress could still do in its lame duck session.  
Journalists focused on possible legislation: an extension of the Bush tax 
cuts, a bill on Chinese currency manipulation, offshore oil drilling, the 
debt limit, and the New START Treaty.192  Several articles focused on the 
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most likely legislative action, the push to repeal Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.193  
CQ added to this list bills on aviation programs, climate change, and 
transportation, while most appropriations bills had yet to reach a floor 
vote in either chamber. 194   But most people, inside and outside of 
Washington, believed that little would come of the lame duck session.195  
They generally agreed with Brian Friel, who wrote: 
 
Lame-Duck sessions such as the one that begins this week are so 
short and fraught with post-election fissures that Congress usually 
musters the will to complete only a single piece of business, if that. 
A mix of a desperate outgoing majority, an obstinate incoming 
majority, a gathering of dejected losers and an eight-weeks-short 
window from Election Day to the start of the new Congress often 
sets the stage for bad feelings and gridlock. … Despite this year’s 
list of consequential leftover issues, history shows that such 
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sessions, more often than not, flounder and produce no major 
legislation.196 
 
After some pro forma Senate sessions, both chambers reconvened 
on November 15.  For several days, party caucuses in both chambers 
sorted out organizational matters, such as leadership positions and 
committee assignments.  Legislating did not fully begin until after the 
Thanksgiving break, and even then, the House did not actually have 
much to do at first.  With a large majority, House Democrats had already 
passed every major bill on their agenda during the regular session.  In 
addition to President Obama’s signature health care reform and major 
Wall Street reforms, the House had already passed and sent to the Senate 
every item on CQ’s Bills to Watch.  After the House passed a Senate 
version of a child nutrition bill “with little time and no alternatives,” only 
one outstanding bill remained, the DREAM Act to enable undocumented 
children of illegal immigrants a pathway to citizenship.197  The House 
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passed it on December 8th by the narrow margin of 216-198.  Only eight 
Republicans voted in favor, six of whom were lame ducks.198  
The real question of the lame duck session was what would 
happen in the Senate.  Everything hinged on negotiations regarding what 
to do about the Bush tax cuts, slated to expire on December 31st.  
Republicans wanted to make the tax cuts permanent, while Democrats 
were more divided, seeking anything from letting the cuts expire on the 
rich (with any number of definitions of “rich”) to a temporary extension. 
For weeks, White House officials such as Treasury Secretary Tim 
Geithner negotiated with leaders of both parties in both chambers.  
Action on other bills was deferred until the biggest issue could be 
resolved – especially since all 42 Senate Republicans vowed to block 
everything before taxes and funding for 2011 were sorted.199  Congress 
agreed only on a continuing resolution in early December that would 
allow an extra few weeks to finalize appropriations bills (an earlier CR 
expired December 3rd).  After the House passed a bill to extend only the 
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low- and middle-income tax cuts on the 2nd, the Senate filibustered.  
Clearly, negotiations were necessary with Senate Republicans. 
Finally, on Monday, December 6th, a deal was struck: the White 
House conceded on extending all the tax cuts for another two years in 
return for reinstating the inheritance tax for estates valued over $5 
million, a one-year extension of unemployment insurance benefits, and 
extending various Medicare and Medicaid provisions.  President Obama 
announced the proposed deal, an $857.8 billion tax cut and 
unemployment package, at a news conference after he and Vice President 
Joe Biden told congressional Democrats that it was “the best they could 
expect.”200  
For a week, people inside and outside of Congress, on both sides of 
the aisle, griped about the deal.  Liberals like Paul Krugman accused 
Obama of succumbing to “tax-cut blackmail.”201  The House Democrats 
met in caucus and expressed their disapproval of the deal in a non-
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binding vote.202  Liberals were granted a vote to amend the package 
regarding the estate tax, but the amendment failed – primarily because 
MCs knew that the Senate would not accept any changes.  The general 
feeling was that after the Senate had voted so overwhelmingly in favor of 
the compromise, the House simply had no choice.  Sen. Bernie Sanders, a 
self-described independent socialist who usually caucused with 
Democrats, delivered a televised (and later published) eight-hour speech 
against the deal, which became known as the Filibernie, but the writing 
was already on the wall.203 
The White House argued that there was no chance of getting a 
better compromise.  Given the imminent Republican takeover of the 
House, Democrats knew that they would have to take a somewhat 
unpalatable deal now or lose any influence over a potential future deal – 
exactly what my theory and model on lame duck sessions predicts.  On 
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the conservative side, commentators criticized Republicans in Congress 
for failing to secure significant deficit reduction, or for negotiating with 
the President at all.  Republican leaders, however, were very happy with 
the extension of the Bush tax cuts.  After all, the two-year extension was 
no accident: Republicans believed they would hold all the cards in the 
2012 lame duck session and would be able to make all the tax cuts 
permanent the next time around. 
And Republicans did not simply fold their cards and let the 
Democrats do everything they wanted just because they won the tax cut 
extension.  Senate Republicans blocked a collective bargaining rights 
measure and a $1.2 trillion omnibus spending bill, which ultimately led 
to a three-month continuing resolution to keep the federal government 
functioning.204  They filibustered legislation intended to give women and 
men pay equity.205  Another measure that died in the Senate was a bill to 
protect whistleblowers in the federal workforce: The bill passed 
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unanimously in the House but died in the Senate because of an 
anonymous last-minute hold.206  Climate change legislation, passed in the 
House back in June 2009, remained stalled in the Senate, and lame duck 
efforts to address renewable-energy standards failed to force cloture.207  
Senate Democrats pulled the DREAM Act dealing with illegal immigrants 
from consideration on December 9th. 208   Negotiations succeeded in 
persuading three Republicans to vote for cloture (including a lame duck 
who had lost his primary, Robert Bennett of Utah), but several Democrats 
broke ranks and the leadership could not muster the necessary 60 votes. 
Still, the tax cut extension deal did open the door to other 
Democratic priorities.  DADT repeal looked as though it might fail at the 
beginning of December when the Pentagon released the results of its 
survey of soldiers on the issue. 209   On the 6th, however, Sen. Joe 
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Lieberman (I-CT) called on the Senate to remain in session longer than 
planned if that’s what it would take to pass a repeal.210  Republicans 
blocked a cloture vote on the 9th to proceed to a vote on the defense 
authorization bill that included the DADT repeal.211  Subsequently, the 
backers of repeal endeavored to make it a separate vote, and thus it 
succeeded, first in the House on the 15th and then in the Senate on the 18th.  
Notably, attempts to bring repeal to a vote had failed in September; only 
after the elections were several Republicans willing to vote for cloture 
and for repeal. 
Several less publicized yet still significant agenda items were also 
addressed in the wake of the tax cut extension deal.  In November, both 
chambers approved a major copyright bill.  On December 1st, the House 
approved an earlier Senate bill reauthorizing child nutrition programs.  
On the 21st, after the Senate passed its version of the Food Safety 
Modernization Act days earlier, the House gave its final approval.  The 
following day, after weeks of lobbying by commentator Jon Stewart and 
others, both chambers approved a bill to provide medical treatment and 
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compensation to 9/11 first responders.  On the last day, December 22nd, 
both chambers approved an omnibus trade act. 
Finally there was the New START Treaty, an arms reduction treaty 
with Russia signed by President Obama earlier in 2010.  The treaty had 
been held up during the regular session primarily because of the concerns 
of Sen. John Kyl (R-AZ), a leading Republican spokesman on defense and 
security issues.  Advocacy groups on both sides lobbied senators, and 
during the lame duck session both the Heritage Foundation (arguing 
against) and the American Values Network (in favor) launched media 
and direct-mail campaigns in the states of several Republican senators 
thought to be on the fence.212  In the end, personal appeals by President 
Obama and presentations by Pentagon officials convinced thirteen 
Republicans to support the treaty.  Lamar Alexander (R-TN) was one of 
them; he had gone into a confidential briefing on START opposed to the 
treaty, listened to the presentation, and came out convinced that he 
should support it.  “His change of position was striking,” writes Shapiro, 
“because it happens so rarely these days.”213  Yet Alexander was not 
alone, for a number of Republicans had changed their minds on the treaty 
                                                
212 Broder, Jonathan, and Emily Cadei.  2010.  “Waging War Over An 
Arms Treaty.” CQ Weekly (December 6), 2805, available at 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport111-000003773459. 
213 Shapiro, Ira.  Op cit, 374.  “But that’s the way the last Great Senate 
worked all the time.” 
 
 168 
from before the elections to afterwards, when it passed 71-26 in the final 
hours before the lame duck session adjourned for good. 
All told, the House held almost 100 votes in the one-month lame 
duck session (out of 664 over the two-year term), while the Senate held 50 
(out of 299).  The President signed 99 laws during the lame duck session, 
more than one-quarter of the total number of laws enacted in the 111th 
Congress.  Observers were united in their agreement that the lame duck 
session of the 111th Congress was surprisingly fruitful.  In CQ Weekly’s 
Highlights, eight of the thirteen significant congressional 
accomplishments of 2010 came in the lame duck session.214  “It’s fair to 
say that this has been the most productive post-election period we’ve had 
in decades,” asserted President Obama.215  He won plaudits for his deft 
approach to the session – Time magazine called it “Obama’s Lame-Duck 
Comeback,” and 56% of voters approved of how he handled it. 216  
Journalists were falling over themselves in acclaiming the session’s 
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success, particularly from the President’s perspective.217  As the managing 
editor of CQ Weekly put it, “Lame-duck sessions need not be quite so 
lame.”218 
Why was the session so successful?  There was a confluence of 
causes, such as the end-of-tax-cuts deadline, but a more distinguishing 
factor was that the White House changed its bargaining tactics, 
approaching key Republicans rather than relying mainly on huge 
Democratic majorities that would shortly cease to exist.  At the same time 
that he was cutting deals with Republicans, President Obama was able to 
head off potential dissidents in his own party by effectively warning 
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them, You can take half a pie now or wait until next year and get nothing 
but table scraps.  “The lame-duck session marked a new strategy for 
trying to win over political foes and discontented supporters that 
administration officials say will continue,” wrote one Washington Post 
journalist.219 
More importantly, the elections had changed the entire political 
landscape.  Politicians on all sides needed to reevaluate their strategies in 
the new environment.  Democrats in particular felt the sands falling 
through the hourglass as time ran out on their one-party control.  House 
Democrats were willing to swallow less-than-ideal bills because they 
knew (even without the president telling them) that any alternatives 
proposed in the coming session would be much further away from their 
ideal ideological position.  Senate Republican leaders saw an opportunity 
to extract concessions from the White House on the tax cut extension and 
gave up relatively little in terms of policy.  Individual Senate Republicans 
were more willing to be courted by the White House for two reasons: 
they wanted to secure their goals sooner rather than later (doing so in a 
way that ensured the battles would be fought again in the not-too-distant 
future), and they believed that a chastened and weakened president 
would be on his way out soon. 
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Ironically, the lame duck session was not just an arena for 
President Obama to spend political capital: It helped him earn more.  
After the bitter repudiation at the polls, he managed to bargain his way 
into finishing his first two years on a high note, for several signature 
legislative accomplishments emerged from the session.  Liberals who 
were angry with the President for the tax cut extension for millionaires 
were generally mollified by the DADT repeal, the arms treaty, and the 
other successes.  “He hasn’t [fixed all his problems], but he is much 
stronger than we thought he was,” said Rep. Charles Rangel.  “I think he 
has been rehabilitated.”220 
My model, using only pre-1995 data, predicts that given the results 
of the 2010 elections, the lame duck session would enact unusually 
significant legislation.  Democrats would know for sure that their days as 
the sole drivers of legislation were over, but since this was their first 
session in almost 20 years holding unified control, the odds were slim 
that they would have already been able to accomplish everything they 
wanted before the elections.  Afterwards, though, certain Republicans 
would be more inclined to work with Democrats rather than continually 
posture or oppose them.  Though the number of Republicans willing to 
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compromise might be low, the net result in terms of legislative output 
would be huge, and indeed it was.  The model’s predictions of the 2010 
session as being one of the most significant in over a century was borne 
out by what transpired. 
 
 
v. No change: 2012 
 
The model predicts that an election where partisan control does not 
change at all would have one of the lowest average levels of significance.  
In the 2012 elections, voters returned to office President Obama, a 
Democratic Senate, and a Republican House of Representatives.  
Democrats modestly increased their numbers in both chambers, but it 
was effectively a status quo election, so the model predicts that relatively 
little legislation of major significance would pass in the lame duck session. 
 The lame duck session was far from everyone’s mind at the 
beginning of a year that saw the longest, most expensive presidential 
campaign ever waged.  Opinion polling on the 2012 election had begun 
almost as soon as the 2008 election was over, and President Obama led 
most of the polls.  Pollsters conducted numerous surveys on hypothetical 
match-ups against potential Republican opponents, and after Mitt 
Romney secured the nomination in April, polls continued to show 
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Obama leading.  Polls asking whom voters would choose between a 
generic Democrat and a generic Republican for the House showed an 
advantage for Democrats throughout the year, though historically such 
polls overstate the Democratic advantage and the margins narrowed 
anyway as Election Day approached.  At the start of 2012, many pundits 
expected the Republicans to win a majority in the Senate, but after the 
summer that became increasingly unlikely. 
 The campaign context made planning for the lame duck session 
rather difficult.  Some believed early on that the post-election period 
would enable both parties to reach a grand bargain over revenue and 
spending, or that such a period would be necessary if Congress proved 
unable to improve its productivity.221  Increasing numbers of analysts and 
lobbyists began to worry about a “lame-duck hell” that might not be able 
to deal with major unresolved issues, particularly on taxes and 
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spending.222  A few observers gamed out how the elections might affect 
the lame duck session, suggesting that a Romney victory might mean 
nothing would happen until January, while an Obama victory might spur 
Republicans to agree to a deal.223  In September, former President Bill 
Clinton predicted that an Obama victory would make a major budget 
deal more likely in the lame duck session, but a few weeks later Speaker 
Boehner said that would be “difficult to do.”224  Meanwhile, the 112th 
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Congress remained gridlocked for most of the regular session due to 
presidential politicking, high party polarization, and inter-cameral 
differences exacerbated by divided partisan control of Congress itself, so 
unresolved issues stacked up near to the elections. 
 Looming before Congress was the “fiscal cliff,” whereby all of the 
tax cut extensions agreed to in the last lame duck session would expire.  
In addition, the 2011 negotiations over raising the debt ceiling ended in 
an automatic “sequester” of $1.2 trillion of cuts in defense and 
entitlement spending if no larger deal could be reached.  With the 
exception of some Tea Party adherents, nobody wanted those cuts to go 
into effect225; with the exception of a few left-wing Democrats, nobody 
wanted all of the tax cuts to expire.  Negotiators from both parties had 
decided months before to use the power of deadlines (as discussed in 
Chapter III) to the logical extreme: if nothing was agreed by December 
31st, important constituencies on both sides would suffer, while the 
American people would presumably turn against the perceived 
intransigents.  Every possible means to force a compromise in the lame 
duck session was put in place before the elections. 
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 One reason that both parties had implicitly agreed to leave so 
much until the lame duck session was that each side believed it would 
emerge victorious from the elections.  President Obama was confident he 
would win re-election, and he was privately expecting to reach landmark 
compromises with Republicans on taxation and immigration in his 
expected second term.226  At the same time, Congressional Republicans 
expected to gain control of the Senate.  By the time polls had turned 
against several Republican senatorial candidates in the fall, the lame duck 
session was already scheduled and hopes for a major breakthrough on 
the fiscal cliff began to dim.227  Besides, as late as Election Day itself, Mitt 
Romney and many of his senior campaign staffers believed he would 
win; he famously wrote a 1,118-word victory speech and planned a 
celebratory fireworks display.228  But when the votes were counted, 
President Obama won convincingly, and in addition to the expected 
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minor gains in the House, Democrats surprised many by picking up two 
seats in the Senate. 
After securing victory, one of President Obama’s first moves was to 
call Speaker Boehner, and they agreed to watch their public 
pronouncements so as to leave room for negotiation.229  The immediate 
reaction to the election was that it would enable both sides to 
compromise in the lame duck session.230  At the same time, however, 
Speaker Boehner cautioned, “We won’t solve the problem of our fiscal 
unbalance overnight and certainly won’t do it in a lame duck session of 
Congress.”231 
Congress returned from the election recess on Tuesday, November 
13th knowing that Washington would look much the same in January as it 
had done for the last 22 months.  The potential legislative agenda was 
huge: the budget, the taxes, farm policy, health, and various national 
security authorization bills.232  Out of twelve regular appropriations bills, 
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for example, the House had passed seven and the Senate had passed 
none.  
Some observers expressed optimism that President Obama’s re-
election opened a window of opportunity.  “Aware that Obama’s 
leverage will never be greater than it is now,” wrote Steven Dennis of CQ, 
“The administration and Democrats don’t want to limit the agenda to 
spending and taxes.”233  As far as they were concerned, issues as far 
ranging as immigration, infrastructure, energy, and research funding 
were now on the table.  Speaker Boehner seemed to help open the 
window: “When the president and I have been able to come to an 
agreement,” he told reporters, “There’s been no problem in getting it 
passed here in the House.”  He and the president agreed to streamline the 
negotiations by meeting one-on-one.234  And people on both sides of the 
aisle agreed that once the fiscal cliff was resolved, it could build 
confidence for legislative action on a number of other measures.235 
Others were less sanguine and suggested that the political 
landscape pointed towards a stopgap measure that would keep America 
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from falling off the fiscal cliff but leave a permanent solution to the 
incoming 113th Congress.236  By Thanksgiving, staffers from both parties 
agreed that a grand bargain was virtually impossible, that Congress and 
the White House would have to pass an immediate short-term fix 
followed by more comprehensive legislation in the next session.237  As 
negotiations dragged on behind closed doors, the public war of words 
was heating up.  Some Republican MCs began openly supporting a deal 
that would include some higher tax rates, but their leaders demurred.238  
The House Republican leadership stripped plum committee assignments 
from several rebellious members (an option not available with regards to 
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lame duck members).239  In response to a proposal by Treasury Secretary 
Geithner, Republican leaders made a $2.2 trillion proposal of their own 
on December 3rd, but the White House dismissed it out of hand.240 
Meanwhile, on December 4th, the Senate rejected the U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Treaty, with all but 
eight Republicans voting against a united Democratic caucus.241  On the 
same day, it approved the defense authorization bill, which along with a 
bill to normalize trade with Russia were the only two bills from CQ’s Bills 
to Watch to make it to the president’s desk during the entire lame duck 
session.  Likewise, the CQ Status of Appropriations checklist on 
December 28th was identical to that of October 19th, except for a 
supplemental disaster relief bill for victims of Hurricane Sandy – which, 
along with all the other bills in limbo, failed to pass through Congress to 
the president’s desk before the term ended on January 3rd.  All energy 
went into the fiscal cliff negotiations. 
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On December 12th, the House pushed back its adjournment date, 
originally scheduled for the 14th.242  With negotiations on the fiscal cliff 
stalled, Republicans began to warn that the highly charged partisan 
atmosphere would poison the well for the negotiations over raising the 
debt ceiling that would be necessary a few months into the new 
session.243  Republican leaders needed to heed its members’ demands not 
to give in to the president.  The rationale on the part of the rank-and-file 
was simple: MCs were already worried about a primary challenger two 
years hence.244  In this sense, the recent transformation of the lame duck 
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session into merely an extension of the regular session may have some 
credence.  However, the fact that voters had just returned all the leaders 
of last session to another term made those leaders less likely to shift their 
negotiating positions.  After all, each of them, Democrat and Republican 
alike, could (and did) claim a mandate, and none had lost because of 
failing to reach a compromise before the election. 
A week before Christmas, and still there was no deal.  It became 
clear that Congress would have to come back to Washington for a rare 
post-Christmas workweek.  Some liberals began calling on President 
Obama to hold off until January, when all the tax cuts would have 
expired so that he could negotiate from a stronger position.   Speaker 
Boehner was in an even tougher bind, for House Republicans signaled 
their aversion to ongoing negotiations when he sought approval of his 
“Plan B,” which would let tax cuts expire for those earning more than $1 
million a year.  Embarrassingly, he had to pull the vote at the last 
moment when it became clear that his own caucus would oppose him, 
                                                                                                                                          
Nate Silver, the statistical guru famous for correctly predicting the 
outcome of the presidential race in every state, posted an article on his 
New York Times blog wondering whether the House could continue to 
function effectively given the gerrymandering trend that has led to 
fewer and fewer swing districts, making primaries more important than 
the general election and leading to more extreme voting behavior on 
both sides.  See Silver, Nate.  2012.  “As Swing Districts Dwindle, Can a 





and some even began to question whether he could survive as Speaker.245  
After all, Republican Speakers and presumptive Speakers had been 
forced out in lame duck periods before.246  From that point onwards, 
three things were clear: first, Congress would have to work right through 
New Year’s Eve; second, all sides shelved the possibility of reaching a 
final grand bargain (so at least another round of brinksmanship could be 
expected in the next session); and finally, Boehner would defer to the 
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White House and Sen. Mitch McConnell, the Minority Leader, to make a 
deal.247 
After Christmas, as members returned to Washington, Treasury 
Secretary Geithner announced that the U.S. would hit the debt ceiling in 
just a few days.  He said the Treasury could use various accounting tricks 
to postpone a default, but the clock was ticking.248  The urgency for 
lawmakers to act was palpable, but deadlock remained.  Quite simply, 
some on both sides thought they had more to gain than to lose by going 
over the fiscal cliff.  With their numbers slated to rise in the new term, 
many Democrats were willing to hold out, and polls showed that most 
Americans supported the President’s handling of the issue.  On the other 
side, some Republicans began to think that another recession under a 
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Democratic President might help them in the next election cycle; besides, 
if there was no deal by January 1st, taxes would rise for everyone, and 
then any new plan would technically be a tax cut, which they would be 
happy to support.249  “Nobody is willing to pull the trigger” on a deal 
because “everybody wants to play the blame game,” said retiring 
Republican Rep. Steve LaTourette (R-OH).250  On Friday the 28th, Majority 
Leader Harry Reid publicly accused Speaker Boehner of running a 
“dictatorship” in the House; notwithstanding the irony that Boehner 
could not even control his own caucus, Boehner’s response when he saw 
Reid in the White House lobby was curt.251  Over the final weekend of 
2012, Reid and McConnell tried to put together a deal, but they could not 
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pull it all together, while Obama and Boehner no longer trusted each 
other to even negotiate in good faith.252 
By this point, panic was beginning to set in.  “Can things possibly 
get any worse in Washington?” asked Ben Weyl of CQ.  “As the 113th 
Congress prepares to gavel in on Jan. 3 and President Barack Obama gets 
ready to begin his second term, the capital’s political dysfunction has 
never been more apparent.253  Whenever the president and the Speaker 
seemed close to compromise, two major stumbling blocks appeared: 
lobbyists and the rank-and-file.254  Conservative groups like the Club for 
Growth pilloried Republicans for considering any compromise that 
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would let income tax rates rise, while liberal groups including organized 
labor showed a willingness to oppose the president they had just helped 
re-elect if he negotiated on entitlements or cost-of-living adjustments.  
Most Republican MCs were loath to vote for any deal that could be 
perceived as a tax increase, while Democrats were incensed that 
President Obama had reportedly put entitlements on the table. 
Ultimately, it was not a deal between Obama and Boehner, but one 
between McConnell and Vice President Biden that broke the logjam.255  
Over the course of thirteen phone calls in two days, they dropped all 
elements of a grand bargain in favor of a deal on taxes and a minor 
postponement of the sequester.256  They agreed that the Bush tax rates 
would continue for families with incomes below $450,000 and individuals 
with incomes below $400,000 – higher than the $250,000 the President 
wanted – while those earning more would pay higher Clinton-era rates.  
The deal set new tax rates on capital gains and large inheritances, delayed 
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the sequester by two months, expanded certain tax breaks for low-income 
Americans for another five years, and extended unemployment insurance 
for another year.257  Much like the last-minute deals that enabled a few 
key bills to pass in the 1980 lame duck session, it was only possible 
thanks to the personal relationship between the two men, who had 
served together in the Senate for decades.258 
Though some Democrats and even more Republicans expressed 
displeasure with the deal, many lawmakers were relieved (as were the 
stock markets).  Despite continued reservations (Reid even proposed to 
Obama that they drop the deal), the Senate voted 89-8 to approve the 
deal; only three Democrats and five Republicans opposed it.259  The vote 
was more contentious in the House, where the Republican caucus was 
almost universally opposed, including such prominent Republicans as 
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Majority Leader Eric Cantor and Majority Whip Kevin McCarthy.260  
Mindful that he needed to retain the support of his caucus, not just in 
general terms but in the vote for Speaker of the 113th Congress later in the 
week, Boehner floated an idea to bring to the floor an amendment 
limiting the tax increases in the Senate deal.  Senate leaders refused point-
blank, and the prospect of complete failure suddenly arose again.261 
In the end, Speaker Boehner realized that there was only option: 
vote for the Senate deal as it stood.262  He was reluctant because the vote 
contravened the Hastert rule, for he felt that a majority of Republican 
Congressmen opposed it.  He was not wrong: 
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Table 6.3 House Republican vote on the fiscal cliff deal, January 1, 2013263  
 
 Yes No Not voting 
Total 85 (35%) 151 (63%) 5 (2%) 
Continuing 69 (34%) 132 (65%) 1 (1%) 
Defeated 10 (37%) 16 (59%) 1 (4%) 
Retiring 6 (55%) 2 (18%) 3 (27%) 
 
However, one of the reasons that Republican leaders did not whip 
returning members more aggressively was that Democrats voted 
overwhelmingly for the measure, 172-16.  Thus, the final tally was 257-
167, and the deal was done. 
 That House vote was the last of the session – which caused another 
controversy.  On December 28th, the Senate had voted 62-32 for a $60 
billion disaster relief bill for victims of Hurricane Sandy.264  As soon as 
the House approved the fiscal cliff deal, representatives from New York 
and New Jersey geared up for a floor debate on the bill.  In an abrupt 
about-face, though, Speaker Boehner pulled the bill.  He claimed that he 
did not want to put members through another tough vote, and others 
said the House would not have enough time to properly debate and 
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amend the Senate proposal.  Thus, the Hurricane Sandy question would 
wait until the new Congress began.265 
Republicans from New York and New Jersey publicly vented their 
fury.  Rep. Peter King called for all New Yorkers to stop donating money 
to the GOP.266  Gov. Chris Christie of New Jersey mercilessly attacked the 
House Republican leadership over the decision.267  He and Democratic 
Gov. Andrew Cuomo of New York issued a joint statement accusing the 
House of “dereliction of duty.”  The House leadership, trying to dampen 
the anger, agreed to schedule a vote – for the beginning of the 113th 
Congress. 
The 112th Congress finished with a momentous but relatively 
unproductive lame duck session.  The best that could be said about it was 
that it managed to avert a major fiscal calamity, even if it only did so by 
the skin of its teeth.  As Ezra Klein put it, “The deal almost broke apart a 
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half-dozen times for a half-dozen reasons.”268  Moreover, the deal, such as 
it was, could only postpone a “budgetary Armageddon.”  As one Politico 
analyst pointed out, “This Congress had no signature achievement – no 
Bush tax cuts, no Medicare prescription drug law, no big energy-
production law, no lobbying reform, no bank bailout, no health care 
overhaul. … The very best the 112th Congress could manage, in its last 
dying gasp, was to avert the worst.”269  The final tally of enacted laws was 
the lowest since the 48th Congress of 1883-1885: this Congress passed a 
mere 239 laws, down from 383 laws passed by the previous Congress.270  
 Those who expected the lame duck session to be the time when the 
112th Congress would turn it around and suddenly produce extensive or 
significant legislation misunderstood the strategic incentives facing each 
of the main players.  The President, emboldened by re-election, felt little 
need to compromise.  Congressional Democrats felt little sense of urgency, 
aware that their membership would increase in January, secure in the 
knowledge that their party would retain the White House, and confident 
that the American people would blame Republicans if the lame duck 
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session proved unproductive.  Congressional Republicans were divided: 
most senators were willing to strike a deal, particularly after Minority 
Leader McConnell brought one to them.  Most representatives, on the 
other hand, were far more combative and less deferential to Speaker 
Boehner (a stance made easier by the public disagreements within the 
Republican leadership). 
None of this was conducive to producing significant legislation.  
Few if any individual MCs on either side were willing to raise their heads 
above the parapet and seek a compromise with the other side.  The 
divided Congress faced high barriers to success, not least the record high 
levels of party polarization.  “It’s the worst ever in terms of what wasn’t 
done,” said political scientist Thomas Mann, “But it’s been worst too in 
the sense of what was done.”271  The most important legislation of the 
lame duck session, and one of the most significant laws of the entire 
Congress, was the deal to avoid the fiscal cliff, and even this was a deal 
that postponed rather than solved most of the problem. “The best 
economic case for the agreement,” wrote a Washington Post columnist, 
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“Appears to be that things could have been worse.” 272   The deal 
addressed neither the debt ceiling crisis nor persistently high 
unemployment rates, nor did it reform taxes or entitlements, and it did 
not even deal with several key components of the fiscal cliff itself.  “On 
almost every point,” concluded The Economist, “The deal falls short of 
already low expectations.”273 
So why did President Obama and Sen. McConnell take the deal?  In 
the first instance, it did avert some income tax increases that could have 
tipped the country back into recession.  While neither side got exactly 
what it wanted, both could walk away with some victories.  Strategically, 
Senate Republicans knew that, with the sequester and debt ceiling issues 
that have to be faced by the end of February, they would have more 
leverage in the next round of negotiations.  They calculated that even if 
the President would declare victory on New Year’s Day, they would have 
the bargaining advantage for the rest of 2013.  Meanwhile, President 
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Obama secured permanently lower taxes for low- and middle-income 
Americans while raising taxes on the wealthy, which was one of his 
signature campaign promises.  He decided that a victory now – getting 
Republicans to accept tax increases – would actually set him for further 
victories in the coming legislative battles.274 
Fraught with partisan tension and unable to meet its own 
deadlines, the 112th Congress did not have a successful lame duck session, 
as my model predicts.  A divided Washington with highly polarized 
political parties is not a favorable environment for significant lame duck 
legislation.  After the status quo election, there were not enough 
incentives for legislators to compromise and pass significant legislation, 
or much legislation at all.  In fact, it is not a far cry to suggest that without 
the artificial deadline of the fiscal cliff, this lame duck Congress might 
have done even less. 
Congress even neglected to officially adjourn.  “What a perfect 
coda for the most contentious, fired-up, hard-to-please Congress in recent 
memory,” noted one Roll Call journalist wryly.  “They couldn’t even 
formally agree on when to end things.”275 
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The last three lame duck sessions of Congress serve well as case 
studies, for each session came after a different electoral result.  In 2008, 
the session took place after an election where a Democrat was elected 
President, replacing the outgoing Republican and preparing Washington 
for unified one-party control.  Consequently, neither party was keen or 
able to do very much.  Two years later, voters rebuked the Democrats by 
shifting control of the House back to Republicans, and the imminent 
reversion to divided government spurred Democrats to pass extensive 
legislation in their last weeks of unified government.  Finally, the 2012 
lame duck session followed an election where partisan control did not 
change at all, and it proved to be one of the most contentious and least 
productive sessions of recent memory. 
 All three case studies support my theory and my model.  The 
theory is clear: Impending changes in partisan control of any part of 
Washington spur more significant legislation in lame duck sessions.  
Changes from unified to divided government lead to highly significant 
legislation; changes from divided to unified government lead to 
moderately significant legislation; a lack of any change, whether the 
status quo is unified or divided, leads to little or no significant legislation.  
The statistical models supports the theory; while the numbers seem 
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exaggerated, the predictions made for 2008, 2010, and 2012 (with pre-1994 
data) are broadly suggestive: 
 
Table 6.4 Predictions for average significance of lame duck laws 
 
Year Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
2008 10,134 11,923 11,236 20,702 
2010 24,527 26,130 23,657 25,907 
2012 -27,009 -30,781 -8,476 5,505 
 
The model is skewed to such large negative numbers primarily by the 
record levels of party polarization; expected values are also negative for 
lame duck sessions just over a hundred years ago, the last time both 
parties had such a low proportion of moderates.276  But the implication is 
clear: little significant legislation could pass in 2008, a lot should pass in 
2010, and next to nothing of significance would pass in 2012.  The model 
predicts that the 2008 lame duck session would be less significant than 
most of its predecessors, 2010 would be the most significant on record, 
and the 2012 session would be the least significant on record.  Relative to 
each other and relative to past lame duck sessions, the case studies bear 
out these predictions.  




Chapter VII: Conclusion 
i. What next for lame ducks? 
 
Steven Spielberg released his film Lincoln to American moviegoers on 
November 9th, 2012 – the beginning of the 2012 lame duck period.277  He 
felt that reactions to his film would be different after the elections, just as 
reactions to anything political are different before and after elections (as 
highlighted in the film itself).  While Lincoln received a dozen Oscar 
nominations and gave Daniel Day-Lewis his third Academy Award, the 
results of the 2012 lame duck session were less impressive.  Legislation 
passed in the 2012 session was also less significant than that of almost 
every previous lame duck session.  One of the main reasons, as this 
dissertation explains, was the status quo election that immediately 
preceded it. 
 I have examined the overall legislative output of lame duck 
sessions and how elections can play a role in determining the significance 
of that output.  Unsurprisingly, Spielberg’s Lincoln is not completely 
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accurate – in fact, one reason that 14 Democrats and a number of other 
reluctant Congressmen voted for the Amendment was that Republicans 
had just won an additional 51 seats in the 1864 elections to the House, 
which would take their majority from 85-72 to 136-38.  Everyone knew 
the incoming Congress would abolish slavery; the only question was just 
how radical a form that abolition would take.  Recalcitrant legislators 
who were lukewarm supporters of abolition at best were willing to vote 
for an amendment that they did not fully support because they believed 
that any similar amendment would pass a few months later that would 
be even further away from their ideological ideal.  The principal reason 
that the Thirteenth Amendment was passed in that lame duck session 
was that the preceding elections for the next Congress spurred greater 
action in the existing Congress. 
 This election effect is not limited to the 38th Congress of 1863-1865, 
nor to the 111th Congress of 2009-2011.  My contention is that elections 
have consequences not just for the succeeding Congress but also for the 
existing one.  They change not only the composition of the next Congress 
but the strategic calculations for the current one.  Specifically, I posit that 
changes in partisan control of the House, the Senate, and the White 
House can open the door to highly significant lame duck legislation.  
When a political party is about to lose control of one or more of those 
three levers of government, its leaders and its members have every 
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reason to enact as much legislation as they can – and make it as 
significant as they can – before that status ends. 
Several permutations of this theory follow.  When elections 
produce no change in partisan control and little change in the 
composition of Congress, whether in 1904 or 1940, there are few 
incentives for urgent action on big-ticket bills.  The most significant items 
on the legislative agenda would have been enacted nearer the beginning 
of the term, leaving Congress with only mundane bills naming bridges 
and post offices for the lame duck session.  Furthermore, any new ideas 
can wait until the next session, since Congress and the White House will 
look very similar.  Even when there are artificial legislative deadlines, as 
with the fiscal cliff in 2012, members of Congress have little incentive 
other than to avert disaster and kick the larger can down the road. 
Such calculations change if voters elect a new party to control 
Washington.  In a divided government that is about to shift to unified 
partisan control, as in 1912 or 2008, the losing party has an incentive to 
compromise on significant issues.  This way, they take them off the 
legislative agenda for the next Congress and preclude action that would 
be even further away from their ideological goals.  Moreover, the lame 
duck session becomes the last chance for the losing party to exert 
significant influence over the legislation that passes.  As for the winning 
party, its leaders might be more willing to compromise now that the 
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election is over, and the certainty of getting 75% of what you want now is 
often preferable to the possibility of getting more at some point in the 
future.  After all, that is the way that most legislation is passed, whether 
in regular or lame duck sessions. 
In a unified government about to become divided, as exemplified 
by the post-election periods of 1980 and 2010, there is an even greater 
sense of urgency among leaders and members of the party in control.  
Unsure of when they will retake the reins of government, the lame duck 
session becomes the last chance to enact legislation.  Whatever they have 
not done yet, they realize after losing an election that now is the time. 
One factor in just how significant the lame duck session becomes 
on such an occasion is the length of time that the outgoing majority party 
has been in control.  If a party has held unified control for several terms, 
as in 1910, they will almost certainly have passed all the major items on 
their legislative agenda.  But odds are that a party that has only enjoyed 
complete control of Washington for just one term, as in 2010, will still 
have a lot on its plate.  The combination of a large outstanding agenda 
and the looming loss of power is a compelling spur to action on 
significant legislation. 
Another potential factor in spurring or precluding action is party 
polarization.  The polarization measure reflects party unity scores and the 
gap between parties’ ideological means.  When party polarization is high, 
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a unified government about to lose power has an even greater incentive 
to enact significant legislation, for it may fear the serious repercussions of 
an ideologically extreme opposition about to take power.  When 
polarization is low, the sense of urgency is lessened by the knowledge 
that the parties will still be able to work together once the majority and 
minority roles are reversed.  Conversely, low polarization should 
dampen the effect in a lame duck session under a divided government, as 
in 1970, for the parties can already work together even if they do not see 
eye-to-eye on everything.  But when an ideological chasm opens up 
between the parties, as it has in the last several years, then divided 
government is a recipe for gridlock in lame duck sessions (and probably 
also in regular sessions). 
One intriguing contribution to the literature stemming from this 
research is that there is an election mandate but it can have a hitherto 
unnoticed effect.  An incoming government can claim a mandate from the 
people to push through important legislation and point the country in a 
new direction.  However, the mandate can lead to a significant last gasp 
of the ancién regime.  The perception of a popular mandate for one party 
that is about take over can have the opposite effect in the intervening lame 
duck session, leading the losing party to enact more significant legislation 
than it would have passed if it had won the election.  If there is a single 
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conclusion that might prove worrying in the larger terms of 
representation and democracy, this is it. 
 
 
ii. Final thoughts and suggestions for further research 
 
 This dissertation has explored legislative outputs across lame duck 
sessions.  By putting data on legislative significance in the context of 
election results and partisanship, I have shown how elections affect the 
productivity and significance of legislation passed in lame duck sessions.  
This adds a new dimension to the existing literature on individual-level 
changes in voting behavior during lame duck sessions and specific case 
studies of important votes held during the lame duck period. 
The statistical models I have created to incorporate elections, 
polarization, and time have verified my expectations about lame duck 
sessions.  I have shown that a party about to lose power does enact more 
significant legislation on its way out the door, particularly in a highly-
charged political atmosphere when it has only exercised power for a 
relatively short time.  Moreover, my models rely on data that covers the 
period before 1995, but they predict the legislative output of lame duck 
sessions that have taken place since then.  For example, as my model 
would have predicted, the 2010 lame duck session was extraordinarily 
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productive, while the 2012 lame duck session was only successful in that 
it averted (barely and temporarily) the catastrophe of the fiscal cliff.  I am 
hopeful that the models will prove equally accurate in predicting the 
many lame duck sessions to come. 
 Some potential research questions emerge from this work.  On the 
comparative front, research on lame ducks could be extended to foreign 
countries.  In most parliamentary systems, leaders repudiated at the polls 
leave office immediately, but in some presidential systems, there can be a 
significant time lag between being elected and taking office.  In Mexico, 
for example, the current Congress and President were elected on July 2, 
2006 but did not take office until September 1 and December 1, 
respectively.  How do elections there and in other such countries affect 
the quantity and significance of lame duck legislation? 
On the domestic side, while the implications for the strategic 
behavior of party leaders seem clear, their incentives could be explored 
through personal interviews.  Public pronouncements during lame duck 
sessions on the party of the President and Congressional leaders could be 
systematically analyzed to find how public rhetoric affects private 
negotiations over key legislation.  Once the ranking of significance is 
extended to include laws passed since 1995, the data should be added to 
the models here to see what, if anything, has changed. 
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 Indeed, the theme of change and continuity runs through this 
research.  Concerns about lame duck members have existed since 1800, if 
not earlier, so some things have not changed when it comes to the public 
perceptions of political intrigue.  The waxing and waning of partisan 
polarization has meant changes in the tone of lame duck sessions; where 
once they were seen as a time to pass either minor or unfinished laws, 
now they are seen by the opposition party as undemocratic attempts to 
subvert the will of the people. 
 Ironically, just when some politicians have begun to raise questions 
about the representative elements of lame duck sessions (or lack thereof), 
it seems that lame duck sessions have returned to their traditional place 
in the biannual congressional calendar.  In that sense, the Twentieth 
Amendment, which sought to end lame duck sessions, has ultimately 
failed.  It now seems that lame duck sessions are back to stay and will 
become increasingly seen as a mere extension of the regular session so 
long as the legislative agenda continues to expand but the legislative 
process is not streamlined.  Unless and until party polarization returns to 
lower levels, the partisan rancor of regular sessions will continue to spill 
over into lame duck sessions.  Eventually, they may be almost 
indistinguishable from regular sessions. 
 “Almost” is the operative word, for there will still be one element 
that can change the political calculus in lame duck sessions: elections.  If 
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trends from recent decades are any indication, Washington will see 
frequent changes in partisan control in the coming decades.  And if high 
levels of party polarization remain, then those changes in control will 
create more incentives for leaders to schedule key votes and try to enact 
more significant legislation in lame duck sessions. 
“It’s a myth that lame-duck sessions are these miraculous periods” 
where lawmakers are freed from normal constraints and change 
behavior, said Sarah Binder in November 2012. 278  Post-election sessions, 
she added, generally do not differ much in terms of legislative dynamics 
or output from previous months.  But on occasion, when elections break 
against the parties in power, the dynamics and output can change very 
much.  My research suggests that lame duck sessions can become 
“miraculous” periods if the electoral and partisan conditions are right. 
Commentator Ed Rogers puts it another way: 
 
“As Sir Isaac Newton would have said if he were a pol, 
‘A government at rest will remain at rest 
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Appendix 1. Landmark laws 1789-2002 as compiled by Mayhew, Landsberg, Dell, and Stathis 
 
Year Month Day Law Public Law Book Stat.at.Large 
       
1789 7 4 Tariff Act of 1789  1 24-27 
1789 9 24 Judiciary Act of 1789  1 73-93 
1790 3 26 Uniform Rule of Naturalization  1 103-104 
1790 4 10 First Patent Law  1 109-112 
1790 5 31 First Copyright Law  1 124-126 
1791 2 25 First Bank of the United States incorporated  1 191-196 
1792 4 2 First U.S. Mint  1 246-251 
1793 2 12 Fugitive Slave Act  1 302-305 
1798 6 18 Naturalization Act (Alien and Sedition Act I)  1 566-569 
1798 6 25 Alien Act (Alien and Sedition Act II)  1 570-572 
1798 7 6 Alien Enemies Act (Alien and Sedition Act III)  1 577-578 
1798 7 14 Sedition Act (Alien and Sedition Act IV)  1 596-597 
1801 2 13 Judiciary Act of 1801  2 89-100 
1807 3 2 Slave Trade Prohibition Act  2 426-430 
1809 3 1 Nonintercourse Act (repealed 1807 Embargo Act)  2 528-533 
1820 3 6 Missouri Compromise of 1820  3 545-548 
1830 5 28 Indian Removal Act  4 411-412 
1850 9 9 California statehood  9 452-453 
1850 9 9 Texas and New Mexico Act  9 446-452 
1850 9 9 Utah territory  9 453-458 
1850 9 18 Fugitive Slave Act  9 462-465 
1850 9 20 DC Slave Trade Act  9 467-468 
 
Year Month Day Law Public Law Book Stat.at.Large 
       
1854 5 30 Kansas-Nebraska Act  10 277-290 
1861 8 6 First Slave Confiscation Act  12 319 
1862 5 20 Homestead Act  12 392-394 
1862 7 2 Morrill Land-Grant College Act  12 503-505 
1862 7 17 Second Slave Confiscation Act  12 589-592 
1863 3 3 Conscription Act  12 731-737 
1866 4 9 Civil Rights Act of 1866  14 27-30 
1867 3 2 First Reconstruction Act  14 428-430 
1867 3 23 Second Reconstruction Act  15 2-5 
1867 7 19 Third Reconstruction Act  15 14-16 
1868 3 11 Fourth Reconstruction Act  15 41 
1870 5 31 First Force Act (First KKK Act)  16 140-146 
1871 2 28 Second Force Act (Second KKK Act)  16 433-440 
1871 4 20 Third Force Act (Third KKK Act)  17 13-15 
1872 3 1 Yellowstone National Park Act  17 32-33 
1873 2 12 Coinage Act of 1873  17 424-436 
1875 3 1 Civil Rights Act of 1875  18 335-337 
1878 2 28 Bland-Allison Act  20 25-26 
1878 6 18 Posse Comitatus Act (Army Appropriation Bill of 1878)  20 152, Sec. 15 
1882 5 6 Chinese Exclusion Act  22 58-61 
1883 1 16 Pendleton Act  22 403-407 
1887 2 4 Interstate Commerce Act  24 379-387 
1887 2 8 Dawes General Allotment (Severalty) Act  24 388-391 
1890 7 2 Sherman Anti-Trust Act  26 209-210 
1894 8 27 Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act  28 509-570 
1900 3 14 Gold Standard Act of 1900 (Currency Act of 1900)  31 45-50 
 
Year Month Day Law Public Law Book Stat.at.Large 
       
1902 6 17 Newlands Reclamation Act  32 388-390 
1902 6 28 Spooner (Isthmus Canal) Act  32 481-484 
1906 6 8 American Antiquities Act of 1906  34 225 
1906 6 30 Pure Food and Drug Act  34 768-772 
1909 8 5 Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act  36 11-118 
1910 6 25 Mann Act (White Slave Traffic Act)  36 825-827 
1913 10 3 Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act  38 114-202 
1913 12 23 Federal Reserve Bank Act (Owen-Glass Act)  38 251-275 
1914 9 26 Federal Trade Commission Act  38 717-724 
1914 10 15 Clayton Anti-Trust Act  38 730-740 
1916 8 25 National Park Service established  39 535-536 
1916 9 1 Keating-Owen Child Labor Act  39 675-676 
1917 2 23 Smith-Hughes (Vocational Education) Act  39 929-936 
1917 5 18 Selective Service Act  40 76-83 
1917 6 15 Espionage Act  40 217-231 
1917 10 6 Trading with the Enemy Act  40 411-426 
1918 5 16 Sedition Act  40 553-554 
1919 10 28 National Prohibition Act (Volstead Act)  41 305-323 
1920 2 25 Mineral Leasing Act of 1920  41 437-451 
1920 6 5 Jones Merchant Marine Act  41 988-1008 
1924 5 19 Soldiers Bonus Act 120 43 121-131 
1930 6 17 Smoot-Hawley Tariff 361 46 590-763 
1932 7 22 Federal Home Loan Bank Act 304 47 725-741 
1933 5 12 Agricultural Adjustment Act 10 48 31-54 
1933 5 18 Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933 17 48 58-72 
1933 5 27 Federal Securities Act of 1933 22 48 74-95 
 
Year Month Day Law Public Law Book Stat.at.Large 
       
1933 6 16 Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act) 66 48 162-195 
1933 6 16 National Industrial Recovery Act 67 48 195-211 
1934 1 30 Gold Reserve Act of 1934 87 48 337-344 
1934 6 6 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 291 48 881-909 
1934 6 18 Indian Reorganization Act 383 48 984-988 
1934 6 19 Communications Act of 1934 416 48 1064-1105 
1935 7 5 Wagner-Connery National Labor Relations Act 198 49 449-457 
1935 8 9 Motor Carrier Act of 1935 255 49 543-567 
1935 8 14 Social Security Act 271 49 620-648 
1935 8 26 Wheeler-Rayburn Public Utility Holding Company Act 333 49 803-863 
1935 8 31 Neutrality Act of 1935 67 (Pub. Res.) 49 1081-1085 
1937 9 1 U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (Wagner-Steagall Act) 412 50 888-899 
1938 6 25 Federal Fair Labor Standards Act 718 52 1060-1069 
1938 6 25 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 717 52 1040-1059 
1939 8 2 Hatch Act 252 53 1147-1149 
1939 11 4 Neutrality Act of 1939 54 (Pub. Res.) 54 4-12 
1941 3 11 Lend-Lease Act 11 55 31-33 
1946 2 20 Employment Act of 1946 304 60 23-26 
1946 6 4 National School Lunch Act of 1946 396 60 230-234 
1946 8 1 Atomic Energy Act 585 60 755-775 
1946 8 13 Hill-Burton Hospital Survey and Construction Act 725 60 1040-1049 
1947 6 23 Taft-Hartley Labor Management Relations Act 101 61 136-162 
1947 7 26 National Security Act 253 61 495-510 
1948 4 3 Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 (Marshall Plan) 472 62 137-159 
1951 10 10 Mutual Security Act of 1951 165 65 373-387 
 
Year Month Day Law Public Law Book Stat.at.Large 
       
1952 6 27 McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act 414 66 163-282 
1953 7 30 Small Business Administration Act 163 67 230-240 
1953 8 7 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 212 67 462-471 
1954 8 2 Housing Act of 1954 560 68 590-648 
1954 8 16 Internal Revenue Code of 1954  591 68 1-928 
1954 8 24 Communist Control Act of 1954 637 68 775-780 
1957 9 9 Civil Rights Act of 1957 85-315 71 349-351 
1958 7 29 NASA Act of 1958 85-568 72 426-438 
1961 9 22 Peace Corps established 87-293 75 612-627 
1961 9 26 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency created 87-297 75 631-639 
1963 6 10 Equal Pay Act of 1963 88-38 77 56-57 
1964 7 2 Civil Rights Act of 1964 88-352 78 241-268 
1964 7 9 Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 88-365 78 302-308 
1964 8 20 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 88-452 78 508-534 
1964 8 31 Food Stamp Act of 1964 88-525 78 703-709 
1965 4 11 Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 89-10 79 27-58 
1965 7 30 Social Security Amendments of 1965  89-97 79 286-353 
1965 8 6 Voting Rights Act of 1965 89-110 79 437-446 
1965 9 9 HUD Act of 1965  89-174 79 667-671 
1965 11 8 Higher Education Act of 1965 89-329 79 1219-1270 
1966 7 4 Freedom of Information Act 89-487 80 250-251 
1966 9 9 Highway Safety Act of 1966 89-564 80 731-737 
1967 11 7 Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 90-129 81 365-373 
1968 5 29 Consumer Credit Protection Act  90-321 82 146-147 
1968 6 19 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 90-351 82 197-239 
1968 10 22 Gun Control Act of 1968 90-351 82 1213-1236 
 
Year Month Day Law Public Law Book Stat.at.Large 
       
1970 1 1 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 91-190 83 852-856 
1970 10 27 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 91-513 84 1236-1296 
1970 10 30 Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 91-518 84 1327-1342 
1970 12 29 OSHA Act of 1970 95-596 84 1590-1620 
1971 12 18 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 92-203 85 688-716 
1972 2 7 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 92-225 86 3-20 
1973 11 7 War Powers Act 93-148 87 555-560 
1973 12 28 Endangered Species Act of 1973 93-205 87 884-903 
1974 7 12 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act 93-344 88 297-339 
1974 7 25 Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974 93-355 88 378-390 
1974 9 2 Employment Retirement Income Security Act 93-406 88 829-1035 
1975 1 3 Trade Act of 1974 93-618 88 1978-2076 
1976 3 23 Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976 94-239 90 251-255 
1976 9 13 Government in the Sunshine Act 94-409 90 1241-1248 
1976 10 19 Copyright law revision of 1976 94-553 90 2541-2602 
1977 8 3 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 95-87 91 445-532 
1977 8 4 Department of Energy established 95-91 91 565-613 
1977 10 28 Indochinese Refugees, Permanent Residence Status, Adjustment and Refugee Assistance Extension 91 1223-1225 
1978 10 13 Civil Service Reform Act 95-454 92 1111-1227 
1978 10 26 Ethics in Government Act of 1978 95-521 92 1824-1885 
1978 10 31 Pregnancy, Sex Discrimination Prohibition Act of 1978 95-555 92 2076-2077 
1980 10 14 Staggers Rail Act 96-448 94 1895-1966 
1980 12 11 Comp. Env. Response, Compensation, Liability (Superfund) 96-510 94 2767-2811 
1980 12 11 Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 96-511 94 2812-2826 
1983 1 7 Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (repository act) 97-425 96 2201-2263 
 
Year Month Day Law Public Law Book Stat.at.Large 
       
1986 10 22 Tax Reform Act of 1986 99-514 100 2085-2963 
1993 2 5 Family and Medical Leave Act 103-3 107 6-29 
1993 11 30 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act 103-159 107 1536-1546 
1993 12 8 North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 103-182 107 2057-2225 
1996 2 8 Telecommunications Act of 1996 104-104 110 56-161 
1996 8 3 Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 104-170 110 1489-1538 
1996 8 22 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 104-193 110 2105-2355 
2001 10 26 USA Patriot Act 107-56 115 272-402 
2002 1 8 No Child Left Bhind Act of 2001 107-110 115 1425-2094 




Appendix 2. Fifty most significant laws passed in lame duck sessions, 1877-1996, from Clinton and Lapinski dataset 
Year Month Day Description 
1879 3 3 U.S. Geological Survey established 
1883 1 16 Pendleton Act 
1883 3 3 Mongrel Tariff of 1883 
1885 2 26 Contract Labor Act 
1887 2 3 Electoral Count Act 
1887 2 4 Interstate Commerce Act 
1887 2 8 Dawes General Allotment (Severalty) Act 
1887 3 2 Hatch Experiment Station Act 
1887 3 3 Tenure of Office Act Repealed 
1889 2 9 Department of Agriculture Act 
1889 2 22 Dakota, Montana, Washington Enabling Act 
1891 3 3 International Copyright Act 
1891 3 3 Court of Appeals Act 
1891 3 3 General Land Revision Act of 1891 
1891 3 3 Immigration Act of 1891 
1893 3 2 Railway Safety Appliance Act of 1893 
1901 3 2 Platt and Spooner Amendments 
1903 1 21 Militia Act of 1903 
1903 2 11 Expedition Act 
1903 2 14 Department of Commerce and Labor Act 
1903 2 14 General Staff Act of 1903 
1903 2 19 Elkins Act 
1903 3 3 Alien Immigration Act of 1903 
1907 2 20 Alien Immigration Act of 1907 
1911 3 1 Weeks Forest Purchase Act 
 
Year Month Day Description 
    
1913 3 1 Commerce Act Amendments 
1913 3 1 Webb-Kenyon Act 
1913 3 4 An Act To create a Department of Labor. 
1915 3 4 Seamen's Act of 1915 
1917 2 5 Immigration Act of 1917 
1917 2 23 Smith-Hughes (Vocational Education) Act 
1923 3 4 Agricultural Credits Act 
1927 2 23 Radio Control Act 
1928 12 21 Boulder Canyon Project Act 
1929 2 13 Naval Construction Act of 1929 
1933 1 17 Tydings-McDuffie Philippines Act 
1933 2 20 21st Amendment 
1942 11 13 Teenage Draft Act of 1942 
1970 11 30 Agricultural Act of 1970 
1970 12 29 OSHA Act of 1970 
1970 12 31 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 
1971 1 2 Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 
1971 1 11 Food Stamp Act of 1970 
1974 11 21 FOI Act Amendments of 1974 
1974 11 26 National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974 
1975 1 3 Trade Act of 1974 
1980 12 2 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 
1980 12 11 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, Liability (Superfund) 
1983 1 6 Surface Transportation Assistance Act 
1994 12 8 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Implementation Act 
  
 
Appendix 3. Full regression statistics for Table 5.1 
 
Hypothesis Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
      control Unified -15,241*** -12,159*** -9,121** 3,505* 
  
(3,228) (3,224) (3,014) (1,610) 
control President (D) -1,699* -3,619*** -1,741* -3,613*** 
  
(936) (912) (764) (542) 
control Senate (D) -17,721*** -10,249*** -6,480*** -4,135*** 
  
(2,126) (966) (845) (726) 
control House (D) 17,632*** 10,084*** 6,923*** 8,377*** 
  
(1,647) (1,452) (1,324) (973) 
control Senate: % of President's Party -34,940*** -45,052***   
  
(5,482) (5,376)   
control House: % of President's Party 11,050** 17,688***   
  
(3,902) (3,841)   
control Senate: Ideological mean (DW) -25,143*** -45,861*** -14,743***  
  
(6,623) (6,175) (4,138)  
control House: Ideological mean (DW) -2,546 5,159 6,619  
  
(4,901) (4,840) (4,491)  
control Senate: Difference between party means (DW) -22,440*** -7,912 -3,135  
  
(6,552) (6,351) (6,096)  
control House: Difference between party means (DW) -4,494 -20,203** -19,120**  
  
(7,062) (6,844) (6,390)  
control IAT: Senate means difference * Unified -49,262*** -68,679*** -64,380*** -60,799*** 
  
(14,010) (13,891) (11,962) (10,029) 
control IAT: House means difference * Unified 68,159*** 87,644*** 70,255*** 47,858*** 
  
(13,185) (13,047) (11,472) (9,428) 
H1 Change coming in the President 2,812*** 3,372*** 3,790*** 3,888*** 
  
(502) (500) (497) (461) 
 
Hypothesis Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
      
H1 Change coming in the President's Party -1,319 -6,005*** -4,957*** -5,225*** 
  
(1,379) (1,267) (1,192) (1,086) 
control Change coming in House: control -13,612*** -18,841*** -7,877*** -7,957*** 
  
(2,000) (1,910) (1,412) (1,088) 
control Change coming in Senate: control -7,538*** -10,026*** -7,337*** -9,666*** 
  
(1,239) (1,209) (1,066) (891) 
control Change coming in Senate: % of President's Party -24,490** -58,680***   
  
(8,060) (6,983)   control Change coming in House: % of President's Party -4,996 14,869***   
  
(3,670) (2,812)   
control Change over 2 years: overall control -4,388***    
  
(525)    H2 Change from divided government 16,488*** 18,302*** 6,093*** 6,297*** 
  
(2,214) (2,215) (1,692) (1,399) 
H3 Change from unified government 31,352*** 31,571*** 22,517*** 24,727*** 
  
(3,396) (3,415) (2,689) (2,357) 
H4 Number of sessions under unified control 587** 1,222*** 555*** 549*** 
  
(198) (184) (156) (146) 
H4 IAT: change from unified * # of unified sessions -3,286*** -3,384*** -3,039*** -3,411*** 
  
(342) (344) (302) (294) 
 
Constant 43,184*** 41,212*** 26,951*** 11,500*** 
  
(4,351) (4,368) (3,239) (781) 
      
 
Adjusted R2 0.0926 0.0828 0.0703 0.0659 
 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
N = 6419 
  
 
Appendix 4. Partisan breakdown of top laws, total laws, and sessions 
 
Top 3000 Laws Democratic Congress Mixed Congress Republican Congress 
Democratic President 1,306 (52 lame, 24cfu) 25 (11 lame, 3 cfd) 101 (6 lame, 6 cfd) 
Republican President 732 (50 lame, 0 cfd) 328 (55 lame, 28 cfd) 510 (162 lame, 49 cfu) 
 
Top 500 Laws Democratic Congress Mixed Congress Republican Congress 
Democratic President 251 (7 lame, 3 cfu) 10 (6 lame, 1 cfd) 13 (0 lame) 
Republican President 90 (8 lame, 0 cfd) 42 (8 lame, 6 cfd) 95 (18 lame, 7 cfu) 
 
Top 30 Laws Democratic Congress Mixed Congress Republican Congress 
Democratic President 17 (0 lame) 1 (1 lame) 1 (0 lame) 
Republican President 0 2 (0 lame) 9 (1 lame, 1 cfu) 
 
Total Laws Democratic Congress Mixed Congress Republican Congress 
Democratic President 13,563 (35.9%) 991 (2.6%) 1,812 (4.8%) 
Republican President 7,569 (20.0%) 3,793 (10.0%) 10,039 (26.6%) 
 
Total Sessions  Democratic Congress Mixed Congress Republican Congress 
Democratic President 20 (33.9%) 2 (3.4%) 3 (5.1%) 
Republican President 11 (18.6%) 8 (13.6%) 15 (25.4%) 
 
Total Laws - LD Democratic Congress Mixed Congress Republican Congress 
Democratic President 891 (13.9%), 406 cfu 385 (6.0%), 178 cfd 297 (4.6%), 297 cfu 
Republican President 381 (5.9%), 57 cfd 808 (12.6%), 459 cfd 3657 (57.0%), 883 cfu 
 
Total Sessions - LD Democratic Congress Mixed Congress Republican Congress 
Democratic President 8 (4 cfu) (24.2%) 2 (1 cfd) (6.1%) 1 (1 cfd) (3.0%) 
Republican President 3 (1 cfd) (9.1%) 6 (3 cfd) (18.2%) 13 (4 cfu) (39.4%) 
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